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ABSTRACT
In contrast to the image of inefficiency and stagnation that came
to define Indian manufacturing throughout the 1970s and 1980s,
Ludhiana's small-firm led industrial base has shown remarkable growth
and resilience. It not only grew at rates higher than the national
average throughout the post-independence period, but withstood severe
downturns in nearly every decade of Punjab's post-1947 industrial
history--including a decade long violent separatist movement in the
1980s. This study is an attempt to understand how, and under what
conditions, these small, capital constrained firms learned to improve
their performance, and over time came to dominate national markets in
the key sectors in which they specialized--bicycles, sewing machines,
auto-parts, simple machinery, and agricultural implements
On the face of it, this region has neither the high-technology,
high wage features idealized by studies of regions like the Third
Italy, nor the engineer-based, state guided economic structure
exemplified by the East Asian successes. Yet, it borrows elements
from both models: firms in the region combine an ability to find new,
highly economical ways of producing standard goods, with an ability to
constantly learn through reverse engineering, and upgrade and revise
their skill-base and production processes.
This ability derives in part from ongoing interaction between
three elements: (i) A skilled workforce with diverse paths of skill
acquisition, and a knowledge-base built around the mechanic's
practical skills, not the engineer's. (ii) State policies that
historically shaped the conditions of accumulation in the region by
encouraging (vocational) skill formation, indirectly generating demand
for local firms early in the region's industrial history, and
providing cheap and extensive physical infrastructure throughout the
state--roads, rail networks, cheap power, water, serviced land and
communication links. (iii) Inter-firm relations that produced, over
time, institutions and arrangements chat enabl&A local firms to
conserve capital; search out new avenues of demand on an ongoing
basis; get cheap and customized feedback from each other; and from a
variety of sources given the extensive spread of technicians' skills
in the region (e.g, from mechanics, assemblers, distributors,
government bureaucrats and users as a "class"--not only a particular
user); and to constantly expose themselves to outside standards
towards which they could build.
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INTRODUCTION
The literature on Punjab evokes two powerful images that are
at odds with each other: first, a state ensconced in the
development literature since the mid-1960s as an agricultural
star performer, the hub of India's green revolution, and a model
for other states to follow. Second, since the 1980s, as the site
of one of India's most violent separatist struggles. The
association of Punjab with its agricultural successes on the one
hand, and recent political turmoil on the other, has virtually
eclipsed from analysis its other key story. That Punjab has
experienced quite sustained and dynamic industrial growth led by
small and medium firms.
Until recently, however, the prevalent view among observers
inside and outside the state has been that Punjab is industrially
"backward" and "lagging" compared to industrial states such as
Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu (Johar and Khanna 1983,
Singh M. 1990, Government of India interviews, 1992). According
to this view Punjab's industry is lagging because unlike the
advanced states which have some of the country's largest and most
sophisticated industries, Punjab's industry is dominated by small
enterprises; it has very few large firms; very few public sector
parastatals; ve::y little direct industrial investment from public
or private sources outside the state, espciaily in core sectors
such as heavy engineering, aeronautics, telecommunications or
automobiles; and its industrial sector contributes less to state
income than the national average.'
Contradicting this negative portrayal, however, is a stream
of evidence that is starkly at odds with labels of backwardness.
Punjab's industrial base, dominated as it is by small and medium
firms, has come to exercise significant command over national
markets in the sectors in which it specializes--woollen hosiery,
metal based manufacturing goods such as bicycles, sewing
machines, agricultural implements, auto-parts, and machinery
(Pathak 1970, Frndit 1985, Dascupta 1989, Taub and Taub 1989).
Over 4/5ths of the nation's output of woollen hosiery and over
2/3rds of its bicycles and parts production comes from this
region (Pandit 1985, Singh S.1990). According to some estimates,
nearly 20% of the non-communist world's export of bicycle parts
originates in Punjab (Dasgupta 1989:65). Equally important,
Punjab's industrial base has shown impressive resilience and
growth in the face of severe political instability in the state
over the past decades, including the intense disruption caused by
separatist violence that raged in the state throughout the 1980s,
up to the early 1990s.
This evidence of resilience and sustained industrial growth
is clearly at odds with the neglect in the literature of Punjab's
industrial story, and the views of industrial weakness associated
Tn 1990-91 the secondary sector in India contributed 29% to
Gross Domestic Product (GDP at factor cost in current prices)
compared to 23.2% by Punjab's secondary sector to Gross State
Domestic Product (GSDP). Punjab's highly productive primary sector
contributed 44.5% to GSDP in the same year, compared to 31% for the
nation as a whole (Statistical Outline of India 1992:201, and
Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1992:102-103).
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with the state. 2 This gap between the evidence and the labels,
I argue, is more because the character of Punjab's industrial
success and several of the features that account for it, do not
fit the standard analytical accounts of industrial success, nor
the path followed by the most industrially advanced parts of
India--Maharashtra, Gujarat, Bengal.
The more visible differences between Punjab and the standard
industrial picture are as described by the critics cited above:
the region has mostly small firms instead of the large and
sophisticated corporations that lead industrial growth in other
parts of India; it has little public sector investment; and its
firms specialize in products that are neither traditional, nor
fit into a high-tech niche; there are no traditionally wealthy
industrial families or business houses that control investment,
nor is there an obvious or direct flow of wealth from the
agricultural sector to industry.
This study looks underneath these visible differences to
build an understanding of the diverse processes by which the
region's predominantly small firms accumulate capital, acquire
and deploy skill, build markets, and endure through political
turbulence.3 The present study, thus, centers around the lesser
2 Only recently have some studies begun to regard Punjab as
one of India's "newly industrializing" states (Vepa 1993).
3 Punjab's industrial trajectory is different from standard
models of growth, but hardly unique. Howrah, Rajkot, Tirrupur and
Coimbatore are four regions in India alone that resemble it, and
the growing literature on small and medium firm led regional growth
documents several comparable cases. See Tendler and Amorim 1996,
Schmitz 1995, Cawthorne 1990, and the work on resurgent regions in
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known story of Punjab's industrial success, and the lessons it
offers about dynamism in a region dominated by small firms.
Focussing on nearly seven decades of small-firm based industrial
growth in Punjab, the study attempts to understand how and under
what conditions small local firms managed to command a sustained
foothold in national and international markets, and grow despite
an environment of political instability. The illustrative case
at the center of analysis is Punjab's metal-based manufacturing
industry concentrated in Ludhiana district.4
The Case:
Four hours by road from New Delhi, and well connected to all
parts of Punjab by an extensive road and rail network, Ludhiana5
is situated along the legendary Grand Trunk Road that linked
trade centers from Calcutta in the east, to the Afghan border in
the Northwest in the 16th century. Teeming with thousands of
manufacturing units producing woollen hosiery and metal based
Europe and the US that inspired some of this work (Piore and Sabel
1984, Pyke et. al 1990).
4 The term "district" in Indi"- refers to an administrative
subdivision within a state. Each district has urban and rural
jurisdictions, comprising of towns, cities and villages. Punjab,
with a population of 20.2 million, has 12 districts of which
Ludhiana is one. Ludhiana district, with a population of 2.4
million, has one metropolis (Ludhiana city, with 1.01 million
people), 9 towns, and about 984 villages. (Population figures are
for 1991.)
s Most of the field work for this study was carried out in
Ludhiana city, the capital of Ludhiana district. The city is part
of a network of industrial towns, a contiguous set of industrial
agglomerations that stretch around it and which specialize in
specific goods and services ranging from steel re-rolling, to
bicycles, sewing machines, sports goods, surgical instruments and
hand-tools.
engineering goods, Ludhiana region is Punjab's industrial core.
Occupying 8% of Punjab's area, with 12% of its population,
Ludhiana accounts for 21% (33,176) of Punjab's small firms, 22%
(82) of its large firms, 26% of its total industrial output, and
in 1991, accounted for 52% of Punjab's industrial exports
(Industrial Abstract of Punjab, 1992:402, 579).6 With a daily
factory employment of 55 workers per 1000 population, compared to
19 for Punjab and 11 for India as a whole, Ludhiana district is
,learly Punjab's industrial hub. Tables 1.1 (a) and 1.1 (b)
compare Punjab's main indicators with four of India's most
industrialized states (Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, West
Bengal) and with Kerala, a state regarded as socially developed
but lagging industrially, and the national average. Punjab has
the highest per capita income among all states in the country and
the lowest percentage of population under poverty. With a long
history of land-reform (since the early nineteenth century, when
the eighteenth-century ruler, Ranjit Singh, redistributed land
rights to the tiller in much of central Punjab, followed by
Colonial reforms in the late nineteenth century and further
reforms in the 1950s), Punjab's land distribution is relatively
less unequal compared to several other states, and is reflected
by a low Gini coefficient of 0.24 (Sims 1988:34). The region's
6 If only registered firms with 10 employees or more are
considered, Ludhiana has an even larger share of Punjab's
industrial base. It has 33% of Punjab's registered factories and
37% of the workers employed in these factories (Statistical
Abstract of Punjab 1992).
social indicators, while not as spectacular as Kerala's, are
better than the national average.
Table 1.1 (a)
Area, population, density and literacy in Ludhiana district
(1991)
Region Area Population Density % Urban Literacy
in Sq.Km in millions per sq.km Populn. (%)
Ludhiana 3,857 2.4 629 50% 58%
(as % of (8%) (12%) (157%)
Punjab)
Source: Industrial Abstract of Punjab 1992:82-83
Table 1.1 (b)
Per-capita income, area, population, density, and literacy in
selected states (1990-91)
State Per capita % Urban % Populn. Density Literacy
Income in Poluln. below per (%)
Current Rs. Poverty# Sq. Km.
Punjab 8423.00 30% 7% 401 57%
Maharashtra 7409.00 39% 29% 256 63%
Gujarat 5404.00* 34% 18% 210 61%
West Bengal 4193.00 27% 28% 766 58%
Tamil Nadu 3894.00* 34% 33% 428 64%
Kerala 3451.00* 26% 17% 747 91%
All India Avg. 4934.00 26% 30% 267 52%
Source: Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1992:118-119, and
calculated from Table 3.19 pp. 82-83.
* 1989-90 figures
# 1987-88 figures (Statistical Outline of India 1992:28)
Note: Goa state had higher per capita income than Punjab (Rs.
3169.00) in 1980-81. 1990-91 figures are not available.
Per capita income in Rupees at current prices.
Table 1.2 (a)
Registered small-scale firms in Ludhiana and Punjab, 1991
Ludhiana Punjab India*
No. of units 33,176 160,368 582,368
Employees 209,277 668,845 3,665,810
Workers/unit 6 4 6
Source: Calculated from Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1992, and
data from the District Industries Center, Ludhiana, 1992.
* 1988 data.
Table 1.2 (b)
Ludhiana is Punjab's industrial hub: Distribution of registered
large and small firms and their workers in Ludhiana and Punjab
(1991):
Ludhiana (%) Punjab Ludhiana as
% of Punjab
Total firms 33,258 100% 160,741 21%
Small firms 33,176 >99% 160,368 21%
Large firms 82 0.3% 373 22%
Employment in small 209,277 82% 668,845 31.3%
Employment in large 45,495 18% 187,311 24.3%
Industrial Exports* 4,537.5 -- 8,663.04 52.4%
(Overseas)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1992:402, 403, 579.
-1 Value of exports in (current) millions of Rupees.
(Figures for industrial exports from Punjab to other Indian
states available only in quantity terms [1009 thousand quintals
by rail in 1991] and therefore not included in table).
Table 1.3
Comparative data from the Second All-India Census of small-scale
registered industries in 1988.
Ludhiana Punjab India
Employment/unit 7 5 6
Fixed capital
per unit* 362.0 125.0 160.0
Working capital 303.0 99.0 125.0
per unit*
Output/unit* 829.0 612.0 738.0
Source: Second All-India Census of Small-Scale Industrial Units,
registered up to 1988. (1992). (All-India Volume:pp. T-75, T-76;
Punjab Volume I:pp. 28-29).
* Output, fixed and working capital are in thousands of Rupees.
As Table 1.2 and 1.3 indicate, small firms dominate both
Ludhiana and Punjab industrial structure, but Ludhiana's small
firms are, on average, slightly larger, more capitalized, and
generate more output per firm than do Punjab's or India's small
firms taken as a whole. However, Ludhiana district is not only
the urban, industrial core of a prosperous agrarian state, it
simultaneously has a very dynamic agricultural base of its own as
Tables 1.4 through 1.6 indicate,7 and has historically been one
of Punjab's best performing districts.
7 Ludhiana is widely regarded as Punjab's best performing
agricultural district. As a researcher observed, if Punjab is the
state in India that is "most closely identified with the gains of
the green revolution, then within Punjab, no district is more
enthusiastically advanced as a model for emulation... than Ludhiana
(Frankel 1971:12).
Between 1960-61 and 1967-68 (after green revolution
technologies were introduced), for example, the area under
irrigation in Ludhiana increased from 45% to 70%. Unlike some
other parts of Punjab, this increase was due mainly to the
installation of tubewells, not canals. Today, over 99.7% of the
net area sown in the district (323,500 Ha.) is irrigated
(Statistical Handbook of Punjab 1991:94). Similarly, between
1965-68 Ludhiana's acreage under high yielding varieties
incre~sed from a mere 170 acres to a stunniig 420,000 acre.,
amounting to 90% of the acreage under wheat in only three years
(Frankel 1971). Today, all the acreage under wheat, 99% of the
area under rice, and 75%8 of the acreage under corn in the
region is sown with high yielding varieties. During 1960-61 and
1967-8 fertilizer consumption rose 17 times, and even today per-
capita fertilizer and power consumption by farmers in Ludhiana is
the highest in the state and nation. Agricultural wages in the
region are amongst the highest in the country (Table 1.6) .' And,
8 These are 1990-91 figures (Statistical Handbook of Punjab,
1991).
9 This is reflective also of the fact that minimum wages in
agriculture are very high in Punjab, as are minimum wages for
skilled metal and wood-workers. But this does not mean that
Punjab's actual industrial wage levels are among the highest. In
the industrial sector, skilled workers in states like Maharashtra,
Bangalore and Tamil Nadu earn wages that are far above the minimum
wage (4-6 times) , whi' "'led production wages in Punjab are
moderately over the minimum wage level (2-3 times higher). Thus
while semi-skilled workers earn more in Punjab than in many other
states, skilled workers earn relatively less. No wonder then, that
most firm-owners say skilled labor is relatively "cheap" in Punjab
compared to other regions. Among small firms however, Punjab's
metal trades pay higher wages in Punjab than the national average
for that sector (Second all-India census of small Industrial units
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as Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show, even though Ludhiana's working
population is dominated by non-agricultural workers (64%), it
still leads the nation in key agricultural indicators: yields per
acre of wheat and rice, area under irrigation, fertilizer use,
and area under high-yielding varieties.
Table 1.4
Distribution of the working population in Punjab and Ludhiana
district - 1990-91.
Ludhiana district Punj ab
Total workers
Total workers
(1991)
% Cultivators
% Ag. Laborers
% Non-Ag. workers
% Industrial workers
% Service workers
758,043
21%
6,036,192
33%
15%
64%
34%
30%
23%
44%
15%
29%
Source: Calculated from the Statistical Abstract 1992:58, 402,
and the Economic Survey of Punjab 1992.
in India 1992. All India and Punjab volumes, pp T-79 and T-33
respectively).
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Table 1.5
Agricultural indicators for Ludhiana, and India 1990-91: Ludhiana
leads the nation.
Region Yield in Kg/Ha % under HYV Ferti- Net
--------------- ------------ lizer Irrigated
Wheat Rice Wheat Rice Consp* area (%)
Ludhiana dist. 4252 3579 100% 98% 240 99.5%
India 2274 1751 86% 62% 72 34.0%
Source: Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1992:158, Statistical
Handbock of Punjab 199':80-81, 88-89, 96; Stitistical Outli'e of
India, 1992:9; and Economic Survey of India 1990-91:104
* Fertilizer consumption is of chemical fertilizer in kg. per
hectare of gross cropped area (1990-91 figures).
Table 1.6
Punjab is one of India's high wage regions--agricultural wages in
Punjab are highest in the nation.
Minimum wages for agricultural workers in selected
rates in Rs. per day in 1989 and 1991.
states: daily
State 1989 1991
Punjab 29.30 (w/meals) 33.53 (w/meals)
33.00 (w/o meals) 37.53 (w/o meals)
West Bengal 18.02 19.65 (w/meals)
22.80 (w/o meals)
Tamil Nadu 14.00 14.00
Kerala 12. .00 12.00 - 15.00
24.00 - 32.00
Maharashtra 12.00 - 20.00 12.00 - 20.00
Source: Ministry of Labor 1991, New Delhi. (Typed Annexure)
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Thus, a highly productive agricultural sector coexists side
by side with Ludhiana's industrial economic profile which is
dominated by non-agricultural employment in mostly small firms.
The Puzzle:
Ludhiana's industrial structure, as we noted above, is
distinct from the picture of small firms in much of the
development literature, and the experience of other
ijdustrialized r gions in India in five key ways.
First, unlike the more industrially sophisticated states
such as Maharashtra, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, Ludhiana's
industrial growth is dominated by small firms even in sectors
which tend to be characterized by large and integrated firms in
other regions--machine tools, auto-parts, bicycles, sewing
machines and agricultural implements. Industrial surveys
conducted by State and Central government agencies (for example
in 1973-74, 1979-80 and 1989) have consistently shown that over
99% of Ludhiana's registered firms continue to be small in
scale' 0 -- so much so that Ludhiana has been dubbed the "small
" In India, large, small and medium firms are officially
demarcated by size of capital investment rather than number of
workers. In the 1970s a firm was designated small-scale in India
if its fixed investment in plant and machinery did not exceed Rs.
3.5 million. Currently this limit stands at Rs. 6 million (7.5 for
ancillaries). Firms with investment greater than Rs. ".5 million
are clubbed together under a composite medium/large category.
Although most small firms have 50 or less workers, the number
of workers in not a defining characteristic of small firms. The
Central government also allocates sole production rights of certain
products to small firms (e.g., nearly all components of cycles,
except rims and chain wheels, are designated as small-firm
products). But this does not restrict small firms from producing
22
industries capital" of India (Pathak 1970; Sandhu and Singh 1983;
Pandit 1985; Sukhpal Singh 1990; District Industries Center
surveys 1989) ." This predominance of small firms in Ludhiana
is further evidenced by the fact that about 92% of the country's
small woollen knitwear firms are located in Ludhiana district,
and along with Delhi, over 60% of all bicycle manufacturing units
in the country are located here (Pandit 1985:30).
What do these small firms actually look like? The majority
of firms referred to above are not the tiny, informal,
predominantly labor-intensive enterprises invoked by references
to the low-end of the small scale category in the development
literature. Neither are they as technically sophisticated as the
small firms referred to in the industrial district literature,
especially in studies of the Third Italy. A bulk of the small
firms discussed here span a range that falls somewhere in
between. They might start out as informal enterprises but most
are typically registered; they are often small in terms of number
goods not specifically reserved for the small sector.
"1 In terms of production, small firms in Punjab accounted for
77% of the state's total industrial output in 1970-71 compared to
only 40% in the nation. Although the relative contribution of
small firms to Punjab's output has declined over the years, small
firms continued to dominate total industrial output until the early
1980s. In 1980-81, for example, Punjab's small firms accounted for
52% of the sta te's industrial production compared with about 30% in
the country as a whole (Sharma, 1980:80, and Sandhu and Singh,
1983:134). Over the 1980s, with the installation of five new
thermal power plants and two large government owned railway coach
and diesel engine factories in Punjab, the output of the state's
large firms has exceeded that of small firms for the first time
(64% in 1990-91, relative to 36% for small firms. Economic Survey
of Punjab 1992-93:40).
of workers, but are quite capitalized, using a range of machinery
and equipment that is for the most part locally made; a large
proportion of these small firms are run by owners who are
themselves skilled--in terms of having practical, technical
skills, not necessarily engineering degrees--but skilled
workers/owners no longer belong strictly to traditional caste, or
artisanal hierarchies. Finally, even the smaller owners often
have 2-3 enterprises run by various family members or partners.
While each of these firms may be quite small, and is operated as
a separate profit center, together the group/partnership or
family has considerable market reach.
The official definition of small'2 thus obscures from view
the kind of firm being discussed here. Since the cut-off limit
for a small firm is Rs. 6.0-7.5 million, a firm with investment
of half a million rupees is also small, and one investing Rs. 7.5
million is also small. While a large number of the smallest
firms in Ludhiana have investment not exceediny a million rupees,
at the upper end, it is hard to distinguish where small runs into
medium, especially if one family or one set of partners owns 3-4
small firms with investment hovering at Rs. 4.0-7.5 million in
each, and together employing 200-300 workers. Although the firms
most visibly successful in this region are mid-sized small firms,
and those close to the cut-off limit for this category, good
12 According to the current definition, any firm with capital
equipment below Rs. 6.0 million (or 7.5 million for ancillaries) is
"small" in scale. (The official definition of medium scale is quite
muddied because it is clubbed together with large scale).
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performance is not associated with any particular end of the
small or medium firm spectrum. Firms of quite varied sizes are
closely linked with each other in production and contractual
relationships, and their success is most often the result of
precisely this interaction."
Thus far we have seen that one difference between Ludhiana's
industrial structure and that of other industrial states in India
is its productive environment is dominated by small firms. The
character of t',.ese small firms, moreover, does not fit neatly
within the usual image of small firms coming off official scale
categorizations of small vs. medium vs. large.
A second difference is that in sharp contrast to the
marginal and dependent role of small firms portrayed in the
literature on industrial modernization and in regions dominated
by concentrated capital in the country, Ludhiana's small firms
are the backbone of the region's industrial economy. Contrary to
13 Of the 117 firms I interviewed in Ludhiana between 1990-
1992, 99 were officially "small" in scale, 13 were officially
medium, and 5 fell in the large scale category. The largest firms
had investment in hundreds of millions of rupees, and employed 800-
1000 workers each. The medium sized firms had investments ranging
from Rs. 8.5 million to up to 20 million, and workers ranging from
150-360. In the "small" scale category most firms had capital
investment between Rs. 3.5 to 8.0 million and employed anywhere
from 15-60 workers. About 20 firms within the small scale category
had investment not exceeding Rs. 0.5-0.6 million and employed from
2 to 10 workers each. As noted above, most small owners owned 3-4
firILs producing related products operated independently by various
family members.
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the view that small firms cater mainly to local demand and often
lag behind larger firms in their contribution to (non-handicraft)
exports, Ludhiana's firms are noted for their dynamism, and
incorporation into national and export markets. For example,
Ludhiana--which had over 33,176 registered small firms and 82
large firms in 1991--produces 95% of the nation's woollen
hosiery, 85% of its sewing machine parts and over 60% of its
cycles and cycle parts'5 (Dasgupta 1989:63, Pandit 1985; S.
Singh 1990).
This domination by Ludhiana's producers over national
markets in these sectors is the result of a very different
process of scaling up, compared to the more common case of a few
large, leading firms dominating output and product development.
In several of these sectors, Ludhiana's small metal manufacturers
started out in the 1930s-1940s producing mostly components and
parLs, not complete items like bicycles, sewing machines or
agricultural machinery. These components and parto moreover,
were meant mainly for repairs, and for the spares and replacement
markets, not for original equipment manufacturers. As more
'" I.J. Singh 1990; S. Singh 1990; Dasgupta 1989; Pandit 1985;
Sandhu and Singh 1983; and Pathak 1970.
's This figure is for the northern "cycle-producing belt"
concentrated in Ludhiana, but stretching up to the fringes of
Delhi.
16 The original equipment manufacturers of products such as
complete bicycles and sewing machines at that time were all large
and integrated firms located outside Punjab--e.g., Sen-Raleigh near
Calcutta, Tube Investments (Hercules) in Madras, a BSA
collaboration near Bombay, Usha and Singer sewing machines in
Bengal.
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and more components came to be manufactured in Ludhiana, local
assemblers emerged in the 1940s and 1950s who began assembling
these components into complete items like bicycles, sewing
machines, diesel engines and a variety of other agricultural
equipment and machinery. While some assembler-manufacturers that
started out small are large firms today, several assemblers
remain small.
This is in contrast to the pattern prevalent in many other
states. In the bicycle industry for example, the earliest
producers were four large integrated firms based in Bombay,
Bengal, and Madras which in the 1940s manufactured complete
bicycles, including all components in-house with the assistance
of overseas collaborators such as Raleigh, BSA, Phillips,
Hercules, Dunlop and others. These firms controlled most of the
market share. In a striking reversal of this control, by the
early 1970s Punjab's component manufacturers and assemblers had
edged out all four of the largest MNC-partnered bicycle firms
from the national market, forcing them to either go under, turn
to the government for help, or procure parts and complete
bicycles from Ludhiana's producers to survive (Singh 1990, Kumar
1989, Timberg 1984). Thus, not only did Ludhiana's small
component producers overcome their local focus and out-compete
lar'e, MNC partnered producers located outside the state , but
they came to control a key national market despite having started
out producing for the spares and replacement market.
Similarly, the region is also a successful producer of
agricultural machinery -- tractors, " diesel engines and pump-
sets. As with some other industries in the region, this industry
also began with a local and regional focus. Punjabi farmers and
agricultural R&D stations were its primary customers. Today, the
reach of these firms has spread to national and international
markets. Local sales" are negligible--less than 20% of total
output in the case of a bulk of the firms I interviewed in 1991-
92. Thus, although firms in the region began with a local focus,
they have not remained dependent solely on local demand. Many of
them have successfully expanded into markets well beyond regional
borders.
Even more significant is their expansion into export
markets. In contrast to the widely noted finding that small
firms, especially in traditional metal manufacturing sectors,
have a harder time establishing themselves in export markets than
'" Supplying to the replacement market is regarded as a
limiting endeavor, far from best practice, especially given the
emphasis on the importance of customer-client ties in the recent
literature on industrial clustering. Producing for the replacement
market, according to some analysts, cannot generate the quality-
enhancing learning effects that come from working closely with a
technologically sophisticated buyer of original equipment. Yet
others have shown how it is often an indication of a firm
"withdrawing" from a particular market, a sign of difficulty and
regression (Humphrey and Schmitz 1995:20).
18 In addition to several small firms, one of the nation's
seven most successful tractor manufacturers is located in Punjab.
'" That is, sales to locally based final users.
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do larger firms,2 0 small firms in Ludhiana--and Punjab more
generally--contribute more to exports than do large firms .2
For example, in 1988-89, small firms in Punjab accounted for 61%
of total industrial exports in value terms compared to 39% by
large firms, as Table 1.7 shows below.
Table 1.7
Export of industrial goods in Punjab: (in millions of Rupees)
Year Small-scale lrg/med total
1. 1985-86 1571.8 880.2 2452.0
(64.1) (35.9)
2. 1986-87 1740.8 1008.0 2748.8
(63.3) (36.7)
3. 1987-88 2339.4 1077.2 3416.6
(68.5) (31.5)
4. 1988-89 2842.8 1817.2 4660.0
(61.0) (39.0)
Source: District Industries Center, Ludhiana, 1991.
20 See Woodfield (1994) for a further discussion of the
difficulties of getting small firms to export successfully. See
also Liedholm and Mead (1987).
21 This export behavior is nct completly uncommon, of course.
In the 1920s small and medium firms in Japan also accounted for a
larger share of Japan's exports than did larger firms that
concentrated on the domestic market (Amsden 1989:181). A similar
resurgence of small firm exports from the US and some European
countries was nited by the Economist in 1993.
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Third, in contrast to the dependence on local input markets
that one usually expects of small enterprises, small and medium
firms in Ludhiana's fastest growiny sectors rely almost entirely
on regions outside the state for raw-materials and resources.
For example, Ludhiana's hosiery industry depends on wool imported
from Kashmir and Australia; the cycle and auto tyre industry
depends on rubber from Kerala; and the bicycle and bicycle-parts
manufacturers, machine tool makers, and the region's light
engineering in'ustry as a whole depends on Bengal, Bihar and
Orissa located hundreds of miles away for iron, steel and
coal. 2
Indeed, Ludhiana is an odd place for a metal industry to be
concentrated in. The state has no natural advantages for the
location of a metal-manufacturing industry as we saw above. Nor
does it have a large local or proximate market for its metal
goods to compensate for the lack of an input base--there are no
major industries located in the region that would be the primary
buyers of the metal products produced here. While local
assemblers are an important source of demand for many small
component manufacturers, a bulk of them sell their output to
retailers, assemblers and merchant exporters outside the
state.2 Indeed, about 90% of the region's output of final goods
' Dasgupta 1989; Sharma 1989; Pandit 1985; NCAER 1962, 1967;
ILO 1961 cf. Pandit 1985.
23 This differs also from the emphasis on close customer-client
relations and their collective efficiency and learning effects in
the recent literature on industrial clustering.
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is sold outside the state (DIC, Ludhiana, 1992).24 When both
input and output markets are hundreds of miles away, why has this
region specialized in metal manufacturing?
Fourth, despite the recent focus on the dynamism of small
firms, enduring strands of the literature--both neo-marxist and
Smithian--view small firms as being transitory. The expectation
is that successful small firms would grow big over time by
accommodating an increasingly sophisticated division of labor,
and the less successful ones would eventually die out of
attrition, or become vestigial. Policy makers in industrializing
regions like Punjab and India seem to echo this view in lamenting
the fact that over half century of robust growth among Ludhiana's
small firms has not caused the region's industrial structure to
change along the lines suggested above, with smaller firms
growing bigger. On the contrary, manufacturing growth in Punjab
over the past fifty years has hardly diminished the proportion of
small firms in the state's industrial profile. Small firms were
no less important in the region's industrial structure in 1990
than they were 15 years ago.2 s
This is not to say that medium or large firms in the region
are of little consequence. Rather, large firms, many of which
24 This figure is for Ludhiana district's industrial output.
The corresponding figure for Punjab is about 80%.
25 In both periods, they constituted over 99% of all registered
firms (industrial surveys conducted by the Government of India in
1972-3, 1979-80, and 1989).
were small in scale till as recently as the 1950s-60s, are an
important part of the region's industrial environment, and
closely tied to its small-firm base institutionally, as we will
see later. Indeed, as they themselves report, their competitive
strength and vitality vis-a-vis producers outside the state comes
in part from the relationships they have forged with the region's
small firms. Neither robust growth, nor the presence and success
of these larger firms has undermined the endurance and salience
of small firms in Ludhiana's industrial environment.
Fifth, and finally, in addition to their growth and
integration into national and international markets, Ludhiana's
small firms have shown impressive resilience in the face of
several episodes of economic and political adversity. During a
long period of industrial deceleration in the country between the
mid-1960s and the late 1970s, 6 for example, Ludhiana's
manufacturing fared much better than that of the nation as a
whole.2 7 Taking Punjab's rates of industrial growth as proxy
for Ludhiana, manufacturing in the state registered a mean annual
growth rate of 6.9% during 1966-1978 and 9.4% during 1971-78
(Johar and Kumar 1983:184) compared to the 5% mean annual growth
26 There is considerable debate over the periodization and
regionally differentiated impact of this deceleration. For
detailed arguments see Wiener 1989, Ahluwalia 1985, and Bardhan
1984.
27 Also see Table 1.8 below for a comparison of the annual
growth rate of income generated by the industrial sector in Punjab
and India, disaggregated by plan periods.
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rate of manufacturing that prevailed nationally during 1966-1982
(Wiener 1989:134). Similarly, from 1970-71 to 1983-84 Punjab's
industrial sector grew 1.67 times faster than the Indian average
(Bhalla et.al. 1990).
Similarly, Ludhiana's small-firm base appears to have
weathered and quite successfully bounced back from severe
political "shocks" as well, in nearly every decade of its recent
industrial history. The first, and worst of these shocks was the
missive upheaval of partition in 1947 when Punjab was splintered
into two halves between Pakistan and India, and the economic and
civic base had to be virtually rebuilt on both sides. Again in
1966, the Indian Punjab was split into three provinces2 8:
Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh. In this division, the
present state of Punjab lost all of the new large-and medium-
scale industrial belt that its leaders had been developing along
the Delhi border since the early 1960s, to Haryana. Later, in
the 1960s and early 1970s, three wars fought along Punjab's
borders (with China and Pakistan) again disrupted communications,
stalled production and blocked the transportation of goods and
labor across the state.
Most recently, Ludhiana's productive structure, and the
private and public institutions therein, seem to have weathered
relatively successfully the intense political turbulenre
unleashed by Punjab's decade-long secessionist movement that
began in the early 1980s. During 1985-90, for example--despite
28 This was an administrative division along linguistic lines.
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the continuing violence--Punjab's secondary sector grew at an
average annual rate of 8.6% compared to 6.8% nationally (Economic
Survey of Punjab, 1992) (See Table 1.8 below). And despite
adverse conditions in virtually every decade of its post-colonial
history, Punjab still leads the nation's twenty-two states in per
capita income2--a lead that it has maintained since the late
1960s.
Table 1.8
Industrial growth rates of Punjab and India: percent per annum
Period Base Punjab India
1965-66 to 1968-69 @ 1960-61 prices 6.7 2.9
(Annual Plans)
1968-69 to 1973-74
(Fourth Plan)
1973-74 to 1978-79
(Fifth Plan)
1979-80 to 1983-84
(Sixth Plan)
1985-86 to 1989-90
(Seventh Plan)
@ 1960-61 prices
@ 1970-71 prices
@ 1970-71 prices
@ 1980-81 prices
Source: District Industries Center, Ludhiana, Punjab, and
Economic Survey of Punjab 1992:59.
Furthermore, the experience of other violence-torn regions
29 Punjab's per capita income was Rs. 9643 in 1992 at current
prices, compared to the all India average of Rs. 5629 in the same
year (Statistical Abstract of Punjab, 1992-1993:119). Goa (till
recently a federally controlled union territory) is the only state
to have surpassed Punjab's per capita income since the 1980s.
5.3
9.95
3.7
6.9
3.4
6.8
6.5
8.6
in the country, Assam and Kashmir, suggest that conditions of
prolonged political uncertainty tend to cause firms to turn
inward, be cut-off from outside markets, withdraw or defer
investment, or hedge risk through capital flight.3  Contrary to
these predictions, many firms in Ludhiana--of all sizes--appear
to be turning "outward," to markets outside the state and country
for sales at an astonishing pace (DIC reports and personal
interviews). Over the nine year period between 1980-81--when the
state's political crisis began, and 1989-90, the most recent year
for which figures are available, manufactured exports from Punjab
to other countries increased by a striking 206%. That is,
exports grew at an average annual growth rate of 23% during this
period (Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1990:335, 547).
Making sense of the evidence: Unusualness of fit and
similarities with other cases:
The dynamism and resilience evident in thIs description of
Ludhiana's manufacturing performance is at odds with the image of
low productivity, marginality and industrial "shallowness"
associated with regions that are "bottom-heavy" -- or have many
small firms with a missing middle and top tier of larger, more
"modern" firms. The argument here (see Briggs for example) is
30 Accounts of Latin America's unstable years document an
analogous set of responses by business to instability, although the
instability there is of a somewhat different nature.
31 Ludhiana's firm structure does include "large" small firms
and medium firms, as we saw earlier in the discussion.
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that although small firms provide employment, and may have
desirable distributional consequences, they cannot by themselves
lead a whole region into growth, because they lack enough
capital, skills and access to sufficient demand to help make a
whole region industrially competitive. The growth of Ludhiana's
metal industry described above goes against the grain of such
arguments.
Ludhiana's picture of dynamic growth is also at odds with
the picture of arrested growth portrayed in the literature on
Indian manufacturing throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These
authors (e.g., Krueger 1974, and Lal 1983) argued that a long
history of excessive intervention by India's restrictive, rent-
seeking regulatory state strangulated industrial productivity and
penalized growth. This argument comes off a now-widely held view
about the bad effects of excessive government presence in
general, regardless of country. If this was che general case,
why was it that industries in Ludhiana succeeded in consistently
growing at rates higher than the national average despite being
part of the same debilitating and restrictive policy environment?
Ludhiana in the context of other states. Punjab is not the
only state with a vibrant small firm base. There are at least
four others in India alone: Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, Rajkot in
Gujarat, Howrah in West Bengal, and in some ways, Bangalore in
Karnataka state. In addition, there are several other cases
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documented in the voluminous industrial district literature. 32
But there are important differences between them. Consider, for
example, the case of Bangalore, the so-called "Silicon Valley of
India." Bangalore's dynamic small-firm base is of relatively
recent vintage. Its origins lie in the vast public sector
investments in core industries such as aeronautics, machine
tools, telecommunications in the region by the government of
India in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1950s Bangalore was the hub
rot of small firas, but of some of the country's largest public
sector firms and science and technology institutes. 3 Ils large
and sophisticated R&D infrastructure has attracted engineers from
all over the country, and it now boasts many of the features
highlighted by researchers of the "East Asian" model of growth--
e.g., a highly educated workforce, a strong research base, strong
government support, and more recently massive MNC investments.
It too represents an interesting and different case to study,
with its own theory-defying outcomes.
Punjab's story is different. In contrast to places like
Bangalore, and Bombay, and to the image of India as having an
3 Cawthorne 1990, Kashyap 1992, Nadvi 1992, Schmitz 1995,
Schmitz and Humphrey 1995, Holmstrom 1994, Kaplinsky 1994.
3 The country's first defense related aviation company--the
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) was located in Bangalmre, as was
its first telecommunications equipment manufacturing firm, Indian
Telephone Industries (ITI) ; the government's largest machine tools
manufacturer (Hindustan Machine Tools, HMT) is headquartered here
since the 1940s. In addition Bangalore is host to a number of
well-funded basic science institutes, such as the prestigious
Indian Institute of Science, and a web of defense related R&D
Centers.
excessive public sector presence, the central and state
governments have invested minimally in equity ownership in
Punjab's industries since it became a border state in 1947.
Indeed, Punjab's share of expenditures on centrally owned
industrial assets fell, from a share of 1.4% of the total central
outlay in the 1970s, to only 0.74% in 1989-90, compared to 17.6%
for Maharashtra in that year, and even higher for Bangalore
(Handbook of Industrial Statistics 1991). Compared to public and
foreign capital financing Bangalore's small-firm boom, industrial
capital in Ludhiana is largely private and from within the
region. It is the technician, or the mechanic, rather than the
engineer, that is the back-bone of Ludhiana's industrial regime;
and rather than large R&D parastatals, a combination of
government business extension agencies and skilled small and
medium firms have provided much of the R&D in the region. Yet
the region has accumulated an impressive industrial record.
And, as we will see in this study, the state was hardly
absent from Ludhiana's industrial story and history. It did not
come in with direct capital investments, but it was very present
in other ways, it did other things. The government built an
excellent and extensive physical infrastructure--roads,
railroads, serviced land, cheap electric power, water (see Tables
4.2 and 4.3 in Chapter 4); it built a tightly-linked research and
development base focussed on the region's key industries--
bicycles, auto-parts, machinery, sewing machines--as described
later; and it built a strong industrial training base in the
state.
What lessons does this case, with its largely private, small
capital base, and a history of a strong, but indirect state role
have to offer other regions that are more like it and less likely
to be able to count on large external inflows of capital and
resources? What explains this region's industrial performance?
Is Ludhiana's spectacular agricultural performance in any way
linked with and/or responsible for its small-firm led industrial
growth? And finally, what lessons and insights does the
resilience demonstrated by small firms in this region provide
regarding the conditions under which small firms are able to cope
well with the pressures of uncertainty and instability?
Argument in brief:
i4y specific argument is that four elements are central to
understanding the pattern of industrial growth in Ludhiana. (i)
The key role of the state government (and in important ways, the
Central government) in--directly and indirectly--shaping the
region's industrial trajectory. Historically, the government
indirectly transformed the skill base of a whole class of
artisanal metal workers in the region through its agrarian--not
industrial--policies. Subsequently, the government not only
became a key source of demand for the state's firms, but its
emphasis on providing extensive physical infrastructure, and
industrial training raised small firm productivity and greatly
lowered production costs. (ii) A series of demand stimulating
conditions early in the region's industrial history helped the
region's growing small-firm base consolidate itself by providing
stability, even if fortuitously, when local firms most needed it.
(iii) Entrepreneur and worker relationships, shaped by the above
conditions, which over time have produced a capital conserving,
interdependent structure of production that has allowed even
small producers to enter national and international markets.
Furthermore, institutional arrangements (e.g., the crucial role
of several intermediaries and brokers) emerged at several levels,
which together with the conditions set by the state's credit and
other policies, have enabled some agricultural surpluses to be
channeled into industry in quite productive ways.34 (iv)
Finally, a differentiated and skilled work force, which has had
quite complementary, though diverse, paths of skill acquisition
and upward mobility. Understanding the struture of the region's
labor market, and the distinctive worker strategies it allows
for, is therefore crucial to understanding the competitiveness
and adaptability of Ludhiana's firms. Enmeshed throughout, is a
discussion of the ways in which the region's predominantly small
firms have overcome the typical constraints that much of the
development literature says hamper small-firm vitality: lack of
34 It must be noted however that several authors who hold that
the absence of large-scale industry in Punjab is a symptom of the
state's industrial backwardness, argue that one of the reasons why
industrial capital remained small and fragmented in the region was
precisely because agricultural surpluses did not flow into industry
in any significant way. See for example Johar and Kumar (1983) and
others in Johar and Khanna (ed.) 1983.
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skill, capital, credit and markets, and the state's role in
indirectly making it easier for them to do so."
Themes and layout of chapters:
The next chapter (Chapter 2) traces the origins of the
region's industrial networks and anchors them within the colonial
government's late nineteenth century policies aimed at developing
the region's agriculture--not industry. These policies were
contraiictory. On th- one hand they resultad in increased
prosperity and social mobility among agrarian groups. They
offered rural artisans new career options in the military,
contractual work on the government's railways, and massive
irrigation works--options that helped transform and upgrade the
skill-base of a whole class of artisanal workers. But on the
other hand, these policies were exclusionary. They excluded non-
agricultural groups from owning agricultural land, blocking them
from access to a key avenue of accumulation. This exclusion
transformed social institutions, broke ties of patronage between
artisanal workers and their landowning clients, and pushed the
newly skilled artisanal groups into industrial work. Chapter 2
details how their identity now came to be centered around skill
and industrial accumulation rather than caste and ascriptive
ties.
s Field work for this study was conducted in two stretches.
First in the summer of 1990, and for six months between the Fall of
1991 and April 1992. I conducted over 150 interviews with firms,
workers, academics, and government officials in Ludhiana,
Chandigarh and Delhi.
Chapter 3 traces the important role of demand-stimulatina
conditions early in the region's history. It shows how the
particular way in which the region's larger firms organized
production and dealt with these demand surges led to the
mushrooming of many small firms. These firms wrested huge
contracts from the government at very low bids and rather than
meet the orders by increasing capacity in-house, they recruited
and trained a large number of small subcontractors to produce for
t'Aem. Because tie government demanded that a minimum quality
threshold be met, the large producers had to ensure that their
small subcontractors learned to meet that quality. This aided
the latter in striking out on their own in the private market
later. Subsequent surges of demand, although generated by
fortuitous events such as partition, and the imposition of an
import substituting regime (ISI), helped these small
subcontracting firms stabilize by providing them continued demand
just when they most needed it.
The protection that generated this local demand, also led to
the emergence of an import-competing local machinery producing
sub-sector in Ludhiana. ISI programs are of course, meant to
help develop just such a domestic machinery producing base
accessible to all domestic firms, but the historical record shows
that they don't always manage to. In most countries, -specially
those like India, the governmcnt's parastatals have led the way
in trying to develop an import-substituting capital goods sector.
As many critics have pointed out, these investments have often
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ended up producing an expensive government-owned capital goods
sector catering mostly to other parastatals or large private
firms. Small producers can rarely afford to procure machinery
from these large plants. But what was different about the way
ISI policies worked out in Punjab was that they encouraged the
formation of a quite sophisticated machinery producing base that
catered primarily to small firms. By providing cheap, locally
made customized machinery and machine tools to the region's small
firms, these small capital goods producers helped lower
production costs for the region's manufacturers of final goods
and intermediates (e.g., consumer durables such as bicycles,
sewing machines, pump-sets, agricultural implements and parts).
These lower costs, and easy access to cheap machinery allowed
even small producers in Ludhiana, who had few resources and
little capital, to exploit more effectively the demand surges
resulting from the protectionist polices of this period, and
grow. In this chapter we also see that, unlike the criticism in
the literature that oftentimes paints import-substitution
policies with a monolithically negative brush, the Indian
governments ISI policies had several direct and indirect positive
outcomes, in addition to its more familiar "unproducitve"
aspects. Ferreting out and understanding how these positive
aspects of IFI policies worked out, thus, merits careful further
research in other contexts.
Chapter 4 examines the particular way in which the state and
its agencies historically related to the region's small firms.
In so doing, it revisits one of the themes laid out in Chapter 2
and examines two issues: first, how the post-colonial state's
agricultural policies indirectly and inadvertently influenced the
growth of industry in Ludhiana. And second, how the government
laid an extensive industrial training infrastructure in the
region, which interacted in important ways with the less formal
skill acquisition strategies of workers in the region's labor
market to produce a skilled workforce at low cost. This skill
base, centered around the technician's, not the engineer's skill,
is a key source of shopfloor innovation among the region's small
firms, and a cornerstone of their ability to raise productivity
at low cost.
Chapter 5 examines the way in which the region's firms got
around some of the common bottlenecks that plague small firms--
access to markets, technical know-how, credit and performance
standards. It examines how firms dealt with the moving away of
key sources of demand without going under. Viu illustrations
drawn from several examples, this chapter shows how the nature of
contractual relationships between the firms themselves, and the
presence of a network of intermediaries--especially sales
merchants, mechanics, and technically skilled local bureaucrats--
helped local firms cope with adversity and defray the costs of
seeking out and moving into new markets. The chapter also shows
how local firms continually expose themselves to a variety of
outside standards, and how the self-imposed pressure of
comparisons with these external standards helps them
incrementally improve their own performance.
An epilogue to Chapter 5 continues the theme of how firms
cope with adversity by returning to the issue of violence in
Punjab during the decade of the 1980s, and examining the
relationship between business and instability. The patterns
emerging from a number of case examples show that firms in
Ludhiana responded quite counter-intuitively to instability.
Rather than holding back or deferring investment as we would
typically expe-t, the most successful small firms actually
increased investment, raised output, automated selectively, and
turned to exports in a big way.
The final chapter concludes by summarizing the findings
about the processes of small firm growth emerging from the
Ludhiana case, and sets them in the context of views in the
literature regarding credit, capital, skills, and the public
sector role.
CHAPTER 2
The agrarian underpinnings of industry: mid-nineteenth century
colonial investments in infrastructure and the creation of a
rural middle-class
Introduction:
This chapter examines the antecedents of some of the key
institutions governing the conditions of accumulation by small
firms in Punjab -- narely, a rural elite, f--agmented capitel in
both industry and agriculture, and a largely private small-
producer pattern of industry built around skill controlled by a
formerly lower-status social group. It explores how these
institutions were shaped historically by the direct and indirect
effects of the colonial government's massive mid-nineteenth
century investments in infrastructure (irrigation, railways and
rural roads) which commercialized Punjab's agriculture, created
an export economy, produced a prosperous peasantry and a large
rural middle-class by the early twentieth century.
Although these state expenditures' were motivated, not by
concerns for industry, but by aims of developing the region's
agricultural base, creating rural employment, and ensuring the
loyalty of the broadbased peasantry by securing and enlarging
their rights in agri-" 1 +" 1- land and private property; they did
influence non-agricultural prospects by creating substantial
1 And some of the legislation that went with them, e.g., the
Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900.
physical and social capital early in Lhe history of Punjab's
industrial growth. This "social capital" played out in two ways.
(i) It provided fresh avenues of employment to those hitherto
bound in relations of patronage, thus helping weaken ties of
traditional hierarchy. In addition, it also offered
opportunities for modest accumulation through contractorships on
construction sites in the agricultural colonies, railways, and
jobs in the military. (ii) The nature of these new jobs and
contractorships (e.g., working with new kinds of equipment,
producing new kinds of products) indirectly helped transform and
upgrade the skill base of a whole class of rural artisanal
workers by exposing them to new configurations of work, and
placing new demands on their traditional skills.
New skills, combined with access on the part of some to
modest amounts of accumulated capital, revised the identities and
career paths of many non-agricultural craft workers.
ConsequentCly, when a legislation designed by the colonial
government to protect the proprietary rights of its main allies
(the prosperous small peasants), c'it off this new class of
skilled workers and small contractors from a lucrative avenue of
accumulation--ownership of cultivable land--they were able to
resist this exclusion by turning towards industrial work and
bui'ding new, corporatist institutions around their skill. That
is, those among this excluded class who had both, skill and some
accumulated capital, were able to invest in manufacturing at a
small scale. The colonial government's infrastructure policies
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thus, although aimed at agriculture, indirectly shaped industrial
identities by creating conditions that both enabled (through
skill formation) and "forced" this excluded group to forge niches
in industrial work.2
This argument is presented here in two parts. The first
part of this chapter shows that: (i) Large parts of the Punjab
that is now in India had a history of smallholder agriculture
dating back to agrarian reforms by an earlier regime that tried,
in the early 19th century, to minimize the threat of revolt
against its rule by fragmenting landlords and their tenants
through recognition of the tiller's rights to land in central
Punjab. The British, on annexing Punjab in 1849, built upon this
pattern of landownership. (ii) Furthermore, through massive
investments in infrastructure -- canals and railroads -- they
commercialized Punjab's agriculture in the late 19th century,
conveicing it into an open, export economy with a prosperous
rural base and new opportunities for accumulation, and mobility.
The second part of the chapter argues that (i) in addition
to the commercialization of agriculture this openness was
manifest in a second way. Work on the railways (being laid at
that time across Punjab, Assam, and East Africa), and in the
military (which moved troops across East Asia, Australia, Middle
East and Flarders) led to considerable mobility and migration
2 In other words, the social identities and career aspirations
of the local population interacted with the nature of the colonial
administration's policies of encouraging agriculture, building on
existing trends of ownership, and encouraging self-employment in
agriculture and outside it.
among workers. Service in these new departments not only allowed
some savings, but became the basis for exposure to new ways of
doing things, and practices outside the region. This openness,
exposure to external standards and ways of doing things, together
with the economy's commercial base, had a transformative impact
on the skills and identities of several social groups. This
transformation coalesced further with the social ferment
generated in the early 1900s over some of the government's
policies that sought to shore up the rights of the higher status
peasantry at the exclusion of non-agriculturalists. Many of
those who were left out, and who had the skill and the means,
turned to industrial work and small-firm ownership.
Thus, indirectly, the government's policies that bestowed
prestige, profitability, and social position to the practice of
agriculture, kept the elite rural, and created the conditions for
a different, lower-status non-peasant group of artisans and
traders to enter into and dominate industry.
In laying out these arguments, this chapter will also show
how the structure of industry in this region has been shaped and
influenced by the particular way in which agricultural policies
played out historically in the region.
PART I
The outcomes of the colonial state's early investments in
infrastructure: mobility, exposure, and the building of an export
base
1. The early phases of agricultural growth and their
spillovers into industry: the late 1800s
Many analysts argue that the dynamism of small industry in
Punjab can be explained in large part by the production,
consumption anI demand linkages generated by rising rural incomes
resulting from the region's spectacular agricultural growth since
the mid-1960s when local farmers widely adopted green revolution
technologies (Thapar 1971, 1972, Ghosh 1977, Gosal and Kishan
1984, Bhalla et al. 1990). While the spill-over effects of
agricultural prosperity in the region did have important positive
impacts on small industry via demand and production linkages, the
presence of these linkages (since the mid-1960s) does not in and
of itself explain the particular shape and character of the
region's industrial structure, as this section shows.
Looking historically at the various ways in which Punjab's
agricultural practices and institutions have influenced industry,
we find four themes that are at odds with the growth linkage
explanations of Punjab's current pattern of industrial growth.
Namely, (i) that in contrast to the salience attached to the
"green revolution" period as the engine of small industrial
growth in Punjab, there were several prior episodes of
agricultural growth, especially in the late 19th century (1860s
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through 1921), and then again in the 1950s which shaped the
institutions and conditions that significantly influenced
industrial investment capacities a. well as local industry's
choice of products and markets. (ii) Contrary to the emphasis
in the growth linkage literature on incomes rising due to the
transformation of agriculture, non-agricultural sources of rural
income-growth were as important as agricultural sources in
bringing about these increased investment capabilities and
purchasing power in the late 19th, early 20th centuries. These
non-agricultural sources of growth included (a) broad-based
absorption of the lower classes especially from the country-side
into new military careers in the colonial army, (b)
manufacturing and livestock-breeding demands from the army
cantonments that came to be stationed in Punjab, and (c)
migration abroad, and to the newly constructed canal colonies in
western Puajab for labor jobs in conatruction, manufacturing and
trade (in addition to agriculture). (iii) Similarly, the inward-
looking regional focus of much of the growth linkage literature,
cannot easily capture the fact that it was not subsistence but
the export nature of Punjab's canal-irrigated agricultural
economy that kept an upward pressure on output and efficiency
from the demand side while absorbing large amounts of labor in
its double cropping cycles, that contributed to rising rural
incines in late 19th-early 20th century Punjab. (iv) Finally
non-agricultural growth in jobs and incomes did not result from
or follow agricultural growth as the growth linkages literature
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suggests, but occurred simultaneously. Both, local agriculture
and industry during this period were simultaneously fuelled by
massive quasi-Keynesian investments by the public sector in
infrastructure (roads, and over 2000 miles of railways),
irrigation-based land settlements (26 million acres were
irrigated and brought under cultivation by the early 1920s), and
military recruitment (over 65% of British India's voluntary army
was recruited from Punjab at the eve of WWI).
These findings--regarding the importance of inter-regional
and overseas migration, remittances, and an open economy, in
raising rural incomes and creating non-agricultural jobs, do not
fit the standard growth linkages theory which is more inward-
looking in its focus and seeks to bound the region tightly,
viewing any outward flows of goods, capital and labor as
leakages.
The point here is not that the growth linkage arguments do
not apply, but that there are other equally salient ways in which
agricultural growth and rising rural incomes influence local
industry in Punjab--producing results exactly similar to the ones
the growth linkages theory is interested in, of dynamic small-
firm growth--but which the theory misses out or does not
accommodate. In other words, although certain kinds of linkages
between Punjab's agricultural successes and its small industry
did occur, the timing and sequence were "wrong" and the
explanation was different.
2. Canal Colonies and the fostering of an export base.
A major feature of late 19th century Punjab was the
commercialization of its agriculture and its orientation towards
export markets within India and abroad. The existing pattern of
agricultural production as the British found it upon annexing
Punjab in 1849, was highly uneven. Parts of the state--
specifically its central regions (see Fig. 2.1)' including
districts like Ludhiana, Jullunder, Sialkot, Amritsar--were
productive and fertile. A large number of smallholders
intensively worked the land in these regions growing wheat and
gram supported partially by irrigation from underground wells and
inundation canals. Some of these districts already practiced
double-cropping at the time of annexation (Banerjee 1982,
Kessinger 1974). The drylands of the southeast cultivated mostly
millets, gram and other traditional crops without the support of
much ,upplemental irrigation. The western region of Punjab
contained vast tracts of barren wasteland.'
To mitigate the unevenness of agricultural output, increase
agricultural productivity and revenue generation, and to reduce
' Source for Fig. 2.1: Fox, Richard G. 1985. Lions of the
Punjab. Berkeley: Berkeley University Press.
4 The land-tenure systems in these regions varied as well.
In contrast to the tenancy that prevailed in south Punjab, and the
dominance of a handful of ruling clans who controlled vast tracts
in the barren West, owner-occupied small-holdings dominated in the
extensively cultivated central regions. This landownership pattern
of small holders in the central regions, as we will see more fully
at the end of this section, goes back to land reforms carried out
in the early nineteenth century by an earlier regime.
Figure 2.1
Region I (Southeast
Region 2 (Central)
(a) The three main regions of colonial Punjab
(b, Major canal irrigated districts of Punjab (1921)
the risk of famine, the colonial government invested massively in
several infrastructure projects in Punjab starting the 1860s.
The most prominent among these were the construction of major
irrigation works and the "canal colonies" in west Punjab, (and
the laying of an extensive railroad network throughout Punjab and
the Northwest.)
The first generation of irrigation works began modestly--as
public works meant to employ disbanded sikh soldiers after the
British annexed Punjab in 1849. The productivity- and output-
enhancing results of these modest works of refurbishing and
repairing old canals--as evidenced by increased revenues--led the
British to scale them up into a more serious effort of
constructing new canals in the intensively cropped central Punjab
(mainly the Manjha region). The first canal was opened in 1859
in the Lahore-Amritsar region; a second watered the Ferozepur-
Ludhiana region in 1883, and by 1887 two and a half million acres
of central Punjab were traversed by these canals and their
distributories (Sims 1988, Banerjee 1982, Fox 1985).
Despite this "scaling up," the Punjab administrators, had
continued to regard these early projects as remedial -- a
"service" aimed at evening out the vagaries of rainfall in the
most intensely cropped smallholder districts of central Punjab --
rather than as investments in the expansion of agriculture.
Consequently, the British had so far committed1 little government
capital to them, financing them instead almost entirely out of
the increased land revenue that they generated (Fox 1985:48-49).
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By the late 1880s the limits of this "self-financing" were
clear. With rapidly rising local demand for water,' the famine
of 1876, and the government's growing concern over potential
rural unrest in the over-cultivated, densely populated small-
holder districts of central Punjab, the government launched a
much more ambitious second generation of irrigation projects:
Massive amounts of government funds (raised in England through
sale of government bonds) were to be invested in irrigating and
colonizing the barren wastes of West Punjab (Fox 1985:chapter 4).
Between the late 1880s and 1920, British and Indian
engineers6 and local labor constructed, with quite modest
technology, an irrigation system that watered 10 million acres of
arid land in government owned tracts of western Punjab. (see
map). By the end of the 1920s these government canals had
converted twenty-six million acres of the province's soil into
perennially irrigated farmland cultivated by tens of millions of
people settled in nine government-planned Canal Colonies (Talbot
1988:38-40, Fox 1985:48-53, Banerji 1982: chapter 2). Between
the late 1800s and the first World War, Punjab had received fully
half of the colonial government's total irrigation investment in
India during that period (Table 2.1).
s The Sirhind canal which began irrigating the Ludhiana-
Ferozepur region in 1883 was already the result of strong protests
and demands from the region's sikh smallholders. They had seen the
success of the Bari-Doab canal which watered the neighboring
districts of Amritsar-Lahore, and also "wanted water" (Banerjee
1982).
6 See Tandon (1961) for an account of the involvement of
Indian engineers.
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Table 2.1
Percentage distribution of colonial investments in Indian
irrigation: 1898-1914
Region Up to 1897-98 During 1898-1914
Uttar Pradesh 27% 7%
Punjab 25% 50%
Madras & Orissa 13% 20%
Bombay 8% 11%
All other states 31% 12%
Total 100% 100%
Source: Khanna et. al. Studies in Punjab Economy (1983:97)
Concern for the productive smallholder from Punjab's
heartland (the regime's loyal allies) had been at the center of
the colonial government's agricultural scheme (Banerjee 1982, Fox
1985) . The government therefore recruited thousands of these
small cultivators to work the newly irrigated land. Eighty-five
percent of the land grantees in the first canal colony that was
settled (Lyallpur), and 75% of the second, were smallholders
"carefully selected by local level officials" from among the best
cultivators in central Punjab (Paustian 1930 cf. Fox 1985:58-
9).7 Many were sikhs from districts that are now in the Indian
7 Most of these settlements were profitable, and the colonial
government recovered more than its original investments (Fox 1985).
For example, the Lower Chenab Colony, the first one settled) ,
generated an annual return of 14.4% on initial capital investment
after deducting all operating costs (Paustian 1930:145 cited in Fox
1985). But profitability and success of various groups within and
across colonies varied considerably. See Banerjee (1982, chapter
2) and Fox 1985 for a discussion of the unevenness of success and
57
Punjab, including Ludhiana, Jullunder and their environs (Sims
1988:54-55).
Compared to the small, fragmented holdings (5-9 acres) they
had farmed in their home regions, the government now allotted
these recruits larger, consolidated plots of irrigated land -- 11
to 56 acres (or 0.5 to 2 "squares")8 -- on ten-year leases at
nominal rates with an ownership option after that (Fox 1985,
Banerjee 1982, Talbot 1988). Many others were drawn in on their
own -- driven by pressures of debt in their home regions, extreme
subdivision, or simply by the lure of the status and
lucrativeness that came to be associated with participating in
this "new style" of agriculture.9 In the three decades between
the 1890s when Lyallpur was opened, and 1920 when the last
allotments were made, an estimated one million small cultivators
had migrated westward to the canal colonies from other heavily
populated parts of Punjab (Talbot 1988:40, Fox 1985, Banerjee
1982:28-29).
of the problems of salinity, water-logging and rising incidence of
water-borne disease that came to plague many of these settlements
later.
8 Each "square" was made up of 22-28 acres depending upon the
colony. A bulk of the holdings were 20 acres or larger -- and this
at a time when according to one estimate (Malcolm Darling), a
family of five could subsist on nine acres (Darling 1930:199 cf Fox
1985:60).
9 The cultivator's "passion" to acquire even a few acres of
land "by the canals," and the "riches" it would bring, very soon
became part of popular lore, the subject of numerous local songs,
stories and ballads. See Tandon 1961, and Banerjee 1982.
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Even as a large but dispersed bureaucracy engineered and
managed the canal systems or the "hard infrastructure", an army
of irrigation officers taught the new cultivators efficient
techniques of husbanding the water that was now perennially
available. The farmers learned a "new sense of time.. .measured
not by seasons or grades of sunlight, but by a rigid schedule of
water allocation" (Sims 1988:55). They learned about rotation of
crops, selection of seeds, alternative ways of preparing the
fields, and use of simple, improved agricultural implements.
Much of the wheat and cotton they produced was for export -- to
other parts of India and abroad -- and the extension agents
taught them to adjust their cropping pattern to meet these
external demands (Banerjee 1982:202). As a result of widespread
migration, this learning/information also spread to other parts
of the province. For example, many of the smallholder grantees
with strong links to their extended families and original
holdings in the central Punjab became the chief conduits through
which information and remittances flowed back to the home region
(Kessinger 1974, Banerjee 1982).
Canal irrigation turned out to be cheaper, easier to use,
required less time input per day, and generated a higher net
return per acre compared to well irrigated or rainfed cultivation
(Fox 1985, Sims 1988). All of these factors together resulted in
record harvests which pushed the agricultural growth rates, and
incomes, in the canal colonies far above the state average (Fox
1985) . Whereas previously bumper harvests had often rotted in
storage, this increased output was now rapidly distributed via
the government's new rail network to domestic and export markets
(Talbot 1988) ." As surpluses increased, wheat exports rose
rapidly (See Table 2.2). Wheat exports from Punjab tripled
between the 1880s and World War I (Fox 1985:55), with half-a-
million tons of wheat exported annually to Britain and Europe
during these years (Talbot 1988:39, Banerjee 1982:51-55).
Already by 1906, two of Asia's largest grain markets were located
in the Punjab (Sargodha in west Punjab and Jagraon near
Ludhiana) ." By the 1920s Punjab, which comprised one-tenth of
British India's area, accounted for a third of India's wheat
output, and a tenth of its cotton crop (Talbot 1988:38-9).
10 Although the canal-colonies' output overshadowed that of
other regions, both output, productivity and exports from the well
irrigated central Punjab also grew throughout the late 1800s, early
1900s. In terms of wages and net-income the central districts
closely followed the canal colonies. (Fox 1985, chapter 4).
1 Agricultural growth in Punjab during this period was not
hampered by lack of transportation. Starting in the 1860s, the
government began laying its 4000 mile railroad network which
connected Punjab to all major cities in the North and to Karachi
port. Simultaneously, the Public Works Department began road
construction, mainly linking the new canal colonies with major
markets and towns in other parts of Punjab. (cite Sims, Talbot)
12 In 1881-82 Punjab exported over two willion cwt of wheat to
England and Europe (a ten-fold increase over the amount exported in
1877-78), a trend that continued throughout the 1880s (Banerjee
1982:54).
" Ludhiane District Gazetteer 1970.
Table 2.2
Wheat export from colonial Punjab during 1890-1919
Year Average net export (in thousand maunds)
1890-94 8,126
1895-99 6,392
1900-04 15,339
1905-09 23,218
1910-14 26,370
1915-19 19,435
Source: Fox 1985:57
With rising output, product prices, and productivity, wages
and net incomes in the canal colonies rose, and remained higher
than the Punjab average throughout the late 19th century and upto
the 1940s (Fox 1985:61-69). Wages in the canal colonies were
over 20% higher than the Punjab average during this period (Fox
1985:69). High agricultural wages induced considerable migration
of marginal farmers, and laborers from other parts of Punjab. In
addition, agriculturally active districts outside the canal
colonies, especially in the central Punjab experienced increased
demand for its food-grains (including wheat) from the colonists
who cultivated wheat and cotton as cash crops. For example, by
1920, nearly 65% of central Punjab's gram exports were directed
towards the canal colonies (Fox 1985:75).
Moreover, unlike in some other parts of India, British
policies in the Punjab did not tax away the rising rural profits.
In fact "revenue demand" or tax rates fell significantly in the
late 1800-early 1900s. Initially set at two-thirds in the 1860s,
then at half the assessed profits, by the 1930s these rates had
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fallen to a "quarter of net assets" (Talbot 1988, Banerjee 1982).
Since land settlements were assessed once in twenty years, the
relatively low revenue demand was arguably even more favorable to
peasants: given steadily rising agricultural prices, the
proportion of the produce they had to sell to pay their revenues
fell over time -- to as low as 10% during the first World War
(Talbot 1988:54). Those who produced for export, thus generated
surpluses. By some accounts, Punjab's peasantry "ranked among
the richest in Asia" in the late nineteenth - early twentieth
centuries (Talbot 1988:53).
Thus, the colonial government's late nineteenth century
policies aimed at commercializing Punjab's agriculture bore
fruit. These policies involved on the one hand, a traditional
role of the state, now much criticized -- of providing large-
scale rural infrastructure -- by investing massively in canal
irrigation, land-settlements, rural roads ar -4 an extensive
railroad network. On the other hand it involved a strategic
focus by the government to empower groups that seemed best
situated to exploit these resources -- in this case the already
productive smallholders of central Punjab. 4 Specifically, the
4 This landownership pattern of smallholders in the central
Punjab goes back to land reforms carried out by Ranjit Singh (ruler
of Punjab from 1799-1839) in the early 19th century in these
fertile trans-sutlej regions. Ranjit Singh's policy of vesting
revenue-paying responsibilities and occupancy rights directly in
the cultivator stemmed only partly from an interest in augmenting
land revenues. It was also a mechanism for mitigating the risk of
large landlords jeopardizing the consolidation of his rule by using
their local influence and power over numerous tenants and
dependents to challenge his suzerenity.
colonial government helped shape an increasingly prosperous
agrarian middle-class out of these cultivators by: (i)
protecting their rights in land through legislation (the land
alienation bill as we will see later), (ii) making a select group
of them a central part of the newly irrigated, prestigious land-
settlements -- the canal colonies, (iii) and in addition to
irrigation, making agriculture even more lucrative by
disseminating new knowledge about seeds, implements, and cropping
patterns, and by keeping the agricultural tax burden low
irrespective of rising prices.
In a society where agriculture and land ownership was
already privileged historically, these efforts by the colonial
government in favor of this rural "elite," endowed even more
status to the practice of agriculture in the late 19th century.
To maintain this status, rural households continually reinvested
their surplus in land (see Gazetteer 1908, Kessinger 1974, Fox
1985). Indeed, temporary migration for work abroad, or
recruitment in the imperial army (as we will see below) became an
added means for small cultivators to reinforce their household's
To foil such threats to Sikh rule, Ranjit Singh removed
uncultivating proprietary intermediaries from between the state and
the actual tillers, thereby eroding the power of traditional
landowning families in the prosperous central Punjab districts
(Banerjee 1982:2-5, also see oanga 1978 and Fox 1985). The British
continued this policy of "leveling" the agrarian class structure,
in favor of the "unfettered" small peasant proprietor (Fox 1985),
and built their efforts to commercialize Punjab agriculture around
them. As most goals, this goal too was realized only partially.
landed position back home." Despite increasing wealth, then,
the social elite (mostly the cultivating jat sikhs and muslims)
remained rural.16
Apart from bestowing prestige on owner-cultivation, the
colonial government also instituted a set of "codes" and rules to
ensure that the smaller settlers performed well, and continued
cultivation instead of alienating their land to non-cultivating
owners. These included strict rules about land preparation and
water use, which were "forced" in some ways by the manner in
15 Kessinger (1974) who studied family histories in a central
Punjab village found that "the motive of the groups to send a
member overseas was to augment the position of the property group
by acquiring land through resources acquired abroad." (pp. 171-2).
16 This is not to say that the rural elite was uniformly small.
To the contrary, the colonial government made clear distinctions in
granting land to various classes and in building disciplinary
mechanisms to hold them accountable for its cultivation. Compared
to the 0.5 to 2 squares granted to smallholders subject to
compulsory residence on site, and owner-cultivation, "yeomen"
grantees got 4-5 squares (or 111 to 139 acres), and "capitalist"
grantees were given 6-20 squares (or 167 to 556 acres) (Fox 1985).
No compulsory residence was stipulated in either of the latter
cases, and purchase in five years was subject only to their
bringing under cultivation at least half of their land by then.
These larger grants were often politically driven--e.g., as
rewards for military loyalty or other forms of political patronage
-- or a result of government auctions of canal lands. (Auctioning as
a (lucrative) means of settling the colonies became increasingly
popular with the colonial government in the early 1900s). These
differential policies bred a distinct set of social relations in
the later colonies relative to the early settlements which
comprised mainly smallholders. The larger "capitalist" and even
"yeomen" grantees distanced themselves from direct cditivation,
maintaining a tiered system o-f tenants and farm servants. These
colonies were also cultivated less intensely than those controlled
by smallholders, and fewer social groups shared in their
prosperity. (See Fox [1985] for a Marxist interpretation of these
distinctions see, and Banerjee [1982] for a closer scrutiny of the
colonial administration's own records).
which canal water was released, and monitored by a large corps of
canal officers. The government controlled alienation in two
ways: initially by limiting the small cultivators' rights to
ownership in the canal colonies--purchase was possible only after
ten years of owner-cultivation as the state's tenants.?
Subsequently in 1900, by legislatively outlawing the sale of
agricultural land to non-agriculturalists (traders, artisans) (we
will examine the impact of this legislation on the excluded
groups in a later section). It is these small but prosperous
peasants, who had migrated from the central Punjab to the canal
colonies, that came to dominate the parts of Punjab that came to
India after partition.18
Thus large infrastructure investments that are seen as too
costly and inefficient today, and large-scale land settlement,
another policy that currently stands discredited as being too
centrelized, too unwieldy, expensive and hard to manage, shaped
an agricultural boom and created wealth in the agriculturally
active parts of the province. This influenced industry in two
ways -- non-agricultural accumulation and employment, and the
social impact of transformed skills.
'7 This initial ten year period became extended for much longer
leading ultimately to a massive revolt by the canal colony
smallholders in 1907.
1 A bulk of the congested, smallholder dominated central
Punjab (except Lahore district), and the populous Eastern
districts, came to constitute the Indian Punjab after 1947.
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PART II: The transformative impact of infrastructure investments:
1. New sources of non-agricultural income generation and
skill acquisition
The government's investments in infrastructure that
increased agricultural output and incomes, also simultaneously
induced growth in non-agricultural jobs and opportunities. In
contrast to the growth linkage literature which sees these non-
agricultural jobs as resulting from agricultural growth, rather
than happening simultaneously, these jobs and non-agri production
were not built off local consumption demand generated by rising
incomes. Instead, they came out of massive government
investment/ programs in construction, irrigation, railways and
new careers in the military. As we will see in this section,
these jobs, in turn, transformed local skills by putting new
pressures on artisanal workers, and exposing them to new
productive environments. In so far as these new manufacturing
tasks revised the skill base of traditional craftworkers and set
the conditions for modest accumulation through contractorships,
nineteenth century colonial investments in infrastructure
inadvertently helped groom a class of skilled workers who had
access to some capital, and was poised for entry into industrial
work in Punjab by the early twentieth century.
(i) Opportunities in trade: As we saw above, in addition
to escalation in trade, the government's colonizing of Punjab's
western frontier resulted in vast movements of peasants and
traders from the densely populated central regions to the canal
colonies in the west. A variety of new non-agricultural jobs in
the colonies induced traders and o-hers to migrate to West
Punjab. Apart from trading in agricultural inputs, helping with
storage of grain, its transportation, and cotton ginning and oil-
expelling. These non-agricultural jobs also included "public
sector" employment in the army's massive horse and cattle-
breeding stations. Increases in available land had enabled the
army to lease hundreds of acres of land for breeding horses and
cattle (200,000 acres in one district alone -- Talbot 1988) in
the region.
(ii) Construction and its ubiquity: Building the canal
network, and the simultaneous construction of the railroad
system1 9 induced a construction boom that lasted from the late
1800s to the early 1920s, and created a huge demand for labor of
various skill levels. Apart from work on the actual construction
of the canals and their main feeder lines, maintaining and
operating the canals generated substantial ongoing employment.
According to one observer, "there were bridges, falls,
breakwaters and masonry work to be looked after, banks to be
trimmed and their berms repaired, roads on the side to be kept
serviceable, and many other jobs for the proper care of the
canils. There was always some new construction work and
remodelling, surveying and designing; and whenever the canals
9 Railroad construction in Punjab began in the 1860s.
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were dry the work that could not be done otherwise had to be
quickly finished before the flow began again." (Tandon 1961:44).
Moreover, West Punjab's irrigation network was not only a system
of canals; it was also a network of planned "colonies" where
roads, houses, and other common facilities had to be built (Fox
1985, Tandon 1961). All of these tasks fuelled job growth
throughout the boom years of construction from the 1860s through
the 1920s, and raised workers' non-agricultural incomes.
(iii) Transformation of an artisanal skill-base: Not all of
this construction and related production work was unskilled.
Workers did not only labor on the canals, but the nature of the
technology used in che irrigation project allowed a greater role
for local craftsmen and artisans. Despite some of the complex
engineering feats that west Punjab's canal systems were known
for,2 0 the technology was quite simple, and the capital
equipment relatively unsophisticated (Sims 1988:75). Under the
supervision of British and Indian engineers, local metalworkers
frequently worked as small contractors on the rebuilding, repair,
replacement or maintenance of small, local parts of the system on
contract. Local craftsmen thus picked up new skills and
manufacturing experience.
A small core Of government-owned mechanical engineering
workshops run by the Irrigation department and the Railways also
20 For example the Triple Project Canal system competed in
1917. See Talbot 1988:39.
emerged during this period. These institutions became the
training ground for a large nurber of skilled and unskilled
workers. The Railway workshop in Punjab's Lahore city alone
employed over 2000 men by the early 1880s, and nearly 4000 a
decade later (Kerr 1991:67); The railway carriage and locomotive
shops that opened in 1910 added still more. Small privately
owned foundries and metalworking shops catering to these
workshops emerged around them.
Just as canal irrigation became a catalyst of rural
prosperity, then, the railways became a catalyst for the
transformation of local skills, especially through employment in
their railway workshops.2' The production processes in these
workshops, "imported almost overnight from Britain...
catapulted workers into a new work environment whose constraints
and dictates were alien to their experience." (Kerr 1991:72).
The railway workshops became virtual "centers of industrial
education," reproducing generation after generation of skilled
workers especially among the children of employees. Through on-
the-job training, and the diffusion of new techniques through
exposure these workshops and the Railway technical schools
produced a workforce with new improved skills 22 (Kerr 1991:70).
21 There were three such workshops in Punjab in the early
1900s.
22 Much of this learning that was indirectly spawned among
local workers by the laying of the railroads, and in the workshops,
was modest in nature. It exposed them to the handling of new
items, new machines, working of pieces that demanded a gaining a
different understanding of the use of metal and wood than what they
were accustomed to. But, all design and construction of
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Similarly, the Punjab Agriculture department, which co-
managed the irrigation system, involved skilled local workers in
the construction of the improved implements the department
designed for dissemination among canal colony farmers. Many
local farmers in addition turned to local mechanics and
metalworkers for the repair of these implements.
Thus, whether repairing new kinds of agricultural
implements, or working on the repair and maintenance of the large
irrigation canals, or the construction and repair of rolling
stock and equipment required to maintain 4000 miles of the
railway system in Punjab, local non-agricultural workers picked
up new skills and artisans learned to adapt their craft knowledge
to new productive processes, new tasks and equipment and to new
standards of accuracy (Kerr 1991, Saberwal 1979).
(iv) Spillovers from the lagged effects of migration.
Cultivators from central Punjab, the original home region of many
of the smallholders recruited by the government to settle the
early colonies, benefited from another kind of feedback. Given
the uncertainty involved in the move to west Punjab in that new
holdings were on government lease for ten years, and the prestige
of owning agricultural land, few of the grantees who moved west
sold their original holdings in central Punjab. These holdings
remained under the control of the larger family oi proprietary
locomotives was done in England (Lehmann n.d.).
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group in the home region (Kessinger 1974, Banerjee 1982). The
extended families of these settlers thus now had their feet in
two places. And, they shared indirectly in the prosperity
generated by the canal colonies through remittances that helped
finance capital improvements such as the sinking of wells on
properties in the home region, and through a flow back of
information about improved implements and seed selection.
In 1947, when Punjab was divided into its Indian and
Pakistani halves, this migration turned "circular." The sons and
grandsons of the sikh small-grantees of the canal colonies
returned to the Indian Punjab, either to their original homes or
as refugees. As we will see more fully in the next chapter, the
exposure of these migrants to a lifetime of practicing irrigated
agriculture on relatively large holdings, not only influenced
local practices, but also placed new demands on the skills of
local craftsmen in the migrant's attempt to figure out how to
practice irrigation in a different way -- without canals and on a
much smaller scale. One of my informants, a successful small
farmer in a Ludhiana suburb reported how his father's frustration
at having to return to well irrigation after having farmed 60
acres of canal irrigated land in Layallpur before partition, led
him to make unceasing demands on local artisans and extension
officers to help him adapt some of the techniques and implements
he had used on 60 acres, for use now on 18 acres in their
Ludhiana village (M.S. Grewal interview, 1990).
The significance of this issue is not only that mobility and
exposure to new techniques led to innovations and their spread
beyond the regions where they were first introduced; equally
significant are the particular kinds of pressures that these new
demands brought to bear on local workers, and the outcomes of
these pressures on the nature of the skill generated. Much like
what happens in the case of repair, these new demands on local
metal-and woodworkers by migrant farmers put pressure on them to
figure out how to carry out a task that they had never before
confronted or performed, and whose solution they did not know,
except for having a sense of the attributes their client desired.
More than anything, then, the nature of these demands, and the
way they played out locally, produced a particular kind of skill
among a subset of the local workforce -- the skill of the
technician, the mechanic. It focussed the workers attention on
process, experimenting with it from the start -- eg how to get a
particular operation done, and this technician or mechanic
oriented skill-base made these workers (in combination with
fragmented capital) particularly suited to learning and
understanding new processes through reverse engineering later.
In contrast to the emphasis in the literature on migration's
"draining" effect on the home region, then, this mobility of a
large number of small cultivators, and the particular nature of
this mobility -- its dual roots, and the keeping open of ties to
original properties -- resulted in the spread and spillover of
their material gains, and exposure to new processes and ways of
practicing agriculture to a much wider base. The spread-effects
of this exposure also spilt over into shaping and influencing
practices of those outside agriculture -- ie the skills of the
local non-agricultural craftsmen.
2. Recruitment in the army, remittances, and new chains of
mobility
A large proportion of Punjab's rural, and lower class urban
population shared in accumulation and mobility in a different way
-- via recruitment in the army, and serving abroad. Throughout
the late 19th century, till the British left India, Punjab, a
region comprising less than a tenth of British India's total
population size thus provided more than half of the Indian army's
troops and officers. At the eve of the first world war 65% of
the Imperial army of India was recruited from Punjab; in the
second world war over a million Punjabi soldiers served the army
accounting for more than 50% of its strength (Fox 1985:44, Talbot
1988).
This disproportionate importance of Punjab to the Imperial
army, and its concern over policing Punjab's crucial border with
Afghanistan, led the army to relocate its recruitment
headquarters in Punjab in the early 1900s, moving away from the
older recruitment centers of Bombay, Madras and Bengal (Talbot
1988).2 The significant presence of the army in Punjab till
23 One reason why so many troops from the Punjab were absorbed
in the army is also linked with the agricultural growth discussed
above. One claim is that owing to increasing agricultural
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well past the second world war had substantial impact on the
region's economy and structure of social mobility. First, with
such broad based induction of the local population into the army-
-especially from rural areas--large segments of the population
got to share in the benefits associated with the new defense
careers--stable earnings, bonuses, allowances, pensions, and
other perks.
Second, remittances from soldiers stationed throughout the
country and aborad (Afghanistan, the Middle-East, S.E. Asia, East
Africa, Flanders and other stations) since the late nineteenth
century and especially during the two World Wars added to
household income in their home regions. Since a bulk of the
recruits came from agricultural households, their remittances
served to both raise investments in agriculture and increase
rural purchasing power (Talbot 1988, Baden Powell, Badenoch
1918). For example one study conducted in 1940 found that (in
one village) although nearly 20% of this amount went to service
debt, 18% of these savings were spent by the household on home
construction, and 16% on cattle and purchase of agricultural
equipment (Fox 1985:45).
In many instances recruitment in the army, especially for
those serving abroad, became an avenue of temporary migration
abroad (most frequently East Asia, Australia, East Africa).
prosperity, better incomes and consequently better diet in many
parts of Punjab, few candidates from this region were rejected on
medical grounds compared to those from less well off regions such
as Bihar and Bengal (Talbot 1988:40-41).
Remittances from this temporary migration led to the
consolidation of family property in the home region (Kessinger
1974:171). In addition to remittances, service abroad whether
through recruitment in the army, or even the railways did two
other things. It brought exposure to work practices outside the
province and outside India; and it provided future business
contacts abroad for those returning to their home region. For
example, in the case of one sewing machine producing firm I
interviewed, one branch of the family had settled in the British
midlands after service in the army. These emigrants maintained
strong ties with the rest of the family in Ludhiana not only
remitting capital to finance their Ludhiana-based sewing machine
plant in the 1940s, but also as buyers of their sewing machines
for sale in the UK and North Africa.
Another firm, a large producer of woollen hosiery and
textiles in Ludhiana, has origins in slightly different kind of
exposure. In the early 1900s, two members of this family of
rural grain merchants who also ran a small hosiery
contractorship, were stationed in East Asia while on service with
the military (and railways). There they became exposed to
Japanese hosiery machines and hosiery processes. Upon completion
of their duty in East Asia, they used their accumulated savings
to purchase and bring back two secondhand hosiery machines from
Japan. With these machines, they set up Ludhiana's first
mechanized hosiery factory in 1923. With the assistance of local
metalworkers (Ramgarhias) they copied these machines to increase
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their capital base; soon similar versions of the machine spread
to other new hosiery firms in the market (Oswal interview 1991).
This then is an early example of exposure via government service
to new technology abroad thus spread among a wider group in the
home region through the mechanism of reverse engineering, however
rudimentary, by local craft workers.
In a similar vein, several of these rural metal workers
belonging to the Ramgarhia community, became drawn into contract
work for the railways or army inside and outside Punjab,
repairing simple tools and machinery. Those that travelled to
railway construction sites in Assam and East Africa, either
returned with accumulated savings and set up small rural metal
working shops; or stayed back and returned a generation later to
set up businesses in Punjab. One firm in my sample, now produces
auto-gears for the national market had similar origins. At the
close of the 19th century this family of skilled woodworkers
travelled to Kenya on contract with the Railway department, where
they remained in business till after independence. With
resources accumulated abroad, they financed the return to Punjab
of the next generation -- for industrial apprenticeship with
relatives in Ludhiana, and then business practice.
Finally, the longterm presence of the army's recruitment
headquarters in Punjab had a significant impact on industrial
production in the region from the demand side. Substantial, and
quite stable demand originating from the army for blankets,
uniforms, socks, woollen gear, small armaments and other
equipment was an important source of growth for the local woolen
hosiery, knitwear, and engineering industrcies throughout this
period (District Gazetteer of Punjab 1970, Imperial Gazetteer
1908, Talbot 1988). In particular, the large-scale demand from
the government for army uniforms became a major impetus behind
the setting up of "tailoring" factories devoted exclusively to
the stitching of uniforms (Marenco 1976). These factories
located in cities like Amritsar and Lahore relied on large
numbers of industrial and domestic sewing machines imported from
Japan, Switzerland, Germany and England (Marenco, Diamond
interview 1992). Demand for the repair of these machines led
many skilled urban workers to specialize in sewing machine repair
(Diamond interview - history). War-induced shortages during the
first world war led to the first instanced of sewing-machine
component manufacture in Punjab. One example involves the taking
up of sewing machine manufacture by a Ludhiana agent for the
German Durkopp sewing machine. As reported in a 1917 industrial
survey of Punjab, "on the outbreak of war and on the consequent
loss of his agency for Durkopp machines, [the agent] himself
experimented in their manufacture, with the result that in the
face of many difficulties in obtaining machinery, he has put on
the market a good sewing machine selling at a moderate price"
(Badenoch 1917:35).
The point here is that several sources of small-scale
accumulation that existed during the late 19th century -- via the
military, railways and irrigation -- converged to augment the
growth already unleashed by the colonial government's investments
in irrigation and agriculture. In addition to raising rural
incomes, these investments had a transformative impact on local
non-agricultural skills. These investments by the state also
provided continuous employment for nearly three decades of
expansion upto the 1920s, and created several sources of demand
that stimulated local enterprise, and brought exposure to
external standards which led to learning, and a revision of local
skills and industrial identities. These emerging industrial
identities became furtner consolidated during the social ferment
that emerged in the early 1920s as state investments fuelling
growth slowed down. This construction of a new identity on the
part of industrial workers and the transformation of social
institutions associated with skill and urban accumulation, was
embedded also within an upsurge of local social reform movements,
induced in part by the very success of prior colonial policies,
as we will see next.
III. Constructing a new industrial identity: The Punjab
Alienation of Land Bill of 1900, exclusion, and its aftermath
The prosperity produced over four decades of investment by
the colonial government in massive infrastructure projects in the
late 19th century, brought with it contradictions too.24
24 On the heels of four-five decades of prosperity from the
1860s to the 1920s, came a massive wave of social ferment in the
1920s. A number of regional social movements prevailed -- in each
major communal group -- the sikhs' Singh Sabha movements, the
muslims's Ahmediya movement, and the Hindus' Arya Samaj movement.
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After Punjab's annexation in 1849, British investments in
irrigation and transportation discussed above, were accompanied
by an attempt to constitute and enforce private legal rights in
land, vesting tremendous value in this asset for the first time.
On the one hand the colonial government, aided by buoyant food-
grain prices encouraged owner-operators to intensify food
production. But on the other hand rising land values and a more
rigorous drive by the government to collect taxes led to
increased peasant indebtedness. Ironically, given their new
legal rights in land, this indebtedness was fuelled by borrower
confidence in their own worth (Fox 1985, Banerjee 1982, Siddiqui
1984). In this process, and given the prestige tied to owning
agricultural land, many agriculturalists lost their land to non-
farming traders, money-lenders and/or urban professionals.
Between 1866 and 1874 for example, 231,000 acres of land was
alienated or mortgaged on average per year in Punjab; to the
These reformist and secularizing movements within the Hindu, Sikh
and Islamic communities in Punjab were in part a response to the
growing influence of the British and their institutions.
The centerpiece of these reforms was an emphasis on greater
control over their material conditions, upward mobility, new
identities based on non-ascriptive attributes (eg skill in the case
of the Ramgarhias). Each of the reforming groups emphasized
education -- primary or vocational -- to partly counter the spread
and popularity of schools and training institutes run by
missionaries and the colonial government, and hence neutralize the
appeal of some of the utilitarian policies that the British
administrators were bringing into the Punjab
It is within these social movements, which interacted also
with the growing "Swadeshi" (Buy Indian) sentiments expressed by
the gathering Indian independence movement that the revision of
identity of a skilled group (Ramgarhias) described in this section
was embedded.
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extent that by 1878, 7% of the province was "pledged" (Nair
1979:81,82; Siddiqui 1984:294; Khanna 1983:104). Fearing that
this take-over of prestigious and valuable agricultural land by
non-cultivating groups would jeopardize agricultural
productivity, output, and the raison d'etre of massive colonial
investments in rural infrastructure, the government legislated
the Punjab Land Alienation Bill in 1900.25 Aimed at
"protecting" the smallholders of the central Punjab and the canal
colonies from being preyed upon by "non-agricultural" classes,
this (non-retroactive) bill divided Punjab's agrarian structure
into "agriculturalists" and "non-agriculturalists", legally
barring the latter from owning agricultural land. Rural
artisans, craft-workers, metal workers and traders were all
categorized as non-agriculturalists, and thus effectively denied
access to, and hence upward mobility through the purchase of
agricultural land.
25 Addressing the fuller controversy in the literature
surrounding the issue of rural indebtedness in Punjab and British
response in the form of the Land Alienation Bill is outside the
scope of this paper. (See Darling 1947; Thorburn 1886; Bannerjee
1982; and Barrier 1966.) Richard G. Fox (1985), however, presents
an alternative explanation about the politics behind this Bill.
Pointing out that the "agriculturalists" being protected were
mostly muslim petty producers from among whom the colonial
government recruited its soldiers, and the bigger muslim and sikh
peasants appeasing whom was politically important to the British
vs. the "non-agriculturalists" who were mostly from non-farming
Hindu communities, Fox argues that the Bill thus supported the
colonial government's objective of maintaining "cheap recruits,
loyal landlords, contented soldiers and inexpensive rural
policing..." (49-50).
According to some historians (e.g., van den Dungen 1972, and
Kessinger 1974), having been blocked from the land market and
from access to a lucrative avenue of accumulation and social
prestige, the artisan metal-workers--in particular the Ramgarhia
community and more broadly the Viswakarmis-- who now had both
upgraded skill and some accumulated capital, turned to urban
industrial work (Saberwal 1979). They also set into motion
processes of constructing for themselves a "corporate" identity
based on their skills, rather than caste. They did so in three
ways--first, by mobilizing the community through journals and a
network of organizers to forge a common identity. The wealthier
entrepreneurs served as a resource and role-models for others,
encouraging them to invest in urban manufacturing, or at least
build upon and diversify their rural shops if they had any.
Second, by building a series of educational institutions--
schools, colleges, educational banks, training and vocational
centers to upgrade/preserve and pass their skills on to the next
generation in a systematic way (Saberwal 1979:chapter 6,8). And
third, by forming several professional associations (quasi-
guilds, or quasi-craft unions) cutting across firms of different
sizes, and often including skilled contract workers, to pressure
the institutions of the state to grant them access to land,
credit, and markets (Saberwal 1979). All of these strategies
helped establish a base for further skill acquisition,
dissemination, investment and the sharing of risk.
While some of the institutions set up by these groups are
robust and active around Ludhiana even today, their community-
based character has transformed to include other castes and
classes: skilled Ramgarhias have over time collaborated with
traders who lacked skills but had capital and knowledge about
national and international markets. These inter-sectoral and
inter-occupational alliances between firms of different sizes put
in place in a previous period, have been central to the inter-
connectedness that characterizes Ludhiana's industrial
environment today.26
In sum then, a prior opportunity to acquire new skills and
adapt old ones (e.g., through work on colonial infrastructure),
exclusion from socio-economic mobility through landownership, as
well as opportunities to accumulate small amounts of capital --
all of which were indirect outcomes of the colonial state's
agricultural policies--together created conditions that pushed
skilled, rural craft workers into industrial metal work. A
failure to look historically at the specific ways in which people
and resources have flowed between Ludhiana's rural agricultural
26 Several authors show how these skilled workers (especially
the Ramgarhias and Viswakarmis) are found chiefly at Ludhiana, in
addition to Batala, Phagwara, Patiala and a few other centers in
Punjab. Moreover, as scholars like Pathak (1970) show, metal based
industries, from their inception in the mid 1800s became localized
mainly around Ludhiana, pulled in by the prior growth of the
hosiery industry in that region. Ludhiana's hosiery industry is
believed to have originated in 1830 when a severe famine in Kashmir
led large groups of displaced skilled weavers to relocate in
Ludhiana; local traders apparently commercialized their skill in
the mid-1890s (see for example the District Gazetteer of Punjab,
Ludhiana, 1970).
and urban industrial sectors in response to state policies and
other conjunctures, then, would obscure some of the early
intersectoral roots of the region's contemporary industrial
regime.
At the same time, the colonial government's focus on
building a loyal rural elite led also to a bifurcation of career
paths of the landed rural elite and the excluded artisan or
merchant groups. Most of the influential rural and urban
families went into public service--as magistrates, judges,
educationists, city councilors--or came to control large
agricultural tracts in the canal colonies. Few, if any went into
industry. Industry thus remained in the hands of the skilled
artisans and medium sized trader groups that had small and local
capital. In the literature, and in many other parts of India,
industry is usually seen as a magnet for big capital and
prestige. In the Punjab case, by contrast, the colonial
government's policy of developing the region's agricultural
prowess for an export economy, colonization of the barren western
tracts of the state, as well as the army's recruitment policies,
indirectly helped industrialization by creating a skilled
industrial class born out of exclusion, and thus linking industry
to a subordinate, lower status group. It did so by (i) keeping
the "elite" rural, by generating attractive agrarian options for
landowning agriculturalists and the rural elite--investment in
the canal colonies, participation in modernized, progressive
agriculture protected by extending and improving the reach of
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legal institutions (e.g., the Land Alienation Bill), by preferred
recruitment in the army, and in upper tiers of government
service; and (ii) by making industrial accumulation one of the
few feasible options for the skilled non-agriculturalists, a
result just the opposite of the traditional control of industrial
institutions by a powerful elite.
Conclusions
This chapter traced the direct and indirect impacts of the
colonial government's massive infrastructural investments in
Punjab in the late 19th-early 20th centuries on agricultural
accumulation as well as the shaping of non-agricultural work
opportunities and transforming skill. This kind of traditional
role of the state--of providing large scale infrastructure -- is
criticized today for being too centralized, too costly and too
cumbersome, yet, in this earlier era, it commercialized
agriculture, produced an export economy, and created a wealthy
rural peasantry.
These investments also generated widespread mobility among
workers and cultivators. This mobility revised traditional
relations and helped break and weaken established ties of
patronage between workers (including artisans) and their
landowning clients. Lower income agrarian households
participated in a variety of these streams of accumulation--
military, farming, service abroad--to seek out and enlarge their
new economic base and sphere of social influence. Contrary to
the view of migration in much of the literature as a "drain" on
local/regional resources, migration played a central part in the
region's growing dynamism in the later 19th century. Migration
brought in savings and capital through remittances. Along with
these remittances came exposure to new skills, new ideas and new
ways of doing things.
On the heels of this prosperity came restrictive and
exclusionary legislation that excluded non-agricultural groups
from purchasing cultivable land. This led to a bifurcation of
the paths of the landed rural elite (most of whom were small-
owner operators in the Ludhiana region) and the excluded artisans
and merchant groups. Pressured by this exclusion, a whole class
of skilled workers, whose skills had recently been transformed
through work on the colonial government's own infrastructure
investments, turned to urban industrial work. Thus, although
state policies bred a fairly prosperous middle-class rural base
that was connected to world economy, this rural class did not go
into industry: a different non-peasant, lower status group went
into industry. In the next chapter we will examine the processes
and institutions that have sustained this "excluded" group in the
world of industry.
CHAPTER 3
When the marginal becomes mains tream: an excluded, small-
producer group in industry and its demand-induced growth
Introduction
The previous chapter showed how the colonial government's
sustained investments in the region's agriculture in the 19th
century, and its policy of protecting--indeed privileging--the
rights of smallholders brought prestige, political power, and
social status to agricultural practice, and generated broad-based
wealth among the peasantry. In the central and eastern regions
of undivided Punjab, dominated by smallholders, these policies
and prior land reforms, virtually precluded the rise of a clearly
defined elite class that could exercise disproportionate control
over agrarian wealth. Rural wealth was instead spread across a
large number middle-class rural households with growing incomes.
On the one hand, the lucrativeness of commercial agriculture
kept much of the Punjabi "elite" rural.' On the other hand, the
1 Elite here refers more to social hierarchy. Jat cultivators
were--and are today--at the top of Punjab's social and political
hierarchy, followed by the 'warrior' castes (Khatris), the
religious elite, and then the traders and artisans. Jats were
mostly Sikhs, but this caste is also found among Muslims (in the
Pakistani Punjab) and Hindus (in Haryana state which was a part of
Punjab before 1966). The core of Punjab's political power,
represented by control over the state's administration, has always
been in the hands of Jat Sikhs. In addition to controlling
agriculture and the state's politics, Jat sikhs are in a variety of
public and academic professions, but despite their wealth,
political influence and education, very few have gone into Punjab's
industry. Small industry, historically controlled by the "lower"
trading and artisan castes in Punjab, never seemed attractive
enough for this group. Their wealth has instead gone into real
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colonial government's concern for developing Punjab as the
granary of British India led not only to the concentration of
public investment in Punjab's agriculture, but also to policies
that aggressively preserved the rights in land of the
agricultural castes (e.g., Jat sikhs) at the exclusion of others.
A case in point is the Land Alienation Bill of 1900 which
outlawed the ownership of agricultural land by non-farming
castes, thus cutting off a whole segment of rural and urban
society--the non-agricultural castes--from participating in a
lucrative avenue of accumulation through agriculture.
Two socially subordinate groups so excluded--rural artisans
(traditional metal workers, and woodworkers), and traders and
small merchants--turned to careers in industry. A bulk of the
artisans that entered industry (mostly Ramgarhias--whose skills,
we saw in the previous chapter, had been transformed through work
on the government's railway and irrigation systems in the mid-
late 1800s) took up metal manufacturing, and over time became the
backbone of the region's light engineering industry. Most of the
non-artisans, especially merchants, constructed for themselves
elaborate distributional networks linked initially to the
production and marketing of woollen hosiery, and later to metal-
based consumer durables such as bicycles and sewing machines. 2
estate, and transportation businesses. More recently, It is
beginning to move into large agri-businesses.
2 These distinctions blurred over the years as former
merchants also entered into metal manufacturing in collaboration
with skilled workers.
But how was it that these two subordinate groups, excluded
from participating in the most prestigious and lucrative
occupation at that time--commercial agriculture--and possessing
only fragmented or modest capital, found success in industry? In
this chapter we examine in greater detail the processes and
mechanisms through which these small producers responded to and
shaped their industrial environment, focusing in particular on
their interaction with the state.
Part I briefly discusses the key characteristics that set
Ludhiana district apart from other typical districts, as well as
the ways in which it is similar to them.
Part II examines how and why small firms came to, and
continue to, dominate industry in this region. A major impetus
behind the emergence of a large number of small firms, we will
see, was a series of demand generating episodes early in the
region's industrial history. Since the second world war, a
number of successive demand surges built upon each other, and
although fortuitous, created conditions of stable growth just
when the emergent small firms most needed it.3 The second world
war was a key turning point in this regard. Although temporary,
its effects proved longer lasting: instead of being followed by a
demand slump and increased competition after war-induced
protection ended, it was followed by new demand generated by
' There has been much recent interest in the role of demand in
its various guises, as driving industrial growth. See Saxenian
(1994) for the impact of defense demand on small firm growth, and
for the role of demand emanating as a result of public policy, see
Tendler and Amorim 1996.
reconstruction needs following Punjab's partition in 1947, and
subsequently through protectiv2 legislation, such as the import
substitution regime, imposed by the government of India since the
1950s. This section emphasizes the organizational effects of the
way defense demand came to be distributed in the region, in
conjunction with the dynamics of capital flow from agriculture to
industry.
Part III examines how this growing demand, in combination
with protectionist policies, led to the emergence of a local
machinery producing sector in Punjab in the 1940s-1950s. In
contrast to other parts of India where firms producing base
machinery were either parastatals or catered to large producers,
Punjab's machinery producing firms catered mainly to the region's
small firms. This sector became a source of cheap machine tools
for local producers of metal-based goods such as bicycles, sewing
machines agricultural implements, textile and hosiery machinery.
Access to locally manufactured cheap machinery helped these firms
lower production costs from the supply-side. This in turn,
allowed them to exploit the demand opportunities created by the
government's ISI polices more effectively.
First, a word about how the Ludhiana region compared with a
typical district in the late 19th century when our story begins.
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Part I: Institutional shifts in the pattern of industrial
investment
In the mid-nineteenth century Ludhiana stood out from a
typical Indian district 4 in at least four ways.'
First, as part of the rich wheat-producing region of central
Punjab, Ludhiana, in the late 19th century, was one of Punjab's
better off agricultural districts. Unlike the large landholding
pattern that characterized Punjab's western districts, the
central Punjab region of which Ludhiana was a part, was thickly
populated by smallholders who produced commercially for the
market and generated a surplus. Although there was thus
sufficient capital in the system, the smallholder dominated
landownership pattern precluded its concentration in the hands of
a small elite as in many other agriculturally prosperous regions
inside and outside Punjab (Fox 1985, Bannerjee 1982, Darling
1947). From an early period therefore, there was no clearly
discernable wealthy elite that had disproportionate access to or
control over the region's resources, and influence over
investment decisions.6
The colonial government's refurbishment and extension of
Ludhiana's existing canal-system in the 1880s (prior to the
4 District is used here in the administrative sense.
s The historical details in much of this section are drawn
from Wall (1973) whose discussion of Ludhian7's history is based on
the 1904 district gazetteer of Ludhiana.
6 There were influential families however, with religious or
public authority.
construction of the new canal colonies in western Punjab), added
to the region's rural wealth and agricultural productivity. By
the turn of the century, Ludhiana had become an important grain
entrepot,7 and a major grain market (Jagraon, just outside
Ludhiana city was regarded as one of Asia's largest grain markets
in the early 1900s), and remained so throughout the colonial
period (District Gazetteer 1904 cf. Wall 1973, Ludhiana District
Gazetteer, 1971). Ludhiana's marketing role and grain trade
drew large numbers of traders into the area, and at the same time
that it enhanced local revenues. In 1888, taxes on the shipment
of grain that moved across the region accounted for about 75% of
Ludhiana city's municipal tax revenues (District Gazetteer of
Ludhiana 1907:218, cited in Wall 1973:80).
Second, along with the rising importance of grain trade,
came the rise in prominence of a key rural intermediary: the
grain-merchant or arhtiya. The arhtiya, based in rural society,
but not of peasant stock, mainly moved grain and money across
different social groups and sectors. As we will see later in
this chapter, this intermediary played an important role as a
financier of small enterprises in late 19th-20th century Punjab--
a role that straddled both the agricultural and the emergent
industrial sector.
/ In part because of its location on a major highway, (the
Grand Trunk road that ran from Calcutta in the East to Peshawar in
the Northwest), and a railway route linking two main north Indian
markets--Delhi and Lahore.
Apart from shoring up informal credit institutions such as
grain merchants and the familiar money-lenders, Ludhiana's
agricultural surpluses in the late 19th century also found their
way into more formally organized credit societies and local
banks. The proliferation of surplus-generating smallholders in
the region, and the broadbased spread of modest rural wealth in
the district, made these credit institutions markedly different
in character from counterparts in larger centers of commerce such
as Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. In the latter, most lending
institutions were urban based with branches gradually spreading
to rural areas. In Punjab, the progression was just the
opposite. Banks, mainly mofussil or medium sized banks,
originated here in rural interior towns' because of the rising
incomes of the peasantry, their military remittances, and profits
from grain trade, and only gradually set up urban branches
(Rungta 1970:113-4).
The origin of Punjab's banks in the interior had some
bearing on the largely local nature of their early investment and
lending patterns. In part, because these banks were relatively
small, and in part because of their location in the midst of
their rural clients they responded to local needs first, rather
than allowing the capital to finance trade and investment in big
cities outside Punjab. Many of the smaller banks did not have
branches outside the state; they held modest capital which they
dispensed locally in the early years of industrial growth in the
8 See Rungta (1970):113, 176-7
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region. Thus, there was credit available through various formal
and informal channels, but it was not concentrated in a few hands
(G.S. Randhawa 1990, Kahlon 1991, Kular 1991, 1992 interviews).
Third, in addition to the availability of small capital
through the institutions described above, Ludhiana also had a
sizeable concentration of metalworkers and blacksmiths who
had worked on the construction of the colonial government's
railroad and irrigation networks in the late 19th century, and
who subsequently took up contract jobs, and urban-based repair
and production work atcer the Land Alienation Bill of 1900
loosened their ties to land. Like a handful of other urban
centers in Punjab where similar concentrations of skilled metal-
and wood-workers were taking on new production tasks and building
up new specialties (e.g., sports goods in Sialkot, and cutlery in
Wazirabad), Ludhiana was already an important hub of woolen
hosiery production by the late 1800s. Two features distinguished
Ludhiana's rising industrial presence from other regions. First,
Ludhiana's woolen products were already being produced for export
by the late 1800s, and second, merchants played a key role in
organizing production and securing new markets for the region's
artisans and skilled workers. Ludhiana's woollen knitwear
industry, organized at that time around the skills of Kashmiri
migrants,9 for example, was driven by local Punjabi traders who
had commercialized the smi_± if the Kashmiri weavers by seeking
9 These migrants had settled in large numbers in Ludhiana
after a famine in Kashmir in 1833 (Ludhiana district Gazetteer
1970, and several other sources).
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out markets for the artisans' products inside and outside Punjab,
and telling them what there was demand for.
Initially this network of traders helped organize the export
of the region's finest woolen shawls to France and England.10
After these exports stopped in 1870 with the onset of the Franco-
Prussian war, the hosiery traders turned elsewhere for demand.
Most significantly, they brokered government demand. They helped
local producers harness the growing demand for woollen sweaters,
vests, socks, and blankets mainly from the "army, police, and
other government departments"" and from the "prosperous
cultivators of the canal colonies" (Latifi 1911, Ludhiana
District Gazetteer 1904 cf. Wall 1973). In a pattern that has
parallels even today, local sales agents helped the small
artisanal producers to cut back the production of their fine
woolen shawls, and switch instead to woollen sweaters, vests,
socks, and blankets which are far cruder items in terms of craft,
but for which there was demand.
Two issues are important to note here. It was important not
only that a network of local merchants harnessed new and varied
sources of demand after older ones collapsed, and succeeded in
organizing the skills of the region's small, immigrant wool
workers around this demand. But equally important to the wool
industry's growth, was the ability and willingness on the part of
10 See Punjab, district Gazetteers, volume XV.A, Ludhiana
District (1904) for a detailed account. Cited in Wall 1973:81.
' See Latifi 1911:30-31, 51.
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the artisans to alter their idea and system of production to
switch to newer products even if it meant lowering their
standards of craftsmanship--e.g., in the above example, socks and
army sweaters required a different skill and understanding of
production than their older trades of knitting fine shawls and
elaborate blankets. This early pattern of production not only
established an institutional relationship between trader networks
who could broker demand from a variety of sources, and skilled
artisans; but the relationship embodied a dynamic that
accomodated progressive changes in what was produced and how it
was produced, and switching to new products even if they were
"inferior" in craftsmanship than the older trades.
The link between distribution networks and skilled producers
tightened after the colonial government's Land Alienation Bill of
1900 pushed a large number of non-agricultural artisans and
traders into industry. These traders entered industry mainly as
financiers of wholesale woolen yarn trade, and as financiers of
small skilled producers and distributors of their products and of
imports. Although this influx of traders into industry happened
indirectly, as a result of legislation aimed at agriculture, the
effect was to put distributors together with producers who had
skills and small amounts of capital. This pattern deepened in
Ludhiana when a fresh wave of traders and skilled workers from
west Punjab converged on the city after partition in 1947. As
one informant put it, "bechne wale (ie those skilled in sales),
aur banane wale (and those skilled in production) ek hi jagah pe
baithe the (were sitting in the same market)." Both groups had
modest capital, and became national players only after they
combined their skills (Kular interview, 1991). Today Ludhiana is
the largest wholesale "market" of wool yarn and bicycles, sewing
machines (and parts) in the entire country."
Over time, networks of sales agents have developed around
each of the items that Ludhiana's manufacturers specialize in.
Although many former traders have themselves acquired skills and
entered manufacturing, a key feature that remains is a vast
network of sales agents and wholesalers that exist side by side
and in close interaction with the network of small producers.
They help small firms market their goods cheaply and seek out new
sources of demand when old ones fade. And like in the example
above, a key trait of the artisanal small-owners who have
succeeded in staying in business has been their ability to not
rigidly hold on to old or past standards, but to move on to new
requirements and be attentive to new needs, even if this meant
coming down to a coarser level of workmanship as we saw in the
above case, of shifting from the manufacture of fine woollen
shawls to socks and vests.
Finally, the government--specifically the army, which was a
major buyer of Ludhiana's goods--influenced the emerging system
of collaboration between distributors and skilled producers.
The army's practice of minimizing the number of intermediaries it
" Selling to wholesalers located in Ludhiana indirectly means
selling in the national market.
dealt with in its procurement process encouraged merchants and
contractors (later cooperatives) to jointly handle the purchase
of raw-materials and sale of finished products (Badenoch 1917).
At the same time, the government also influenced the adoption by
skilled artisans of new processes. For example, when hosiery
producers widely adopted knitting machines after the first World
War, the government set up small training institutions to provide
"instruction in the use of knitting machines intended for small
capitalists who wish[ed] to open small factories on their own
account" (Badenoch 1917:9). TI-nese training institutes, the
army's procurement practices, and the vast rail and road network
that the government began to lay in Punjab in the mid-1800
deepened the growing links between local producers, the rapidly
developing sales networks run my local traders, and the access
and exposure of both groups to outside markets.
By the turn of the century, thus, Ludhiana district stood out
from other typical districts in three key ways. (i) It produced
for export, not just for local consumption both in agriculture
and industry by the late nineteenth century. (ii) It was a
prosperous district, but the dominance of smallholders made it
hard to isolate a clearly identifiable elite. No single group
thus controlled access to the region's resources, although there
was enough capital in the system. The region had a concentration
of skilled workers who, in alliance with distributors, "3 or the
region's middlemen, captured large external (export) and public
sector demand which became the basis of their growth. This
alliance also allowed them to find new markets and products when
old markets died out. (iii) Finally, the government's provision
of extensive physical infrastructure in the state, and the
setting up of training institutions targeted towards upgrading
traditional artisanal skills, provided Ludhiana's skilled
artisans the ability and incentive to shift to the production of
newer, non-traditional goods.
Part II: The demand impetus behind the mushrooming of many small
firms in Ludhiana.
A second key role that the state played in shaping inter-
firm relationships in the early years of Ludhiana's industrial
growth was demand generation--mostly through defense contracts
during the second World War. This section examines various
facets of the demand impetus behind the deepening of Ludhiana's
13 This alliance is typically regarded, with good reason, as
exploitative for the skilled producers. That exploitation is not
entirely absent in Ludhiana; but the difference is that over time
there has been a blurring of boundaries in that distributors are
themselves becoming skilled, or at least have been training the
future generations that way, and the skilled workers have learned
the salience of marketing and many control vast distribution
networks of their own, and/or form consortia or networks of their
own to obtain some of the advantages that distributors who know the
market so well have. One way they have done this since the 1970s
is to make incoming skilled trainees from the family in-charge of
sales for the first several years. They travel across the country,
sometimes abroad, and "get to know the market" before they handle
other aspects of production. These processes are discussed more
fully in the next chapter.
small-firm base, and the state's role in it. Since the state's
demand generating role has been so mixed in with protection--both
inadvertent, as in the cutting off of imports during times of war
or strife, and through deliberate policy, as in the government's
import-substitution regime and tariff protection policies--we
examine exactly how this combination of demand surges and
protection played out within and across firms of different sizes.
1. The distribution of defense demand during WWII and its impact
on the organization of production
The second world war was an important turning point for
local industry in Ludhiana in several ways. During that time
many skilled repair firms experimented with the production of
hitherto imported components and parts whose supply was cut off
by the war. But most importantly, the defense department became
a major source of direct and often indirect demand for the
region's goods. Episodes of regional growth fuelled by war-time
defense demand are not uncommon. 4 What makes Ludhiana's
defense-driven industrial growth distinct is the particular way
in which this demand got transmitted across firms in the region.
As we will see below, the way in which defense contracts were
handled by the region's larger firms is significant because of
the specific relationships it helped forge, not only between
14 The role of defense demand in shaping inter-firm
relationships has been salient in several quite distinct industrial
environments. See Saxenian (1994) for an excellent recent
statement on the silicon valley's defense related growth.
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firms of different sizes, but also across sectors.
For example, as reported to me by a medium sized, Ludhiana-
based machine tool producer who started out as a hosiery
manufacturer in the early 1940s, the colonial government floated
a massive tender for knitted socks for the army during the second
World War (R.K. interview, 1990). This 20,000-socks-a-day tender
(for a fixed time period) was nationwide, but the informant firm
won it having underbid by a wide margin the only two other large
hosiery syndicates of that time both of which were located in
Bombay. In order to deliver the order on time and yet make a
modest profit on the very low bid, the firm recruited dozens of
households in the region as its "ancillaries." The parent firm
gave its new ancillaries "advances" to purchase sock-knitting
machines (which cost Rs. 20 at that time, according to the
informant) and yarn which it bought against quotas from the
government at bulk rates. To finance these up-front costs the
firm in turn borrowed credit from arhtiyas or grain merchants who
have seasonal (agrarian) surpluses to lend at interest. At the
end of the defense contract there were, according to the
informant firm-owner, "at least 500 new small and tiny hosiery
units in Ludhiana." These units initially drew upon each other
and their medium-sized "benefactor's" connections to first build
an understanding of the industry, and then to produce for the
market directly."
15 See Tewari 1990 for more detail on this subsequent points
in this sub-section.
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One other factor crucially helped these fledgling firms
stabilize, grow, and consolidate their own position in the
market. This was continuing demand from several sources during
the period of their initial growth. As we saw in the previous
chapter, Punjab was of disproportionate importance to the
imperial Indian army throughout the late 19th century up to the
end of colonial rule in 1947. For example, in both the first and
second World Wars, more than half the total strength (over a
million people) of the imperial army was recruited from Punjab, a
province that had only a tenth of British India's population (Fox
1985). By the early 1900s the army had shifted its recruitment
headquarters from Bengal and Maharashtra to Punjab, where the
army's presence remained entrenched till independence in 1947.
This continued military presence in Punjab, including in
cantonments around Ludhiana, generated sustained demand for a
variety of goods that local firms produced--pullovers, knitted
vests, uniforms, belts, socks and other products. This provided
the new, smaller firms with a ready market just when they most
needed it--early in their firm-histories when they were trying to
get an independent footing in the industry.
As the hosiery industry became consolidated in Ludhiana,
skilled workers engaged in the repair or hosiery machines took to
the production of machine parts and eventually the whole machine,
and its related tools and equipment. Foundries emerged by the
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late 1930s (District Gazetteer of Ludhiana, 1970) .1 As we will
see later in the chapter, the significance of Ludhiana's hosiery
industry lies not merely in its own expansion, but also in the
way in which it stimulated the growth of the engineering and
other metal based industries in the region.
2. Organizational lessons from the way war-time demand came to
distributed across firms in the region
The above example illustrates several points. The first set
of points concerns the nature of linkage between the region's
firms and agriculture--in particular, how capital flowed from
agriculture into industry. The second concerns how the search by
firms for profitability in the face of low profit margins
influenced the nature of inter-firm relations and subcontracting
that later developed in the region.
(a) Issues of lag, and financial flows from agriculture to
small industry
(i) The first point this example illustrates is the way in
which agricultural surpluses flowed out to finance capital
formation in industry via a key set of intermediaries who
straddled both the agricultural and industrial sector. Grain
brokers or arhtivas have played a significant financier role in
Ludhiana's small-firm development since 1906 when an important
6 Foundries in other parts of Punjab e.g., Lahore, Sialkot,
Batala -- and even a few around Ludhiana -- had made an earlier
start catering to the needs of the Railway workshops, canal
construction and flour and sugar mills in the late 1800-early
1900s. See Latifi 1911, and Badenoch 1917.
102
grain-market was established in a suburb of Ludhiana (Jagraon).
This grain market was set up to handle huge surges in
agricultural production in Ludhiana district following the
colonial government's aggressive efforts to boost output in light
of a series of "scarcities" or near-famine conditions in the late
1800s.'7 The government invested heavily in irrigation and
related infrastructure -- roads, railways. As we saw in the
previous chapter, these investments greatly enhanced agricultural
output and led to broad-based prosperity in Punjab's
agriculturally active districts.'8 The arhtiya, or the rurally
based grain merchant played a central role in handling this
increased agrarian wealth. They coordinated sales of farmers'
crops, acted as export intermediaries, and made hefty profits as
brokers in moving surplus agricultural stock across the country.
Many grain merchants themselves invested forward in ginning, oil-
pressing and other processing mills; but a large number also lent
surplus capital on interest to others who were known to them and
were investing in productive units in towns and cities within
their districts, as the above example showed.
Two points emerge here about the way in which linkages
between agriculture and industry played out in this region, and
which might also be pertinent for other settings. First, that
17 Specifically in 1860-61, 1869-70 and finally in 1877-78
(See the District Gazetteer of Ludhiana 1970:241-245).
8 Between 1898 and 1914, for instance, wheat production in
Punjab increased by roughly 60% and that of cotton by 77.3% (Nair,
1979:78,128).
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agriculture-industry linkages may have an important lag element
that deserves greater invescigation. The above example suggests
that instead of the post-independence agricultural modernization
in Ludhiana, which most existing studies cite as having induced
the rise of small firms in this region (Johar et.al 1983, Gosal
and Krishan 1984, Thapar 1972)," it may have been this much
earlier period of agricultural growth 20 that in part stimulated
small industry, and influenced the relationship between large and
small firms. And it influenced these interfirm relations not
througn consumption expenditure multipliers--but rather through
indirect investment links2' financed by non-farming rural
intermediaries such as the grain merchants of this region. Post-
independence production and consumption links between industries
such as hosiery, machine tools, cycles, and increased purchasing
power and changing demand conditions in the mid-1960s, in turn,
seem to have reinforced these earlier patterns, not generated
them.
This leads to the second point. Rather than assuming that
surpluses from an agriculturally dynamic region will necessarily
flow into or influence local industry, it is more useful to
19 See Child and Kaneda (1975) for a similar argument in the
case of Pakistani Punjab.
20 And subsequent periods of agricultural growth as in the
1950s.
21 See Hart (1989a), Harris (1989), and Berry (1985) for
discussions about the crucial role cf investment in engendering, or
not, linkages between a dynamic and modernizing agriculture and
regional industry.
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understand the mechanisms by which this may happen and under what
conditions. For example in the case cited above it was not
peasants who were themselves investing across sectors, nor the
state or the banking sectors distributing rural revenues
indirectly, but rather it was the non-farming grain merchant--
usually thought of as an exploitative middle-man--that proved to
be the crucial broker-connection between agricultural surpluses
and local industrial investment." But it is also important to
note that a central reason why agricultural resources could flow
into industry in the absence of any direct state intervention is
because production was organized in such a way that the bigger
firm--with the collaboration of a large number of small firms--
could successfully capture and capitalize on the region's
intersectoral investment potential.
22 Paul London's (1970) work on the role of the rural trader
in spreading the adoption of fertilizers among farmers in Punjab
and U.P. is one of the few studies that examines the developmental
role of the merchant in contrast to the neglect of this group by
government policy and much of the literature on grounds of it being
the "problem" than an agent of positive change. More recently
industrial studies have begun to focus on the condiLions under
which traders can play a growth-enhancing role in small firm
clusters (see Schmitz 1995).
23 Contrast this situation with the case of the Muda region
in Malaysia described by Hart where surpluses generated due to the
irrigation scheme were concentrated more sharply in the hands of a
few groups who found it more lucrative to invest their money in
real estate in the capital city, or on other non-local expenditures
-- like Haj travel. The region's political economy together with
the Malaysian government's macro-policy created conditions which
failed to retain the effects of Muda's enhanced incomes within the
region.
Just the opposite seems to have occurred in Punjab. Although
resources did flow out of the region, e.g., for travel abroad for
employment or immigration, a considerable amount was invested
locally. Given that a large number of people had small surpluses,
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(ii) Second, as we saw above, it was not consumption or
expenditure links resulting from rising per capita incomes that
induced local industry in Ludhiana's hosiery sector, but rather,
a bulk of these small firms started out producing for the
government, located outside the state. The state through its
defense expenditures, then, played an important but indirect role
in generating the demand and thus setting the conditions for
attracting investment and enabling accumulation in a number of
small firms in Ludhiana during this period. Thus, although many
aspects of Ludhiana's small firm growth today resemble the
classic features of agriculturally induced industrial growth, a
key impetus for the region's earlier growth described here
actually came from outside of agriculture--from the state. In
other words: (1) The theory of growth linkages gives a key role
to demand that is internal to the region resulting from rising
agricultural incomes, but the demand discussed here is exogenous,
and from the public sector. (2) the theory emphasizes backward
linkages through private sector purchases; but this is a case
backward linkages through public sector purchases. (3) Finally,
this demand-side influence of the public sector is often ignored
because the public sector is usually thought of as providing
supply-side conditions for small firm growth (subsidized credit,
it was too costly for these small investors to try bigger external
markets. Furthermore, since Punjab itself was an economically
growing, not a stagnant region, it proved profitable to invest
locally.
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investment, infrastructure) .24
(b) Low profit margins, nature of the product and a
sustained pattern of decentralized production
(i) The mushrooming of a large number of small and tiny
firms during this period occurred not merely because of defense
contracts, but because of the way in which the region's
large/medium firms organized production. Instead of choosing to
produce the entire order of socks in-house 21_-which on the part
of the contract winning firm would mean investing in vast amounts
of dedicated machinery and adding to permanent capacity--we saw
that the winning firm, even though it was not small, opted to
subcontract parts of the order out to many new, small firms. The
impetus behind this way of organizing production was the large
volume of production, and most crucially, a low bid and hence low
profit margins. The low bid helped the Ludhiana firm wrest the
prestigious contract from bigger, more established Bombay
producers. But at that low quoted cost the firm couldn't
conceivably produce the order in-house and still make a profit.
Low profit margins and the pledged low end-product prices led to
cost cutting strategies such as engaging smaller ancillaries.
This linkage between low profit margins, low costs, low end-
product prices and ancillarization (specialized contract work) is
a pattern which prevails in Ludhiana up to the present day.
24 For recent studies that focus on the n'blic sector's demand-
generating role on small-firm growth and attempt to correct this
imbalance see Tendler and Amorim (1996).
25 As the Bombay firms were proposing to do.
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(ii) Finally, to understand why production in this sector
continues to be organized in a highly decentralized fashion we
need to look at the nature of the tasks that hosiery production
involves. Although a detailed analysis of the hosiery industry
is outside the scope of this section, it is important to note
that in contrast to activities such as spinning which have
significant economies of scale, hosiery (e.g., knitted outerwear)
technology is highly divisible up and can be broken up into
various stages that can be decentralized into separate,
specialized firms. For example, there are firms that do only
dying work, others that only knit, and yet others that embroider
(see Singh 1990, Sikka 1990).29 Ludhiana has both a spatially
compact organization of work--where firms from several key
industries are located in close proximity--and an infrastructure
of brokers and intermediaries who facilitate labor exchanges, job
work and subcontracting among specialized shops. Moreover, as
several firm owners pointed out in interviews, no single firm
then bears all the risk--of investment, changing demand and
tastes, and even while labor costs are cut substantially (because
of fewer workers per firm), labor management is "not cumbersome"
under such arrangements--reasons that are quite consistent with
the findings of many other studies of small, interconnected
29 See Cawthorne (1989) for a similar break-up of the
components involved in knitted hosiery in Tirrupur, Tamil Nadu,
Indi".
In Ludhiana, the same is true for the cycle and sewing machine
industry, where a variety of firms produce the separate parts,
each requiring several distinct operations which in turn are done
"outside" by specialized service providers.
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producers.
The divisible nature of technology, especially in the
hosiery, bicycles, and sewing machine parts industries, has
continued to reproduce the fragmented, interconnected nature of
production, as we will see in subsequent chapters. Yet, firms in
Bombay and Calcutta who were in the same sectors, did not go this
route. This is mainly because the origin of these larger
producers in Bombay was different. Possessing the capital needed
to invest in integrated operations, they started out with the
production of all components and phases of work inhouse. The
small producers that existed around them catered to a different,
cruder segment of the market, there was thus more of a
disarticulation between the big houses and the smaller sector
around them. In Ludhiana by contrast, few groups had the capital
to internalize all operations under one roof. Firms thus started
out as component producers (in the metal trades) or specialized
in specific segments of production or work processes. As more
and more components came to be produced in the region, assemblers
emerged, fuelling further growth through backward and forward
linkages, as we see next.
30 See John Harris (1981) for an analogous argument for
Coimbatore's small-firm sector.
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Part III: The supply Response: Import restrictions and the
emergence of a cheap, local machinery-producing base in Ludhiana
The above discussion showed how a large number of small
firms emerged in Ludhiana's hosiery industry at the end of the
second world war as a result of the way in which the region's
firms distributed the government's defense demand in order to
sustain themselves on low profit margins. But demand surges
created by conjunctures of war are notoriously short-lived. New
entrants drawn in by war-time booms often exit as rapidly after
the temporary surge in demand subsides. According to much of the
literature, the smallest firms are the most vulnerable, and the
first to go under. How did these new firms born during the
temporary surge in production during the second world war
survive? Two factors played a role--one fortuitous, and one
related to the region's organization of production.
First, rather than being followed by a post-war slump, the
expansion of demand during World War II," was followed,
fortuitously, by a series of new demand surges. Only two years
after the war ended, independence and Punjab's partition in 1947
brought an upsurge of reconstruction demand by the state
" This demand which opened up during the war period of the
early 1940s was selective in its impact on factory production. It
did not benefit all industries equally: it raised output primarily
in those industries which were important to the war effort. In
Punjab these included woollen hosiery (socks and knitted outwear
such as pullovers, jerseys, blankets), sewing machines used for
tailoring of army uniforms as well as tailoring woollen hosiery,
and the spare parts of these machines which were difficult to
import because of the war (see Singh 1990:72-3).
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government; followed by the opening up of massive domestic
demand when the government of India imposed its import
substitution regime in the early 1950s."
Second, around the time of partition a major
decentralization of production occurred in the hosiery industry
with the emergence of several new tiers of traders and
specialized producers (Wall 1973). Changes were also occurring
in the region's metal industry. In part because of the ISI
regime which curtailed imports of goods such as bicycles,
machinery and other consumer durables, it became lucrative for
local repair shops to take up the production of components. As
more and more components of hosiery machinery, bicycles and
sewing machines came to be produced in the region, assemblers
emerged and absorbed more and more of the output of local parts
producers.
At the same time a machinery sector grew which significantly
lowered production costs for the region's small firms. These
lower production costs allowed a larger number of local firms to
32 This discussion sheds light on another issue. The
literature on Punjab's industrialization often cites its small-firm
bias as rooted in the influx of enterprising immigrants from
western Punjab upon the state's partition in 1947, many of whom
started small businesses as a means of rehabilitation. But this
inflow of a large number of displaced immigrants from Pakistan did
not in and of itself translate into a mushrooming of "dynamic"
small and medium firms in Ludhiana. Rather, it was the
simultaneous opening up of massive domestic demand that
fortuitously allowed these eNergent firms to stabilize and grow.
Import restrictions and protection were the key impetus--from the
demand side--which allowed new firms to find markets for their
output relatively easily.
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exploit the new surges in demand. The source of lower production
costs was the emergence of a cheap machinery and tools
manufacturing base in Ludhiana and neighboring districts that
catered specifically to small producers. I trace the key
features of this process below.
(i) Exploiting demand surges in an environment of scarcities, and
its influence on local skills and capabilities:
The cutting off of imports during the second WW, and the
simultaneous escalation of demand from the army for woollen
pullovers, sweaters, and socks was accompanied by severe
shortages of woollen yarn and knitting machine parts and needles.
While a few local metal workers repaired and reconditioned
knitting machines and parts at that time, knitting needles and
most of the yarn (wool-tops and shoddy) were imported. Given the
urgency of the government's own war needs, its solution was to
fix supply quotas for dyed woolen yarn and knitting needles. The
defense department's purchasing agency distributed knitting
machine needles, and a fixed quota of dyed yarn per fixed order
of jerseys and socks -- e.g., 150 bales of yarn for 100 pullovers
-- to firms that won the government's supply tenders (personal
interview, Raibahadur 1992)." But increased competition
between firms (nationwide) who were vying for these same supply
" In fact, it was in the inter-war period that the government
first considered developing the local industrial base, and with
that goal in mind, set up an industrial review committee to examine
issues of tariffs and protection for local firms.
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tenders from the government pulled down profit margins as we saw
earlier. Ludhiana's firms coped with these low profit margins by
subcontracting, as we saw in the previous section, and by
increasing efficiency. One way in which firms increased
efficiency (as I illustrate below) was by increasing output and
reducing wastage--a pattern that characterizes the region's
organization of work even today. The point to note in the
illustration below is how reduction of wastage was an inadvertent
effect of the search by firms of ways to increase output and
shore up margins in the context of a quotas and input scarcities.
"Forced" efficiency and the broadening of skills: an
example. A medium sized woollen hosiery firm that started
production on a small scale in 1926 1 reported that in the
inter-war years and during World War II, firms tried to make up
for low margins by increasing output. They did so in a variety
of ways. One way was to economize on the fixed quota of dyed
yarn that the government gave them (150 bales of yarn for a
supply order of 100 pullovers), and to use the saved yarn to
produce extra pullovers which they sold at a higher premium in
the local market. Since the yarn was procured only by firms that
1 Raibahadur (RB), personal interview 1992. Several of the
firms I have used to illustrate my points are medium sized firms
today (with investment upto Rs. 15-20 million and about 100-150
workers spread over one or two units) that started out as small
fir-Las. I use these firms because they have the longest history of
my sample and best illustrate the process of evolution, change and
continuity in some of Ludhiana's most enduring productive
practices.
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won tenders to supply sweaters to the army, this economizing on
yarn could not come at the cost of pullover quality because the
order had to meet the army's strict requirements of color, size,
knit, and design.
The interviewee firm and a few of its colleagues economized
instead by eliminating wastage by using new kinds adaptations to
standard knitting machines which they developed together with
local machinery repair and reconditioning firms. To take one
example, the standard practice of producing jerseys and pullovers
at that time involved knitting the body and sleeves of the
garment separately on different machines and then sewing them
together using industrial sewing machines. In this process, the
sleeves generated the most wastage. Sleeves were knit singly on
9-inch knitting frames as rectagles that were 9-inches wide,3 5
and as long as the sleeve needed to be. These rectangular pieces
were shaped by cutting off a strip down the length so that the
wrist tapered down to 4 inches during the actual stitching. A
long, sleeve length knitted strip was thus invariably wasted for
every sleeve. To eliminate this wastage, and put the saved yarn
to better use, in the late 1930s-early 1940s the interviewee firm
and a few other hosiery producers turned to local mechanics for
help with modifying the standard machines. Their solution was to
replace the standard, imported knitting machine's 9-inch cylinder
with a 14-inch cylinder, so that the knitted sleeve-rectangle
3s The width was 9 inches to accommodate the armhole.
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would now yield exactly two, diagonally stacked sleeves of the
exact dimensions (9" for the armhole + 5" at the wrist on each
side. 9+5 = 14).
The superfluous strip was thus fully eliminated. Hosiery firms
saved on yarn, which they used to increase output to sell on the
open market at a premium and shore up their margins.3
Although not on par with imported machines in terms of
quality and their economic life, the locally adapted machines
provided adequate quality of knit despite their shorter economic
life (RB interview, 1992). These modifications moreover were
cheap. They were cheap not only because they were carried out by
local mechanics, but also in part because the innovation was
simple. It involved copying the existing design of the 9--inch
cylinder to make one of a larger size that suited the knit that
the hosiery firms required, and substituting it for the standard
9-inch cylinder on a regular knitting frame body.
But two other features were important. First, that there
was skill in the region to attempt such modifications, and that
small producers had easy access to these skilled workers and
36 Some firms simply sold the extra yarn to other producers at
a premium.
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mechanics. Second, a key pressure on the mechanics that focussed
their efforts, was the strict quality code imposed and enforced
by the final customer whom the hosiery firms served--the colonial
government's defense agency. Woollen pullovers and socks hardly
compare with the narrow latitude for deviance from standards that
armaments and other "harder" war-supplies impose on producers.
But within the codes for size, design, and quality that the
government's woollen gear did have, the mechanics had to be pay
attention to certain demands of quality. If the hosiery
suppliers wanted repeat orders, they had to supply the government
the quality of goods it needed and in a time frame that the
government set. That this quality threshold was relatively low,
may explain why the metalworkers succeeded, or even attempted to
make the modifications in the first place. But more important
even in this regard was that the demand that the hosiery firms
placed on the machinery manufacturers was not abstract, but
highly specific: once the solution was discovered, the workers
had a model (e.g. the 9-inch cylinder) to work from and did not
have to begin from scratch.37
Once introduced, the modification became ubiquitous across
Ludhiana's hosiery firms. This adoption had broader spillovers.
It also led the repair mechanics who made the modifications to
eventually produce the entire knitting machine (RB interview,
1992). The process thus improved the output and earnings of the
37 The "forced" innovation came from copying and modifying
what existed.
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small hosiery producers, broadened the skills of local mechanics,
and deepened the region's productive structure through backward
linkages. 38
(ii) Import controls, demand escalation, and the creation of a
cheap, local, machinery base geared towards small firms
A similar process occurred in the growing metal-based
consumer durables industry. The rising standard of living among
Punjab's peasantry, as well as the location of the imperial army
in Punjab raised local demand for consumer durables. According
to the Punjab District Gazetteer of Punjab 1907, "the circulation
of...currency [doubled] between 1891-1904; deposits in postal
banks increased by [27%] ... and wages rose twice as high as in
[the mid 1800s];".. ."[The peasantry's] increased means enabl[ed]
them to travel more, eat better food, wear better clothing." And
"In the towns, cheap European luxuries, such as German watches,
...shoes, bicycles find a considerable sale.." (1907:70,72).
Many local households owned goods such as bicycles. Similarly,
the growth of the hosiery industry and the army's presence in
Punjab increased the demand for goods such as sewing machines
(industrial and tailor models) for stitching uniforms, pullovers
38 The solution seems an obvious one; and there is no way of
knowing whether firms in other regions thought of the same thing or
not--but that is less important. It is clearly a major a set to be
part of a productive environment where a small firm (the hosiery
producer) can turn to another local small producer (the repair
mechanic) to successfully innovate at relatively little cost on an
imported machine without sacrificing on the quality requirements of
its final buyer (the army).
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and other items (Marenco 1974 ck); as well as for repair work.
Faced with shortages during WWII in the availability of
spare parts many of these repair firms took to producing
replacement parts and components themselves. Shortages in the
availability of nuts and bolts and other fasteners in the
replacement market for auto-parts similarly drew in producers
into that line of work. After partition these metal-based
consumer durable industries got a further boost when several non-
artisanal traders from former West Punjab, who formerly held
local agencies for the distribution of sewing machines and
bicycles, also entered into the production of parts and assembly
of sewing machines and bicycles upon their arrival into India, in
partnership with skilled local artisans."
As the firms producing metal components grew in importance,
the local machine tool industry whose beginnings we partially
traced above, also gathered steam. Three demand-enhancing
factors influenced its growth: growing demand from the region's
* A point worth noting here concerns the role of imports in
creating demand and as a means of exposure to outside standards and
products. The agriculturalists and urban middle classes in this
region already consumed goods from industries outside the state and
country -- e.g., German bicycles, watches, British and Japanese
sewing machines. As Hirschman pointed out in 1958, regions or
countries "tend to develop a comparative advantage in [producing]
the articles they import" because "imports fulfil the very
important function of demand formation and demand reconnaissance
for the country's entrepreneurs" (1958:122, 123).
Similarly, the consumption of items not locally produced,
created demand for repair. In fulfilling tis need, local workers
learned about the nature of the product through
working on its replacement and reconditioning. At the same time,
this prior set of imports created a niche, and a need for the
manufacture of these goods later on.
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metal-based industries; massive reconstruction needs after the
partition of Punjab in 1947; and protection from import-
competition after the government of India embarked on an
elaborate import substitution program (ISI) in the early 1950s, a
few years after partition.
On the one hand, high import tariffs (on consumer goods)
protected local industry from outside competition, allowing for
its growth. But on the other hand, these tariffs (on some
producer goods) also created severe shortages of intermediates
and machinery by raising input and costs, thus constraining these
firms' ability to easily exploit the opportunity for
expansion.40 The primary response to the ISI policy was the
government's own. It invested in creating domestic machinery
making capacity--mostly in large public sector parastatals such
as Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT), although a few large private
sector firms also emerged (such as Bombay-based Kirloskars) . But
the machinery produced by these large public and private firms
met the needs mainly of other parastatals or large private firms.
Their machines were of too large capacity, and too expensive for
small firms to afford.4' A different kind of machine tool
40 This strategy of protection differed from the import
substitution practices that prevailed in Latin America (such as
those recommended by ECLA) . Following the Feldman/Mahalanobis
models, the Indian government sought to cut off imports not only of
consumer durables, but also of some basic machinery in order to
build a basic goods (e.g., steel) and machinery building base
domestically.
41 Thus, as much of the literature critical of import
substitution industrialization argues, protection, in this early
period seemed to benefit larger firms more than smaller ones.
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industry developed in Punjab in response to the same import
substitution policy: it comprised manufacturers who were
themselves small in scale, and who produced for customers that
were also primarily small in scale." As we saw in the
previous section, a majority of these small scale machine tool
producers were skilled metal workers (Ramgarhias) with roots
mainly in repair, reconditioning, and contract work for the
Railways or the Punjab government's irrigation department.
In Ludhiana specifically, two changes occurred after
partition, that drew a bulk of the these small producers, both of
machine tools and metal-based consumer goods, to spatially locate
in and around its vicinity. First, as the hub of north India's
hosiery industry, had an evolving industrial infrastructure, and
a widespread skill base. It had trading and distribution
networks, service providers and training institutions. It also
had a large concentration of skilled workers, the Ramgarhias, who
were involved in the metal trades, including the production of
hosiery machinery, and after WWIT and partition, the production
of metal components for other final goods such as bicycles and
sewing machines.
Second, after the partition of Punjab in 1947 Ludhiana
became one of the main destinations for immigrants from Pakistan
Smaller firms relied on second hand machines.
42 Coimbatore was another region with a response similar to
Punjab's.
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-- especially those who already had their own businesses
(manufacturing or trade) in former west Punjab,43 or had
industrial skill, and were looking for a viable place in which to
restart their factories, and/or find industrial jobs. Ludhiana
had a central location within Punjab, away from the troubled
border; it already had a vibrant hosiery industry, and a growing
light engineering base. But most importantly, these
entrepreneurs and workers were drawn to this region by the new
serviced industrial sites and cheap housing that the government
of Punjab developed in Ludhiana for distribution in easy
installments to immigrants from Pakistan and other entrepreneurs
who wanted to relocate away from Punjab's violent border in the
late 1940s. The government of Punjab launched this program
explicitly to revive the disrupted economic base of the state by
developing Ludhiana as a major industrial center within Punjab
(Luthra 1948) ." In order to help local firms rebuild the
region's industry the government provided cheap serviced land in
three industrial estates in Ludhiana, located the state's key
industrial extension institutes, R&D centers, quality-enhancing
institutions such as the Ludhiana Productivity Council, Quality
Marking centers, and a key joint facilities center (the
Industrial Development Institute) around these estates. It also
4 Chiefly the manu:--'- of cycle parts and sewing machine
parts.
"4 The older centers of Lahore, Sialkot, Wazirabad, Karachi had
gone to Pakistan, while Amritsar--the only other major industrial
center that came to the Indian Punjab (other than Ludhiana and
Jullunder) was on the border and disabled by violence.
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targeted skilled workers in particular, giving them modest loans,
industrial sites and housing (on installments) to take up
production in Ludhiana.
Industrial growth thus took off rapidly in Ludhiana in the
late 1940s, and the period between 1951-1960 was the region's
major phase of industrial expansion after independence (Sharma
1988, Pandit 1985). Between partition in 1947 and the mid-
sixties, capital employed in Punjab increased 24 times compared
to 10 times for the country as a whole; employment in factories
increased 4 times in Punjab when for the country it little more
than doubled; industrial output grew 10.4 times in Punjab while
in the nation it grew 2.3 times; and output per person in Punjab
increased 1.4 times compared to 0.6 times in the nation as a
whole (Sharma 1988:79,80). Moreover, unlike the dismal record of
industrial estates in most parts of India, Ludhiana's industrial
estates were regarded amongst the most successful in the country
(Dhar and Lydall 1961, Ford Foundation 1966). But this growing
concentration of a large number of metal-based small firms in one
region created bottlenecks in the procurement of base machinery.
Machinery importers in Bombay and Calcutta demanded large
advances and charged hefty premiums as insurance against doing
business with firms located in a state reeling under the chaos of
partition (Oswal interview, R.K., Bhogal). On the heels of this
came the government's ISI policy in the 1950s, and hefty tariffs
on imports.
These pressures that created substantial demand for cheaper
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machine tools from within Punjab, encouraged several skilled
artisans in Ludhiana and Batala (four hours from Ludhiana, and
the home of a large number of ironworkers and foundries) to begin
local manufacture of simple general purpose machines--lathes,
milling machines, and hand tools--and other machinery that was in
local demand. A start had already been made, as we saw in the
previous section, with the manufacture and modification of
specialized machines in the hosiery industry. Foundries and re-
rolling mills had emerged in Ludhiana's vicinity (Khanna and
Gobindgarh), workers with varied skill in metal work were widely
available, manufacturers of complex sewing machine components
since the 1930s had spawned workshops that carried out
specialized processes, and now, with a growing local market,
machinery production became profitable.
Metal workers engaged in repair and reconditioning responded
to this demand for cheap, more suitable machines. Building
upwards from the specific needs of their clients, and learning
through reverse engineering by copying existing models, these
metalworkers/mechanics began to put together machines that local
firms most commonly used, and which were previously imported or
purchased from distant markets.45 Because this production was
carried out and organized by repair mechanics who had craft
skills, but little capital, and who worked closely with their
customers, the structure of the machine tool industry took on
4s They produced mostly simple, general purpose machine tools
such as lathes, drills, power presses, grinders, shapers, milling
machines, planers, small tools and hand tools.
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distinctive characteristics: most producers started small, as did
a bulk of their clients. They built networks around themselves
which they call their "infrastructure" comprising of loosely
coupled mobile teams of skilled workers, workshops that focussed
on single processes such as tempering, casting, forging, and so
forth, which allowed them to produce profitably while economizing
on their limited capital.
In the late 1950s, less than a decade after partition, these
producers broke into national markets. A national survey
conducted by the Government of India in 1956 found that a single
district of Punjab, Batala, alone "produced nearly half of the
national output of machine tools in the private sector" (Sharma
1988:78) 4
By the 1950s then, production firms in Punjab and Ludhiana
had a sizeable machinery making base at their own doorstep -- a
base they could draw upon to craft tools and equipment that was
much more closely tailored to their needs than any standard set
of machines. Equally salient, these machines cost far less than
the equipment produced by the government's parastatals and large
private firms. A study comparing a workstation produced by
Ludhiana firms with that prepared by firms like HMT, found for
example, that the Ludhiana produced machine cost about half (55%)
the price of the standard equipment for output of identical
" An important byproduct of this machinery base has been the
development of a quite sophisticated hand-tools industry in Punjab,
one of the region's premier exports today.
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quality (Asian Productivity Organization 1981:52-53) .47, 48
As a result of the local presence of an import-saving, -heap
machine tool base, production costs fell for firms in Ludhiana
and Punjab that used these machines and tools to produce products
such as bicycle parts, sewing machines and parts, diesel pumps
and agricultural implements. This happened at the same times as
demand for them increased through the introduction of the
government's ISI regime and tariff protection. Thus, as domestic
demand for locally produced goods increased, Ludhiana's small
firms were able to capitalize on it more efficiently and
economically than small firms in other parts of the country who
lack access to similar resources at low cost. As we will see in
the next chapter, Ludhiana's small firms lowered overheads,
minimized wastage and economized on capital in a variety of ways
to compete successfully by the early 1970s, not only with other
small firms, but even with the large firms that produced the
See the Tokyo-based Asian Productivity Organization's study
of the processes used in Ludhiana to produce the bottom-bracket
axle (a bicycle component requiring considerable precision) vs that
used by larger firms in other parts of India (1981:Chapter 4).
48 Despite the obvious merits of these small machine producers
-- and the national demand for their products, e.g., all circular
knitting machines in the country are made in Ludhiana even today --
there is still disdain among several policy-makers for these "peon-
to-proprietor" small producers of Punjab. Perhaps the time it took
local firms to learn to improve quality in the 1950s-1960s, their
use of lower grade steel for manufacturing machine bodies, and the
facc that the machines were made by skilled workers and mechanics
rather than engineers, might be some reasons for the relative
neglect by outside observers, until recently of these efforts.
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products they came to specialize in -- bicycles and sewing
machines.
Conclusions
To summarize then, this section focussed on the other side
of the demand surges faced by Punjab's small firms. It argued
that the very sources that created large demand which helped
boost local output during this period, also put impediments in
the standard path available to local firms to meet this increased
demand--the path of relying on cheap imports. That is, due first
to war, then the ISI regime, rising demand was accompanied by
severe restrictions on imports, which blocked local access to
machinery, spare parts, and other intermediates that would help
firms meet growing demand for woollen hosiery (during World War
II), sewing machines and bicycles.4 9 These pressures, which
prevented local firms early in the region's industrial history
from following the standard route of relying on imports of
intermediates and spare parts, opened up new opportunities for
skilled workers, metal mechanics and artisans. Most of them were
part of the Ramgarhia community that had been building for itself
an industrial base since the Alienation of Land Bill of 1900
49 For example, to fulfil hosiery and army uniform orders
during the war, firrm :-- knitting machine needles, sewing
machines and sewing machine maintenance (spare parts) which were
all hitherto imported from UK and later, Japan and germany. During
the same period, and after partition, repair firms needed spare
parts to meet the maintenance demand from bicycle owners --
hitherto imported from Germany.
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excluded it from agricultural accumulation.
This dual pressure of increased demand opportunities on the
one hand, and restricted imports on the other, generated a wave
of import competing practices in machinery production by local
metal workers and artisans, laying the basis for a shift from
repair to component manufacturing.5
Two final points need to be made here. First, the nature of
these demand episodes early in the region's industrial history
ensured, at another level, that there were ongoing pressures on
local skilled workers to come up with new ways of doing things
that would help final goods producers, who operated on slim
profit margins, to cut costs. In part, because many of the small
owners of the sewing-machine and bicycle component firms, as well
as machine tool firms were themselves skilled workers or
mechanics who had arisen from the same stock of skilled workers
they employed, they were better able to converse about and
respond to these demands. Moreover, for the skilled small
machine tool producers, who worked with 2-3 helpers on the
shopfloor to figure out how to meet the requirements of their
customers, it was their own self-interest to keep revising their
skills in order to make the most of demand openings. Thus the
5 These developments on the supply side that made it cheaper
for small firms to do business in this region at that time. They
found cheap machine tools and cheap machinery, cheap repair
services and cheap reconditioning teams. "Import competing"
practices by local machinery producers thus helped lower the
capital costs facing producers of consumer durables, allowing them
to use existing demand more effectively.
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widespread presence of skill among Ludhiana's small firm owners
is not an idiosyncratic result of history, but rather, the nature
of demand, the structure of supply conditions and the pressures
that local producers found themselves under. These factors not
only shaped those skills, but demonstrated the benefits of having
access to a large pool of skilled technicians: it helped them
compete with much larger competitors. It was in their interest
to invest in creating institutions that would help maintain this
skill and its advantages. How they did so, and what some of
these institutions were, we will see in the next chapter.
Second, in contrast to the view in the literature that
import controls most often benefit larger firms that are able to
capture sheltered markets, the distributional impact of import
restrictions and the machinery manufacturing response by small
local firms in Punjab benefited the region's small manufacturers
the most. This departs from the case of large public sector
firms such as HMT (and private ones such as Kirloskar), that
produced equipment affordable mainly by medium and large firms or
by other parastatals. But, at the same time, investments by the
government in parastatals like HMT indirectly played a key
complementary role in the emergence of a small-firm based local
machinery sector in Punjab. Parastatals like HMT provided
Punjab's small firms with a standard of quality towards which to
evolve. After Bangalore, the Government of India located a
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branch plant of Hindustan Machine Tools in Pinjore' in the
1950s, a few hours from Ludhiana by road. The machines prcuced
in this plant presented local firms with a standard of quality to
work towards, and a product that was more readily accessible to
them to copy than imported models. Public sector plants owned by
the central government therefore unwittingly provided local firms
with a model around which they could grow--a role that is not
usually attributed to the state.
51 This city, now in Haryana, was part of Punjab until 1966
when Punjab was split into three separate states (Punjab, Haryana
and Himachal Pradesh).
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CHAPTER 4
Accumulating human capital: substituting the technician's skill
for meager capital and a limited natural resource base
Introduction
Earlier in the study we noted that Ludhiana is a curious
place for a metal industry to be based. It has no material
advantage: there are no mineral or coal deposits in the state or
in its vicinity; coal, steel and iron must be carted over
hundreds of miles from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The state of
Punjab is landlocked and has no ports. Yet, despite these
bottlenecks, a metal consumer durables industry dominated by
small firms--just the firms that the literature argues build on
local resources--has thrived in the region for the past 60-70
years. What accounts for the flourishing of a successful metal
industry in this particular region?
As a partial explanation I argued in the previous chapter
that the nature of skill in the region's workforce, and a
sequence of demand-generating episodes early in its history were
crucial in overcoming the region's lack of natural advantage.
But skills and demand-escalations are hardly unique to Ludhiana.
Many regions have artisanal skills--Howrah, Rajkot, Coimbatore
are examples in Irdia alone that have skills very similar to
Ludhiana--and have been subjected to substantial demand. Yet,
despite some success, small firms run.by skilled worker-
entrepreneurs in these cities do not define the industrial
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character of these regions in the sa-me way as they do Ludhiana's.
Similarly, as we will see more fully in a comparative section in
the next chapter, Bengal's famous metal industry at Howrah, an
industry also based on small firms, metalworking skill, abundant
natural resource advantages, and steady--indeed captive--
government demand, declined over the same period that Ludhiana's
metal industry developed a national stature. What explains the
difference? What are the conditions that have allowed small
firms run by skilled mechanics and former artisans, such salience
in Ludhiana's industrial regime?
This chapter argues that in addition to the social structure
and historical features discussed in previous chapters, a central
feature of this region's productive environment is its fostering
of a continually evolving human capital base centered around the
technician's skill. As we saw above, many regions have skilled
workers. What is different here is that more than just the
presence of skill in the workforce, the process of skill
acquisition in this region seems to include an ability on the
part of skilled workers, artisans, and the many skilled small-
owners to be open to new ways of doing work, to change and alter
their skills to suit new needs, rather than hold on to highly
refined, but older craft skills. We have already seen in the
previous chapter how the roots of this openness to change go back
to the way in which work relationships evolved between skilled
artisans and locally based merchant distributors who brokered
demand for them from various sources in the mid-1900s. We saw
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how highly skilled weavers of fine woolen shawls were willing to
come down to cruder levels of craftsmanship in order to shift to
products such as woolen jersies, pullovers, socks and belts for
the army for which there was plenty of demand. Thus, even though
artisans and technicians, not engineers, dominate the region's
skilled workforce, their skill is hardly traditional. And, as we
will see, it is constantly transforming in response to demand
pressures.
A second part of the argument is that this human capital
base is a result of at least two conditions: (i) An inadvertent
interaction between an extensive, formal state-supported system
of vocational training, and the less formal trajectories of skill
acquisition by workers involving movement across the labor
market, and processes such as on-the-job training on the
shopfloor. (ii) And a second condition is the way in which work
is organized within and between local firms, where small-owners
(many of whom are themselves skilled) make constant demands on
themselves and their workforce to find cheaper or more effective
ways of producing standard goods using non-standard processes and
through reverse engineering. Together, these conditions have
provided prestige, credibility and value to the technician's
craft and to vocational education.
The final part of the argument is that this human capital
base differs in at least two ways from discussions about human
capital in the recent literature. First, unlike the emphasis in
the literature on an educated workforce centered around the
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college educated skilled engineer--as in studies of East Asian
industrial competitiveness (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, World Bank
1994), the skills in Ludhiana are those of the mechanic--the
mistry,' or "practical" engineer, located in-between the
craftsman and the trained engineer. Till the 1970s, most of the
region's skilled workers and small-owners were matriculates or
trained through the vocational system. Thus, if measured in
terms of level of schooling, literacy, and the proportion of
engineers in the technically skilled workforce, Ludhiana's human
capital base would appear quite mediocre. Yet, the region's
manufacturing sector has consistently grown faster than the
national average,2 and the region's key industries (bicycles and
parts, industrial sewing machines, and woollen hosiery) dominate
national markets in terms of market share (60%, 85% and 95%
respectively).
Second, the Ludhiana (and Punjab) case raises questions
about the macro policy arguments in the recent literature about
the importance of making heavy investments in education,
literacy, and health as preconditions to equitable economic
growth (Birdsall et. al. 1995). As we will see in this chapter,
Ludhiana's case, in contrast to East Asia, does not fit these
education-health first arguments. Despite mediocre social
indicators and literacy rates (see Table 4.1 below), and despite
1 A mistry is a mechanic, technician, or master craftsman--
production engineer in modern parlance. A mistry most often holds
a high position on the shopfloor.
2 See Table 1.8 in the Introduction.
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the dominance of the technician, not the engineer, in its skilled
labor-force, Punjab has an innovati-e workforce, the highes' per-
capita income in the country, and only 7% of the state's
population lives under the poverty line compared to 30% for the
country as a whole. 3 The Punjab government's focus on providing
basic infrastructure4 throughout the state, and its emphasis on
the formation of cheap and accessible technical skills allowed
broad sections of the urban and rural population to build middle-
class livelihoods.
In Table 4.1 below we see Punjab's economic and social
indicators compared with four of India's most industrialized
states (Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal) and
with Kerala, the state that leads the nation in social
indicators. Punjab's social indicators--especially literacy and
infant mortality--are better than the national average, but
nowhere near Kerala's performance which closely resembles the
literacy and public health standards achieved in the high-
performing East Asian economies of which Birdsall et. al (1995)
model their argument. However, Punjab's economic indicators are
among the best in the nation. Although not all group and regions
have equal access to this wealth, land-holdings are relatively
less unequal in Punjab; the Gini coefficient for land-holdings
was a modest 0.24 in the 1980s (Sims 1988), and agricultural
3 These are 1987-88 figures. See Table 4.1 for references.
4 Such as electricity, water, roads, rural credit societies,
basic schooling.
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wages are the highest in the nation as we saw in the Introductory
Chapter.
Table 4.1
Per-capita income, area, population,
selected states (1990-91)
density, and literacy in
State Per capita % Urban % Popula- Density Literacy
Income in Polula- tion below /sq.km (%)
Current Rs. tion Poverty#
Punjab 8423.00 30% 7% 401 57%
Maharashtra 7409.00 39% 29% 256 63%
Gujarat 5404.00* 34% 18% 210 61%
West Bengal 4193.00 27% 28% 766 58%
Tamil Nadu 3894.00* 34% 33% 428 64%
Kerala 3451.00* 26% 17% 747 91%
All India Avg. 4934.00 26% 30% 267 52%
Source: Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1992:118-119, and
calculated from Table 3.19 pp. 92-83.
Per capita income is in Rupees at current prices
* 1989-90 figures, all the rest are 1990-91 figures.
# 1987-88 figures (Statistical Outline of India 1992:28)
Note: Goa state had higher per capita income than Punjab (Rs.
3169.00) in 1980-81. 1990-91 figures are not available.
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Table 4.1 (cont.)
State % Net Irrigated Infant Gross Factory
area (1987-88) Mortality Output per capita
Rate (1990) (Rs) 1987-88
Punjab 95%* 61 4,071
Maharashtra 12% 58 4,603
Gujarat 23% 72 4,245
West Bengal 23% 63 1,795
Tamil Nadu 44% 59 3,047
Kerala 14% 17 1,466
All India Avg. 33% 80 1,971
Source: Statistical Outline of India 1992:7,9,10
* 1989-90 figures
Table 4.1 (cont.)
Per-capita Cons. Daily newspaper Registered
and availability circulation motor vehicles
State of milk (1987-88) per 1000 per 10,000
(kg/per annum) population* population*
Punjab 255** 48 556
Maharashtra 44 42 425
Gujarat 84 28 404
West Bengal 44 33 108
Tamil Nadu 61 28 209
Kerala 57 62 179
All India Avg. 64 29 206
Source: Statistical Outline of India 1992:7,9,10
* 1989-90 figures
** This figure is not a mistake.
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The first part of this chapter continues the thread from the
previous chapter of looking at the state's role in this region's
industry. It shows how an important input in the ability of
small firms in this region to thrive and build a strong human
capital base, has been the Punjab government's emphasis on
infrastructure provision and training. This emphasis is in
contrast to the usual way in which governments in other parts of
India have intervened in industry--through direct investment in
public sector enterprises and equity participation in industry.
The second part of the chapter focusses on technical knowledge
and how local firms acquire it. It examines the networks through
which the region's small firms get access to technical know-how,
skill, and training, and the government's involvement in this
process through its emphasis on vocational education. The third
part of the chapter looks at some examples that show how small
firms actually use this technical knowledge on an every-day basis
to solve production problems on the shopfloor.
The government's different focus -- infrastructure and training
Part I: The state's infrastructure investments: fostering unusual
agriculture-industry linkages.
Neither the state government, nor the central government
invested much in Punjab's industry through asset ownership, or
through the establishment of parastatals. This was a departure
from the standard way in which the governments of other states in
India have intervened in industry throughout the post-
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independence period till recently. Since the mid-sixties the
state government has had only a 2% share in the number of
factories in Punjab and a 9% share in its industrial employment
(Sharma 1988:80), compared to a public sector share of at least
24% in manufacturing employment alone at the all-India level
(Johar et. al. 1983:167). In addition, Punjab has very few
large, centrally-owned public enterprises. In the early 1990s,
its share of central government industrial investments was only
0.73% of the national total, compared to 17.6% for Maharashtra
for example (Punjab Economic Review 1992-3, and Handbook of
Industrial Statistics 1991). But, although the Punjab government
did not invest in industry through equity participation, it
focussed on other things: it invested heavily in the provision of
infrastructure, and encouraged skill formation through
investments in technical training.
As we saw in the previous chapters, since colonial times,
Punjab's respective governments have invested substantially on
developing Punjab's physical infrastructure--roads, railroads,
water, irrigation (through an extensive network of canals and
tubewells)--mainly with the aim of developing the region's
agriculture. Between 1898 when massive infrastructure projects
began in Punjab, and 1914, the colonial government had invested
fully half of its total infrastructure spending in Punjab (Khanna
1983:97, Sims 1988). After independence, thp Punjab government
continued these policies of building up Punjab's infrastructural
base, mainly through investments in massive power projects (e.g.,
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the Bhakra Nangal Dam) and roads, again with the view of
improving Punjab's agricultural productivity (Sims 1988). Only
in the mid-1980s however, when industrial actors--industrial
associations made demands on the government for more power, did
the state government set up a series of five small thermal power
plants to increase generation capacity in response to industry's
needs.
But the benefits of infrastructure such as roads, rails,
power and water are "fungible" across sectors--once the
infrastructure is provided, benefits accrue to a variety of local
consumers. Hence the region's growing industrial sector
benefited as much from the availability of cheap and ready power,
water and transportation, as did the agriculturalists. The
presence of this physical infrastructure--funded by both, the
central and state governments--is an important factor that
explains why small firms in Punjab did so well despite being in a
state that lacked any natural resource advantage. Punjab's
producers have long had access to cheap infrastructure, and to
lots of it--more so than other states (see Table 4.2).
In 1951 only 4% of Punjab's villages were electrified; by
1966 the figure increased to 24% (Sims 1988:64). Eleven years
later, by late 1977, all 12,342 villages in Punjab were
electrified--nearly twenty years ahead of most other parts of the
country (See Table 4.2 for the current situation). By the 1987
only three other states in India reported 100% electrification of
villages: Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Haryana (Haryana, till 1966 was
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a part of Punjab state) (Industrial Abstract of Punjab 1988:238).
By 1992, a total of ten states reported 100% electrification.
Punjab's consumers, therefore, had a head start of nearly two
decades in the availability of electricity, and hence the
possibilities of adopting more modern equipment.
One way in which small firms have benefited from the
government's investment in fungible infrastructure is through
consistently low power tariffs in Punjab.5 Power rates have
remained low precisely because the government's investments in
power were initially targeted on agriculture, and the state's
powerful agrarian lobby has held them in check. As one informant
reported, the Punjab administration, traditionally dominated by
agrarian interests has been "locked into keeping power rates low"
since the 1960s when the first dams were built. "Local officials
say that they will not increase unit prices of electric power
because that will raise fertilizer costs, and push up fertilizer
prices; 6 the powerful farm lobby will 'never allow that'" (J.S.
Randhawa interview, 1990).7'
s Although I do not have data on comparable power rates for
various states, interviewees within and outside Punjab reported
that power rates are lower in Punjab than in many states. Some
states, for example Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, have over
time, provided new investors with special power-rate discounts for
fixed time periods as incentives to attract investment. Similarly,
bulk rates vary according to users in various states.
6 The first fertilizer plant was located in Nangal in the
1970s, after the Bhakra-Nangal complex was completed in the decade
of the 1960s.
7 Since Punjab's power stations are the major suppliers of
power to New Delhi, the Indian capital and the seat of government,
it is in the central government's own interest not to raise power
140
The greater political control of agriculturalists over
Punjab's policies, thus indirectly wrested a benefit for small
firms that the politically "subordinate" small industrial
producers may not have been able to win by themselves--cheap and
abundant power.
However, these spill-over benefits to industry--and
especially their continuity--have had to be fought over too.
Agriculturalists have always received preferential supplies of
power to ensure smooth irrigation via tubewells and pumpsets.'
Many older firms that I interviewed reported having had to work
at night during the drought years ia the late 1960s-70s to make
up for the diversion of power to farmers during daylight hours.
Similar shortages occurred again in the early 1980s leading a few
medium firms to set up units outside Punjab (Upper India Steel,
interview 1991). But this time round, in the 1980s, Punjab's
industrial associations heavily lobbied the industries department
and the state government for better access to power. In
response, the Punjab government set up a series of mini-thermal
power plants throughout the state to mitigate industrial power
shortages. By 1987, abundant power supply was restored to
industrialists, notwithstanding times of drought. The firm cited
tariffs in Punjab and its own electri-ity bill.
8 In contrast to the cases of "urban bias" documented in the
literature (see Lipton) however, ever since Punjab's farmers
adopted tubewells as the preferred means of irrigation in the
1960s, power supply has traditionally been "rural biased" in
Punjab.
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above (Upper India) which had set up a branch plant in Andhra
Pradesh in the early 1980s (despite slightly higher rates there),
reported having returned to Punjab to expand operations there now
that "uninterrupted supply was restored" (Upper India interview,
1991).
Today, Punjab's industrial as well as agricultural producers
have the highest per capita consumption of power in the country
(Table 4.3) -- even though part of this high energy use is driven
by the Punjab government's post-independence policy of charging
farmers ("rural consumers") a flat rate for electricity
consumption.
Table 4.2
Rural electrification and percentage of villages linked with all
weather roads in Ludhiana district, Punjab State, and India as of
1990-91
Region % of villages % of village
linked w/roads* electrified
Ludhiana district 100.0% 100.0%
Punjab State 97.7% 100.0%
India 41.0%** 83.1%
Source: Statistical Handbook of Punjab, 1991 (pp. 234, 256).
Statistical Outline of India, 1992 (pp. 9).
* Indicates all-weather roads. ** 1987-88 figures.
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Table 4.3
Annual per-capita consumption of electricity: selected states
1989-90
State Per capita consumption of electricity (KWH) in:
Residential Industry Agriculture Total9
Punjab 74.9 266.5 276.1 639.2
Maharashtra 63.3 216.0 83.4 404.6
Gujarat 37.36 214.2 99.4 398.8
Tamil Nadu 43.1 138.9 68.3 295.4
West Bengal 27.8 81.5 NA 138.j
India 34.5 111.7 53.5 236.02
Source: Statistical Handbook of Punjab, 1991 (pp. 108-113)
Similarly, an extensive network of roads and railroads
covers towns and villages throughout the state. The role of
infrastructure in fostering industrial growth 1s the subject of
much policy research today, although the connections are not well
understood (World Development Report 1994, Gulyani 1996 and cites
therein). The Punjab case suggests that access to cheap and well
distributed physical infrastructure helps small producers compete
better in several ways. Since the 1970s Punjab has been one of
the nation's few states where the government had invested in
servicing practically every village by at least one all-weather
9 Total figure includes also consumption of electricity in
commercial lighting, public lighting and non-utilities.
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road (see Table 4.2 above for a current statement) .10 This
extensive network of roads opened up new markets for Ludhiana's
small firms throughout the state's interior in the early-1970s.
This transportation link between small producers and markets
throughout the state not only helped Ludhiana's firms capitalize
on the demand for agricultural machinery and implements generated
across rural Punjab during the peak years of the spread of green
revolution technologies in the state in the mid 1960s-1970s, but
it also had another inadvertent outcome.
A key indirect benefit to small industry of this network of
roadways was the spread of the trucking industry in Punjab since
the 1970s, which significantly lowered costs for small producers.
This industry again, grew in response to the marketing needs of
Punjab's rapidly growing agriculture. It was controlled by
wealthy Jat Sikh farmers who owned fleets of trucks, but rented
them out regularly since the 1970s to local firm owners to
transport their goods within and outside Punjab. As one medium
sized firm-owner reported, this became a highly preferred mode of
transporting goods for local industrialists because it was
cheaper than the railroads, and, most importantly, helped firms
"turn their money around" faster. He said, compared to the
1 In many cases expatriates, settled in Canada, the U.S. or
Britain added to this network. As one interviewee who was visiting
from the United States reported, many come back to link "their
villages" or community centers (e.g, Gurudwaras) and schools to the
nearest metalled road as a sign of their new status and prestige
(G. Singh, interview 1991). This interviewee, who owned a small
trucking business in New York city had just funded the construction
of a road linking his village school to the main road.
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chronic delays in the rail-transport system due to strikes, late
arrivals of trains, and over-booking, as well as the loss of
goods due to theft and damage, trucks were a far quicker and
safer mode of transporting their goods. Firms did not have to
invest in their own trucks, the farmers were in this business.
And they needed to do something productive with their vehicles in
the non-harvest season. Over time, Punjab's trucking industry--
servicing both industrial and agricultural producers--has evolved
into one of the best developed in the country (Pahwa interview
1992, Kharbanda interview 1991, World Bank 1995).
As several firms reported, unlike trains, the trucks reached
the farthest markets in the country within a week; most north-
Indian markets were within a day from Ludhiana. Not only did the
trucks prevent delays, damage, and delivered goods "door-to-
door," but most importantly, this faster delivery meant that the
customers sent their payments faster (Avon interview, 1992)."
This interviewee reported that "this way, the working capital I
invest comes back to me four times in one month. We produce a
batch, it leaves our factory the same night. It reaches the
customer's door the next morning. The customer makes the payment
a few days after that. The money comes back to me, and I put it
back again. Every 100,000 [rupees] I spend comes back to us four
times in a month. If I relied on railways, I would be lucky if I
got my money back twice in a month" (Avon (Pahwa) interview,
" Occasionally, the truckers who delivered the goods brought
back draft payments.
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1992). This quicker turn-over of returns meant greater liquidity
and revenues--just the conditions the firm needed to reinvest and
expand (Avon interview, 1992) . It also lowered wastage and saved
on overhead costs: "You do not have to buy bulky wooden crates.
Padded plastic wrapping is enough, so you save on packaging
costs. Because wooden crates are not used, there is more room on
the trucks and we can pack more goods per truck. The extra
weight of the crates is reduced and so transportation costs per
unit are lower. There is some saving on the labor side also, you
need fewer people to do the packaging. Overall, wastage is less
and you save money" (Avon (Pahwa) interview 1992) .
The presence of cheap electricity benefited small firms in
Punjab in another indirect way via agriculture. The spread of
electricity, ironically, led to the rise of a diesel pump-set
industry in Punjab, localized in Ludhiana. In the late 1950s-
early 1960s, the rapid spread of electrificatinn in state led the
Punjab government to institute subsidies to encourage local
farmers to adopt tubewells as the chief means of independent
small-irrigation instead of the government digging more canals or
12 The interviewee also made the point that it was important
that they started doing this early on in their firm's history, when
they were still small, capital was a constraint, and outside
markets were still being forged. Lowering production costs by
lowering overheads was crucial to their carving out these markets,
and competing successfully against larger firms in other parts of
the country. Today, twenty-five years later, the interviewee firm
is one of the region's larger bicycle producers. Still, it
continues to transport its goods (within India) in exactly the same
way.
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building large public water tanks. By the mid-1960s, tubewells
had indeed become the chief source of irrigation in the In-dan
Punjab (Sims 1988, London 1975). c'hortly after, severe power
shortages in the mid-1960s, and the drought years of 1966-68 made
it difficult for farmers to operate their tubewells.
Following strong protests by farmers, the government (i)
increased agricultural prices in Punjab (despite urban dissent),
(ii) and launched a "crash policy" of distributing heavily
subsidized pumD-sets to farmers--both by providing farmers with
subsidies for the purchase of pumpsets from private dealers and
also by procuring pump-sets from local producers and distributing
them to the smallest farmers (Sims 1988, London 1975, J.S.
Randhawa interview 1990). This sharply increased the demand for,
and sales of, pumpsets: 86% of pumpsets in Punjab were purchased
after the government introduced this subsidy in 1966 (London
1975:52). This period, when the government and private dealers
were the main buyers of pumpsets, fuelled the rise and rapid
growth of the local diesel pumpset industry, localized in
Ludhiana where some firms already manufactured and assembled
pumpsets. Mechanics who used to repair or assemble pumpsets from
kits of parts purchased from outside the state (Gujarat mostly),
took to manufacturing parts, assemblers grew, and new
distribution networks emerged (London 1975:66). Subsequently,
the Punjab government's subsidies to farmers for the purchase of
a variety of other agricultural implements throughout the 1960s-
70s led recursively to the adoption of these implements by
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farmers and a further consolidation of a vibrant agricultural
implements producing base in the region.
Farmers adopted the new equipment--threshers, diesel
engines, pumpsets, seed-drills, tubewells--not only because more
and more firms produced them locally and they could be procured
"without great difficulty" (Sims 1988), or because the technology
was simple. A key reason behind widespread adoption was also
that local mechanics and metal workers spread throughout the
region had the skills--or developed them--to fix, alter,
recondition and customize these machines."
This discussion of the interaction between small metal firms
in Ludhiana and the spread of mechanization in Punjab's
agriculture reverses a commonly held view of small-firm growth in
Punjab. According to this view, Punjab's small-firm based
industrial structure was fuelled by rising incomes and demand
unleashed by the spread of the green-revolution in Punjab in the
mid-1960s (Bhatia 1968, Sharma 1988:92).
In contrast to this view, the above discussion would suggest
that rather than the green-revolution ushering in the rise of
" One study of Ludhiana district (Aggarwal 1973) showed how
the presence of large numbers of skilled mechanics who worked in
Ludhiana but lived in its the rural hinterland (within a 25-30 mile
radius) gave the small peasants access to a huge quasi-repair and
reconditioning network. Although these technicians worked in
factories, they were ava.-~e to their peasant neighbors for
advice and assistance. Farmers saved on repair costs (compared to
situations where a peasant farmer from the interior has to trudge
to the city for repairs), understood the equipment they were using
better, and hence were able to ask for more precise modifications
and customized changes (Aggarwal, 1973).
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small metal based industries in Lurhiana and its vicinity, it was
the opposite--that the prior presence of a core of successful
metal based engineering industries facilitated the widespread
adoption of the new farm technology when it was introduced in
Punjab in the 1960s.1'4 In the process, the existing cluster of
firms grew, and deepened, as did the skills of local mechanics
and small manufacturers. 5
Industrial estates--targeting industry directly
Aside from the indirect effects discussed above, the Punjab
government also targeted industry directly. Starting in the
1950s, for example, the state government carved out several quite
successful industrial estates around Ludhiana and neighboring
cities. As part of a national program adopted in 1955, the idea
was to provide small producers "the advantage of common services
and other facilities such as a good site, electricity, water,
4 In a comparative study of farm-mechanization in the Indian
and Pakistani Punjab, Gotsch (1972) shows how the access of farmers
in the Indian Punjab to smaller than usual pumpsets (5 hp) and
tractors (15 hp instead of 35 or 45 hp) and other equipment adapted
by local artisans and metal workers to suit the special needs of
particular farmers allowed even those with smaller holdings to
adopt the newer technology. See also Sims (1988) for a similar
study.
is Crucial to this ability of local mechanics to deepen their
ski-ls and develop newer machines of the size and capacity that
suited small local farmers was close interaction with, and exposure
to the designers and engineers of the land-grant Punjab
Agricultural University (PAU) established in Ludhiana with US
assistance in 1962. PAU's agricultural engineers designed new
implements which they got local small producers or mechanics to
help build.
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gas, steam, compressed air, railway siding, watch and ward.."
(Official policy statement cited in Dhar and Lydall 1961:36).
Ludhiana's industrial estates, now called "focal points,"
are among the more successful industrial estates in the country
(Dhar and Lydall 1961, Abell and Mahoney et. al. 1989). They
were successful, according to some evaluations, because the
government was able to harness the skills of local artisans by
encouraging them to set up small factories through the provision
to them of small loans to purchase factory sheds on installment.
They also allotted sites to accommodate an influx of skilled
workers and small producers who came to the Indian Punjab from
Pakistan after partition and were looking for safe locations
after the disruption of partition (Dhar and Lydall 1961, Harbans
Singh interview, 1992).
As one evaluator comparing 12 industrial estates'6
throughout the country in 1960 put it, "In Ludhiana estate, there
is no difficulty in finding applicants for factories, even at
unsubsidized rents" because there already "was a center of
hosiery manufacture.. .and [since the war] significant growth in
engineering industries like bicycles and bicycle parts, sewing
machines, automobile parts, machinery and machine tools" (Dhar
and Lydall 1961:42). Given the "plentitude of enterprise and
skills" available in the region there was "chronic shortage" of
factory space. Thus, while in Ludhiana all the sheds completed
16 Two hundred and six factories in twelve industrial estates
out of a total of 483 factories operating in India's 34 functioning
industrial estates in 1960 returned the evaluators' schedules.
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were immediately occupied, in several other regions where "there
were no entrepreneurs straining at the leash anxious to move out
to better accommodations," up to 90% of the plots lay vacant
several years after the industrial sheds were constructed (Dhar
and Lydall 1961). The output per worker of small factories in
Ludhiana's industrial estate was also among the highest in the
country--more than twice that of the other estates evaluated
(Dhar and Lydall 1961:56).
Such estates are still being constructed by the Punjab
government, and there are eight such focal points around Ludhiana
alone. In 1991, at a time when separatist violence was at its
peak in Ludhiana, the region's District Industries Center
received 700 applications for the 61 plots it was releasing for
small units in its most recent Focal Point in Ludhiana (DIC,
1991). This overwhelming response came despite intense
instability in the region, and despite reports in the media that
businesses were moving out of Punjab.
Part II: Access to technical knowledge: The path of vocational
training
A second, key direct investment by the Punjab government in
industry was through the development of a network of vocational
training institutes throughout the state that capitalized on the
already entrenched practice of acquiring skill and building
entrepreneurial ability through moving up systematically through
the labor market (as we see below). By emphasizing vocational
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training, rather than making engineering education the center-
piece of its industrial training programs, the government enabled
a broad swath of the working popul-tion to gain low cost access
to skills--technical skills. Even in the early 1990s, compared
to 3 engineering colleges in a state of 20 million people, Punjab
had 115 technical, Industrial and polytechnic institutions. Of
the total number of trainees registered in technical courses
throughout Punjab, less than 9% were registered in engineering
courses in 1991. (Statistical Pandbook of Punjab 1991:201,203).
This pattern has a longer history in the region.
Unlike many other states in India, vocational education has
historically occupied an important place in Punjab's industry for
several reasons. Even today, the rise of engineers in the
state's workforce has not diminished or entirely displaced the
salience of vocational, or "practical" industrial training in
industry circles. Although it is commonplace now to find a
youngar generation of small-factory owners formally trained as
engineers, vocational education still commands respect and
carries value. Many of my informants echoed the feelings
expressed by successful small firm owners in the late 1960s that
"the comparative advantage we hold in the metal trades will not
endure unless [our] children get vocational training rather than
[only] general training." (Rangnekar 1966, and Bhogal interview,
1990, J.S. interview, 1991).
First, in contrast to the pattern in states like Kerala, and
Tamil Nadu where getting a graduate degree quickly and straight
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off is the norm, getting to work quickly--either in your own firm
(or farm) or in government, or in other firms--has been socially
privileged here. "Working with one's hands" has long carried
status. To some extent this idea of "working with one's hands"
has derived indirect validity from the religious symbolism in
Sikhism of "kirit karo, vaand chhako" -- i.e., roughly, work with
your hands and share the fruits of it with the community for the
common good (to reach God). According to some informants, this
idea is also rooted in the highly pragmatic, urban "householder"-
based interpretation of Sikhism in the late 19th-early 20th
century. During this period, when social ferment swept the
Punjab region (in partial response to cultural "clashes" with the
growing influence of the British, and with reformist and
secularizing movements within the Hindu and Islamic communities
in the Punjab), the urban elite of Sikh society "read" their
religion in this more pragmatic way so as to appropriate and
hence neutralize some of the appeal of the utilitarian policies
that the British administrators were bringing into the Punjab."
Second, perhaps recognizing the existence of a large number
of skilled workers and mechanics in the region, the state
government has since the turn of the century promoted the idea of
vocational education as a relatively cheap way of building a
skilled workforce. This thinking was first articulated by local
17 See Kenneth Jones 1989, and Heimsath 1964, for an account
of social movements in Punjab during this period.
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administrators in response to the recults of two detailed
industrial surveys conducted by the colonial government of Punjab
in 1911 and 1917, the latter with the explicit aim of
understanding what kind of technical training--"industrial
education"--system to develop in the province (Latifi 1911,
Badenoch 1917). The primary motivation for the government at
that time was the training of technicians for its ongoing
irrigation works in Punjab and its railroad construction
projects. The first technical institutes in the public sector
were thus run by the Railway department and the Public Works
Departments.
At the same time, civic groups such as the Ramgarhias
(artisanal metal and wood workers), who were just then turning
towards industrial entrepreneurship, were also setting up their
own parochial vocational education schools to train younger
members of their own community for industrial work. 1 8 These
schools, funded by the wealthier members of the Ramgarhia
community who had accumulated capital in the course of
contractorships in Punjab, Assam and East Africa, were initially
open only to their own members. But the success of Ramgarhia
entrepreneurs in Ludhiana's growing metal industry attracted non-
artisanal groups to vocational education, and over time the
18 As we saw in Chapter 2, possessing only fragmented
capital--skill was central to their ability to compete and grow.
Led by a group of wealthy Ramgarhias the community, by the 1920s,
had set up technical schools in several parts of Punjab (Saberwal
1979), as well as educational trusts and some banks near Ludhiana
(Kessinger 1974, Saberwal 1979, Pandit 1985).
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character of these initially communal schools has become more
secular. Although major funding still comes from Ramgarhia
industrialists, they now receive some support from the
government.
Indeed, the visible presence of these institutions and their
popularity among local workers and small entrepreneurs also
served as a model for the government's own emphasis on vocational
education, or at least reinforced it, in the 1930s and later
after independence, in the 1940s and 1950s. In an iterative
process of influence from government to community groups and back
to the government, the colonial administration of Punjab also set
up its own vocational training institutes by the 1930s. After
independence, these institutes were supplanted by Industrial
Training Institutes (ITIs) and Advanced Training Institutes
(ATIs) funded by the central government.
The ITIs and ATIs are funded by the central government in
states throughout the India, not in Punjab alone. The difference
in Punjab is the image of credibility that the training provided
by these institutes carries, not only in the eyes of the
population, but also of the government. 9 A second difference
is that unlike other states in India where ITI trainees typically
work as production workers in large companies, in Punjab most ITI
graduates become entrepreneurs, and start their own small firms.
19 This is not to deny that many small firm owners regard ITI
trainees as being "too white collar" compared to those that have
learned by moving through the ranks.
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The government of Punjab encouraged this tendency towards self-
employment by promoting the spread of these institutions in
smaller towns and rural districts.
This is so partly because, unlike states like West Bengal
which have a huge presence of government, the public
administration has been historically lean in Punjab. This
translates into a smaller number of white collar job
opportunities in government.2 0 For example, in 1988, Punjab
accounted for less than 1% (0.9%) of employment in total central
public undertakings compared to 18% for West Bengal, 10% for
Maharashtra, over 5% for Karnataka (Handbook of industrial
Statistics 1989:157). Government policies have therefore
implicitly reinforced what goes on anyway--job creation in the
private sector--in industry and agriculture, either as workers or
employers, rather than employment in government departments, and
even less so in government owned industries.
The latter point is an important one. The state government
hardly has any industrial employees (it has only a 9% share in
industrial employment in Punjab, compared to an average of 25% at
the national level in manufacturing employment alone), because it
owns very little industry in Punjab. Thus, the state in this
region wasn't doing what the state did elsewhere in India, namely
own and run large public sector enterprises in secto:s such as
20 In the organized, non-farm sector however, the Punjab state
government together with central, local and quasi-governmental
organizations does provide a larger proportion of employment than
the private sector (Punjab Plan Document, n.d. pp. 272.)
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steel, aviation, heavy industry and so forth, that demanded a
heavy input of sophisticated engineers or expensively trained
personnel. This left room for the state to do something less
costly, which also reached a larger number of people: e.g.,
fostering the technician's skills across broad sections of the
workforce." Vocational education, thus, appears to have been a
cheap and logical option in an industrial environment where
"middle-class" entrepreneurs dominated, and where the typically
heavy presence of the Indian state in industry was absent.
The state government's own early policies of recruiting
diploma holders from these institutions rather than focussing on
getting more and more engineers into the system lent patronage
and respectability to these institutions as we see below. When
the Punjab industries department was first established as a
separate entity in the late 1950s" the state government
inducted several three/four-year engineering diploma holders, 23
and graduates from ITIs to staff its new "elitc" field corps or
extension cadres. The prospects of mobility seemed good to those
hired compared to the older career trajectory in the state's
industrial bureaucracy (Ambika, interview 1992). After half a
21 This is not so say that the state government discourages
engineering education. There are several engineering colleges in
the state, and a growing number of younger entrepreneurs are
engineers. Rather, vocational education, and technician's
knowledge carries validity and prestige here that it doesn't in
regions where the engineer is at the center of industrial work.
" From being a part of the urban rehabilitation and civic
supplies department.
23 As opposed to the five year engineering degree.
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decade or less in the field (at 2 or 3 progressive grades), the
jobs promised the recruits officers' ranking as Project officers
or Functional managers in the industries department. According
to a retired industry department employee who was recruited at
that time, there was "excitement about industrial careers, many
people wanted to join the new department. The qualifications were
not difficult to get" (Gupta, Ambika Industries interview, 1992).
You did not have to be an engineer.
The state government's emphasis on hiring engineering
diploma holders and technical graduates from ITIs and ATIs to
fill the ranks of the industries department, thus, raised the
profile of these training programs in the eyes of both, those
inclined towards jobs in government and those intending to go
into private industry as skilled workers or owners. Initial
enrollments were high--mostly from the ranks of the urban-based
middle and lower-middle classes (Interview, 7. P. Singh, Technical
Instructor, Central Training Institute, Ludhiana, 1991).
Subsequently, as more sophisticated centers were set up
with UNIDO and West German funds 24 as a result of the state
government's lobbying the central government, a different,
relatively better off layer of potential workers and owners was
attracted to these Institutes--e.g., sons (few women train for
industrial work; those that do are Lrained at a separate Womren's
24 For example, the Central Tool Room (CTR) set up with W.
German funds in the 1980s, which offers a four-year training
program; and the Bicycle and Sewing Machine R&D Center set up with
UNIDO funds in the early 1980s.
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Industrial Training Institute) of small or medium entrepreneurs,
sons of mid-to even upper level local government bureaucrats,
sons of college teachers and professors. They join these
sophisticated technical diploma courses (usually of 4 years
duration including one or two years of internship in local firms)
either after 12 years of schooling, or after a general B.A or
B.Sc degree. Meanwhile, the original Industrial Training
Institutes (those not under bilateral or multilateral funding and
sup'.ort), are drawing rural applicants (children of agricultural
workers, petty traders and others) and blue-collar urban groups.
But even today, these Industrial Training Institutes remain
more "productive" in Punjab, than in other states. Although some
of the larger states have a greater absolute number of training
institutes, Punjab's ITIs and affiliated institutes produce the
largest number of trainees per institute: In the 1980s for
example, Punjab produced 169 technical trainees per institute,
compared to 80 per institute in Maharashtra, 50 in Gujarat, 7 in
West Bengal, and 75 in the nation as a whole. Only Kerala state
comes close with 163 trainees per institute.25 Vocational
institutions thus remain an attractive route to skill acquisition
in Punjab.
25 These are 1983 figures calculated from the Government of
India Handbook if Industrial Statistics 1989: Table 144, page 212.
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How vocational training works in practice and its indirect
effects: For all the credibility that vocational training has
been endowed with in Ludhiana, and Punjab more generally, the
total number of enrollments as a proportion of total skilled
workers in the labor force is surprisingly low. Evaluators of
the "advanced" training institutes (CTR etc.) from New Delhi,
from UNIDO, from the German mission express disappointment at the
apparent and perplexing "failure" of these institutes in getting
local industry to "upgrade it' workforce" by hiring more CTR and
Industrial Training Institute Graduates. The problem these
evaluators say is that there just aren't enough big, highly
capitalized firms in Punjab to absorb these graduates who
obviously demand higher pay.
What these proclamations of failure neglect to see, however,
are the processes that actually occur on the ground--and the
changes that these institutes have unleashed both in the attitude
towards skill and mobility in the local labor market and the
availability of information among workers and the region's small
firms.
First, unlike Maharashtra, West Bengal and some Southern
states where a bulk of industrial trainees are absorbed as
workers in the large /medium local firms, in Ludhiana, a bulk of
the graduates of these enterprises, after a few years of moving
thrcugh the labor market, start their own enterprises, and
therefore are not counted in the ranks of "workers". Several of
the graduates of these institutes that I interviewed, reported
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that they saw attending the institutes as a particular "phase" or
"episode" in their preparation for eventual entrepreneurship.
Apart from those who had joined the government, many of the
others gave several reasons for taking this route. They said
they chose to go to these institutes because (i) they were a
cheap way (in terms of time--3, sometimes 4 years and money)"
to get exposed to some theory and some practice of the lines they
had decided to concentrate on--e.g, tool and die making. (ii)
These institutes, they said, were a way to gain focussed exposure
to a variety of machines and processes (both in the Institutes
and during training with the medium and large firms in the
region). They were a way for trainees to gain access to a
network of technicians, professionals and other personnel who
they could call upon later for either assistance with technical
problems, orders, or plain clarifications about government
procedures and policies that applied to thei chosen lines and
fields.
(iii) They gain access also to a cohort who will also be in
industry and with whom they can potentially consult. As one ITI
alumnus who now runs a factory producing milling machines
2 Typically a recruit enters an ITI after 10 or 12 years of
schooling, increasingly after 12 years. So the entering age is
usually 17 years. Some enter after a (3 year) bachelor's degree.
After an initial two years at an ITI the recruit can spend another
one or two years at an ATI (Advanced Training Institute) before the
training is over. In Ludhiana a large number of recruits join the
ATIs on a part-time basis--working during the day and going to the
institute at night. The newer training institutes such as the
Central Tool Room run a full time four year training course after
12 years of schooling. They also offer an evening school option,
which stretches for more than four years.
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reported, many of his batchmates now have their own firms. Some
are raw-material dealers, others are machinery or spare-parts
dealers. "These contacts are very useful. I turn to them if I
need to get information about things I don't know much about --
where to buy certain parts or materials, who to go to, who is
good, what is cheap, who can deliver at short notice; I ask them
about quality differences, what to watch out for. In asking
them, at least I know what I am getting" (Ramdass interview,
1991).
Similarly many other graduates reported turning to their
former instructors for technical advice, or for the use of the
institute's machinery after hours for a limited time period. One
small firm-owner reported he had had difficulty procuring base
machinery when it started out because of a severe credit crunch.
He told of how he turned to the Central Training Institute from
where he had graduated to make patterns for crucial spare parts
that he needed, off of the institute's lathes and milling
machines. The instructors allowed him to open up the machines
and make copies of the parts he needed, thus saving him the large
up front expense of going out and buying a new lathe and milling
machine. With the help of these molds, he assembled the machines
on his own shop-floor with the help of job-shop owners and could
do turning and casting on contract, at less than half the cosc. of
the machines. Assistance from these institutes thus spills over
into everyday technical assistance in ways that go beyond
training and instruction, ways that are harder to discern.
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Second, and equally important is another indirect effect of
these institutes that is even less visible: the way they have
influenced skill acquisition trajectories in the labor market,
and have in turn been influenced by the workings of the labor
market. The labor market in the region has mimicked the kind of
training that the vocational institutes impart. Building-in some
of the systematic instruction provided in these institutions
around a framework of learning through apprenticeship and on-the-
Tob-training, wo'kers in this region's labor market seem to have
devised paths of skill-acquisition that provide workers with a
similar rounded-ness of skills and knowledge that vocational
education would. In contrast to the unevenness and random-ness
of on-the-job training, there is a relative systemacity to the
way in which workers in this labor market of metal manufacturing
move from shop to shop that makes the skills they are gathering
look more "like" the systematic learning that occurs within
formal vocational settings.27
This appears so, in part, also because the Institutes
themselves have incorporated in their style of training (or at
least in what they emphasize) the needs and skill requirements of
the firms around them. This reciprocal influence between the
institutes and the labor market and firms is strengthened by the
27 See Taylor and Piore (1969) for an account of how this kind
of systematic worker-driven training worked among tool and die
makers, chefs, and printers in the United States. In each case the
movement of workers from firm to firm, or the courses the chefs
took had the same quality--they made related moves, or took related
courses in the same field.
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fact that the lines of distinction between the instructors and
the region's small entrepreneurs are quite blurred. Just like
the mid-level bureaucrats mentioned earlier, many locally based
ITI or ATI instructors also play out a dual role as producers,
running their own firms or consultancies under the name of a
family member or friend. They are thus quite enmeshed in the
local industrial culture and understand the practical needs of
industry better than they would from a distance. Similarly, the
ongoing contact between former trainees who become firm-owners,
and the institutes' instructors as illustrated by the example
cited above, brings back to the institute substantial feedback
about what kinds of things worked and what did not.
Organizationally, the industrial training institutes in this
region are no different than they are in other states; they are
all centrally funded and similarly organized (the ITIs, that is,
not the Central Tool Room, which is particular to Ludhiana and
one of two other cities). But the particular nature of their
insertion in Ludhiana's (and Punjab's) industrial environment has
altered both how they work, the impact they have, and the way in
which they are viewed by those on the outside--by local workers
and firm owners." They are part of an industrial milieu where
28 This is not to say these institutes are not criticized or
even derided by some firms or government officials. There is ample
debate about them. But on balance they occupy a higher social
space than do such institutes in many other parts of the country.
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practical skills 2 9 are valued and where vocational education
still carries respect; not dismissed as the poor man's
alternative to an engineering degree that produces a blue-collar
production work-force for large public and private firms.
Similarly, being part of an environment where those working
inside these institutes are deeply enmeshed in the everyday
industrial life outside them has imbued these institutions with a
relevance that cannot be deduced just from their statistical
profile or standardized structure.
The region's strong focus on technician's and mechanics
skills has lent significance not only to vocational training, but
it has also brought into relief the importance of combining it
with more informal types of training, such as on-the-job
training, to serve as cheap and effective mechanisms of
upskilling a workforce. This "combining" is not deliberately or
consciously orchestrated by anyone. It has worked out that way.
The relative systematic-ness that less formal types of training
have acquired through exposure to and informational spill-overs
from the public sector vocational institutions, have made on-the-
job training more focussed, and a more effective avenue for
acquiring more than just plant-specific skills, as we will see in
the example presented in the next section. In this region, both
groups of workers--those who train formally, as well as those who
29 In my interviews it was commonplace to hear firm-owners
describe themselves, or their fathers or older relatives as being
"practical engineers" "production engineers" or "engineers through
practice not training."
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learn by moving from job to job--seem to be motivated by largely
similar goals: of picking up technician's skills, learning the
craft, and eventual]y starting their own enterprises. A strong
focus on obtaining technician's and mechanics skills motivates
both groups. Vocational education and systematic on-the-job
learning, together provide these skills.
This creation of technicians (through vocational training or
movement through the labor market), who eventually become small
industrialists, also provides the region with an ongoing growth
dynamic. More and more technicians can become small owners in
part because their practical knowledge helps lower costs by
allowing them to internalize some of the production skills
themselves, instead of relying only on expensive labor. Those
who move up the labor market to firm ownership, are also able to
shape the nature of skills they demand from their workers to suit
their own needs better. This eventually spi'ls over onto the
workforce as a whole.
There are, thus, several direct and indirect points of
contact between these public sector programs and apprenticeship
methods available in the labor market--through indirect
influence, demonstration effects, or more directly through
participation in both. Those who rise through the ranks, as well
as those trained in ITIs often work in similar settings, though
the former remain in the workforce longer (about 7-10 years) than
the latter before establishing their own firms. But the
combination of publicly provided training programs and more
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informal systems that the government's emphasis on vocational
training brings into relief and validates, provides broad
sections of the local population with a public good that is
available to all without taking away individual choice about how
to build a career, or move through the labor market.
The following section provides an example of just such a
choice, and of the systematic-ness of moving through the labor
market.30 Notice the tacit way in which the training institutes
help soread information to workers outside the institutes about
the kinds of experience / knowledge that would help build a
skilled career. The example comes from the low end of the labor
market, and from one of the smallest firms in my sample.
Acquiring the technician's craft by moving through the labor
market: the case of S.S. Die maker
SS, seventeen years old in 196'/, worked as a novice metal
worker at his maternal uncle's agricultural equipm'.ent repair shop
in a small rural town near Ludhiana. Low income and family
responsibilities cut short his education after high school. .(e
said he wanted to get into industrial work, but did not know how
to go about it. At that time, he said, our "role models were a
group of young men" from his rural town "who worked in factories
3 This systematic movement, and the building of a consistent
skill acquisition trajectory by moving selectively from job to job
is not new or peculiar to Ludhiana's industrial environment.
Several others have documented similar trajectories in situations
ranging from the training of cooks, chefs and printers (Taylor and
Piore 1969), to garment designers (Pyke et all for the Italian
cases), and software workers (Saxenian 1994, Holmstrom 1995).
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in Ludhiana," but ultimately wanted to start their own firms.
They had completed their diplomas in Tool and Die making from the
local Industrial Training Institute and had good jobs in
Ludhiana. They earned well--"they sent money home, and when they
visited, they always had money to spend." They told stories
about opportunities in Ludhiana, "there is always a lot of work."
Unlike these friends, SS could not afford to take the two
years to go to an ITI, he had to start earning soon, so he turned
t2 them for advice; what was a good line to get into. They told
him die-making was a good line because you can succeed with
little initial investment, "if you learn how to think about
design." If you know what you want you can get all processes done
from "the market": casting, precision machining, planing,
hardening and so on. But, because SS could not take the time to
go to a training institute, they suggested he build his expertise
through experience from the bottom up. First he needed to learn
how all kinds of presses work. Based on their own experience at
the ITI, and now in the job market, they told SS that to "learn
about die-making you need to know how to operate press on which
dies are used. If you understand everything about the process:
how the operation for which the die is needed is carried out; how
the machine works, what materials are involved, their
composition, limitations, then you can learn to design. Or you
will be dependent on the knowledge of the press-operator." They
advised him to move to Ludhiana.
SS's colleagues helped him get a job with a registered firm
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that made sewing machine parts--specifically the tension lever,
which involved press work--and got many orders. In all, SS
trained as a press-worker for five years: from 1967-1972 in
mainly 2 firms. (i) He started out in the firm where his friends
got him the job, but stayed there only for a few months because
the owner made him do a lot of other work--such as transferring
materials from one station to another. So as soon as he learnt
some press work, he moved to another firm at a higher salary.
(ii) The second firm, Super Cycles and Allied Industries--a
firm that assembled complete bicycles, but also manufactured
several other parts, was his real training ground. It was a
relatively large firm, he got to work on many different kinds of
press-jobs, initially operating the machines, then setting them
up, and eventually fixing any problems with dies that came up.
In five years he was satisfied that he had learned
everytling he could about press-work. He was a master. Even
though SS did not go through the ITI, or a diploma program at a
special tool and die making school, his trajectory through these
first five years was nevertheless not arbitrary. It was
systematic, and guided by the experience of his ITI-trained
colleagues. He did not learn about die-design, but laid the base
by learning about machines that used dies--a process that is
similar to, yet different from the traditional apprenticeship.
Like in an apprenticeship he built a base by gathering practical
experience as he worked his way up bit by bit. But unlike an
apprenticeship, SS was not tied to a single firm or "master." He
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selected the firms where he would be able to learn based on the
information he got from his colleagues in the labor market who
had been formally trained at training institutes and had
experience.
During his tenure at Super cycles SS realized also the
importance of one skill that he would have learned at any
training institute--being able to read drawings. He began to
study in the evenings. A graduate co-worker in the factory who
tutored him for a fee, taught him to read and manipulate
drawings, and also prepared him for his equivalency exams.
Now that he was ready to learn how to design dies, he again
turned to colleagues to find out what his next steps should be--
where could he go to train as a die maker? One colleague
introduced him to a well-regarded tool and die maker of Ludhiana-
-JS, a mechanical engineer. SS started to train with him. Just
as Taylor and Piore (1969) show that individual workers bear most
of the costs in this worker-driven "training", SS also bore his
own training burden. He worked for JS as a factory supervisor at
half the salary he was earning as a production worker at Super
Cycles.
But this job was not a traditional apprenticeship. SS's
employer and teacher, JS's main line of business was not tool and
die making, but manufacturing agricultural machine-parts and
threshers; tool and die making was only a side business. JS made
them on labor rates (i.e, the customer supplied the raw-materials
etc.) because he liked designing dies, not because it was his
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bread and butter. Thus, SS's primary job was that of shop-floor
supervisor for the agricultural equipment factory. In addition
to supervising production, SS maintained the machinery, repaired
the equipment and as part of his repair duties, learned about
die-design. After one and half years at this firm, SS's
employer and teacher--JS put him in touch with one of Ludhiana's
best die-makers for a final period of training. SS spent six
months at the new firm.
After seven years in the labor market, first as a press-
operator, then as a supervisor, maintenance man and tool and die
apprentice, SS felt confident that he had the skills to design
dies, tools and could start his own firm. He took seven years
to learn what a trainee who had chosen the ITI or diploma route
would have learnt after two years of formal training and two or
three years in the labor market.
SS's systematic movement througl the labor market to learn
die-design and start his own firm did not end here. Although he
had explored the market, made many contacts, he felt he had not
yet tested his skills at a large enough scale, and he still did
not know if he could control labor. So he found a job as a die-
fitter in a relatively big (though officially still a medium
scale firm), registered, firm to test his abilities as a designer
and to learn about controlling labor. The owner of the firm he
chosc, KSJ, was himself a masterful tool and die maker and had a
reputation of being a demanding employer, merciless about quality
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and precision. "That is why I went there.""3 Within a few
months, SS was placed in charge of the entire tool shop at KSJ's
firm. "This gave me confidence; I felt I was ready now." While
still an employee, SS began to look out for orders. He had
already assembled a small lathe at home, and had been slowly
procuring some basic equipment. Within a year he got a big order
for dies from one of KSJ's former customers. With this order,
and 50% of the advance payment in hand, SS left his job, rented
space and started his own firm. This was IP years ago. Now he
owns his factory space, has more machinery, and employs two
workers and one apprentice.
This is not an exceptional story. The histories of a lot of
former workers who accumulate skill by moving strategically
through the labor market and then start their own small firms
sound like this. Information to guide such workers flows into
the labor market from many sources. An important source, as we
saw above is the interaction of workers who are learning on the
job with engineers (like JS, the mechanical engineer who SS
worked for) and others who have gone through the public
vocational training institutes.
Partly because the region's industrial structure is not
polarized into some sophisticated firms that hire mainly
engineers and others who dennd mostly on less formally trained
" One cannot of course join a firm of interest at will.
Several former-workers who are owners today reported that they took
cuts in pay (or waited for an opening) to join a firm that had a
good reputation, or where you could learn.
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workers, this interaction between formal and informal systems of
training imparts guideposts to workers that are meaningful--even
the region's largest firms accord central importance to those
with experience. As a result, many who do not go through the
formal system, nevertheless learn from it indirectly." The
influence, moreover is not one way--from government programs to
the labor market. The nature of the local workforce has, in
part, shaped what kinds of programs and skills are emphasized in
these institutes--just as the past pattern of investment in the
region has influenced the demand for certain types of skills--
e.g, the technician's skills--more than others.
Part III: Institutions and practices that facilitate adaptation
32 As reported to me by one of the owners of Ludhiana's largest
bicycle, moped, and motor-cycle producing firm--the Hero group
(which hires 1000s of workers today, but started as a small firm in
the 1940s)--the owner's son, a US trained engineer, was put to
training with the firm's most respected mistry (technician) before
being mace production manager. Indeed, the Hero group launched a
whole new machine tool company built around the skills of a non-
engineer technician (Atma Singh) whom they had initially hired to
produce, adapt, copy, and customize machinery for their various
plants. This technician today has two firms of his own, one of
which exports multi-speed freewheels to several countries.
3 What they learn has its own inner dynamic of change. With
the introduction of new processes --e.g., the use of CNCs--the
information available in the labor market also changes. For
example, a medium sized machine tool producer in Ludhiana reported
that his firm was planning to adapt and produce CNCs in their own
firm. They wanted to design simpler versions of these machines
that would suit local needs, and make them cheaply enough so that
every Industrial Training Institute in Punjab could afford at least
a few--to train the next generation of skilled workers. In the
labor market as well, skilled workers talk about getting to know
these machines.
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and learning among small firms
How do small firms actually use these skills on a day to day
basis? We will see below that the presence of skills among small
owners--many of whom were workers once, their ability to
understand, copy and manipulate machinery, as well as the easy
access they have to a variety of services, and a wide array of
skilled workers and mechanics--outside the firm, allows small
firms to upgrade their production processes at a pace and a cost
that most small firms not located in an environment of such
industrial depth can hardly afford. The point is that this
"industrial depth," or the variety of services available in this
region are geared towards small producers, and often provided by
other small producers, as opposed to an environment where
expensive state of the art technology and services are available,
but are not affordable to small producers.
(i) Reconditioning teams. One of the chief links between
firms of different sizes and technology "markets" are work groups
known as reconditioning teams. These groups were not set up by
any agency or trade association, but evolved over time around the
process of transmitting technical knowhow within the region's
firms. These "floating" teams of highly skilled workers move
from shop-floor to shop-floor to provide specialized services to
small and large firms. Organized under "contractors" who are
often themselves skilled, these workers form composite teams--of
skilled fitters, machinists, specialists in milling, hydraulic
machinery, electrical machinery, etc.--that recondition machines
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and sometimes assist firms in adapting or modifying shop-floor
equipment.
A bit like the construction industry, these teams are
loosely organized as an association of independent tradesmen,
rather than as a permanent firm or enterprise. The constituent
members of these teams often hold other, full-time factory jobs,
while still being members of such a team, affiliated with a given
contractor who knows where each team member works and lives.
When work comes in, the contractor is able to track down the
members and assemble the team quickly. During some periods, some
teams may be more fully consolidated and hold other affiliations
that are only part-time; yet others may be self-employed.
Although some team members may own some machinery such as lathes
or other equipment, most of the time the team as a collective
does not own equipment. Reminiscent of sharecropping
arrangements, these floating teams use their cliert firm's
machinery and equipment, or the services of the region's job
shops, or hire out the use of equipment lying idle in firms that
are going out of business, or are changing lines, or have spare
capacity for other reasons.34 The contractor who organizes the
team is responsible for the quality of the work they do.
34 One reconditioning contractor that I interviewed had leased
out the fully equipped machine tool factory whose owner had
suddenly passed away and the only successor, a school-going son,
was too young to take up production. Inctead of selling the
equipment, much of which had been specially made by the deceased
owner, the family had contracted it out to the reconditioning
engineer on commission with the understanding that he would also
train the son during the summer and winter vacations till he
finished college (Prem Engineering, interview 1991).
175
Given the "temporary" character and floating nature of these
work-groups one would expect them to be worse off relative to
permanent workers--with regard to r.inimum wages and other
benefits. But the opposite seems to be true. In contrast to the
mostly non-unionized status of permanent labor on the shopfloor,
these independent workgroups are fairly organized and wield
considerable bargaining power vis-a-vis firm-owners as reflected
in rates that are both coordinated across most teams in the
region, and frequently renegotiated. Rate lists displayed
prominently by most such teams coordinate rates across teams. An
important source of their bargaining power comes from the fact
that these groups have come to serve as key links between
individual firms and the "technology market"--i.e., since they
circulate between a variety of firms, they know who is selling
what machines, who is looking for machines, who has the skills
that some other firm is looking for, and what new machines have
arrived in the government's "seconds" store for auctions. They
are tied to markets outside the state as well, and are,
therefore, important conduits for the spread of technological
information among the region's firms of all sizes.
There is a second kind of arrangement wherein various
contractors lead different "crews," each specialized in
particular operations (painting, grinding, turning, milling) to
firm- that need extra skilled hands, or those that as yet lack--
or can't afford--an adequate enough permanent skilled/semi-
skilled staff, or have received bulk orders in a product line
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they have only recently entered. Eventually many of these
workers/ specialists open their own shops, but the institutional
arrangement persists, permitting small firms to gain access to a
shared pool of specialized skills that few of them can afford to
permanently internalize. This lowers their production costs. To
ensure that this system continues, many producers associations
are talking about lobbying state government bureaucrats to
provide welfare benefits to these latter groups.
(ii) Other features of Ludhiana's productive environment
within which the region's skills are embedded
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, skills by themselves
are not enough. What are the other features of this region's
industrial environment that allow small firms that have access to
skills, but not much capital, to lower production costs? I
highlight six such features of Ludhiana's prcductive environment.
(a) An array of inter-linked networks: The scores of small,
medium and a few large firms that produce bicycles, sewing
machines, textile and knitting machinery, auto-parts,
agricultural equipment and machine tools in three spatially
contiguous industrial estates, and eight "focal points" on the
fringes of Ludhiana city,35 are supported by a variety of
networks. These firms are highly inter-linked through chaias of
job-shops, layers of independent contractors, labor teams,
intermediate goods producers. All kinds of production services
3s As well as thinly spread throughout the city.
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from electroplating, material testing, hardening, forging,
casting, machining, tool and die making can be got done from
specialized small firms in "the market." Raw-materials such as
re-rolled steel and intermediates such as nuts and bolts of all
varieties and so forth, are locally produced and available cheap,
as are services of accountants, fax shops, and sundry other
administrative assistance.16 A variety of government
institutions 7 engaged in R&D, human resource development,
export assistance, monitoring and incentive provision to small
firms, permeates this landscape.
(b) Active manufacturers associations: Operating throughout
these industrial districts are over 50 remarkably active
manufacturers associations organized by trade. Among other
things, these associations organize buyer-seller meets
collaboratively with local government agencies, pressure the
state government for training, resources, and infrastructure, and
monitor and maintain "market custom" among local firms.
Underneath the 5-10 largest associations, this monitoring is done
3 Many of the smallest firms get form letters of other bulk
material typed at very low rates from typing and shorthand training
colleges.
7 Some of the key institutions are the (i) District Industries
Center (funded by the state government), (ii) the Small Industries
Services Institute (one of 16 centrally run networks of regional
institutes set up in Ludhiana in 1956), (iii) Ludhiana
Productivity Council (one of 47 such councils in the country set up
here in 1958), (iv) Mechanical Engineering Research and
Development Organization (one of 3 in nation set up in 1965), (v)
Quality Marking Centers (by trades; funded by the state government
funded, and first set up since 1956), (vi) Central Tool Room
(UNDP/West German funded), and (vii) the Bicycle and Sewing
Machine R&D Center (funded by UNIDO and operational in 1988).
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by numerous loosely coupled consortiums of firms that arise from
time to time in episodic fashion around producers in very
specific product lines" to deal wish localized problems faced
by them--such as undercutting or other problems. It is similarly
possible for firms to belong to a number of different sectoral or
regional associations.
A common pattern also is that skilled workers who are
members of reconditioning teams are often also members of
particular pror'ucers associations (such as machine tools
associations). Similarly, some service firms or job shops are
part of quasi trade unions--e.g., turners associations, or
milling workers associations. This blurring of boundaries
between workers and small owners in part reflects the trajectory
of skill acquisition and small firm ownership discussed in the
previous section. Many technicians who are workers go on to
become firla owners. This crossing of boundaries, and continuity
of identity between skilled workers and small entrepreneurs who
rise from the ranks, also ensures that "market custom"39 is
3 These episodic organizations form around and include firms
that are actually facing the problem not the larger sectoral group-
-e.g., they would form around free-wheel producers (not all bicycle
parts producers) or sewing machine crank-shaft producers (not all
sewing machine parts producers).
" See Piore discussion of customary law for an analogous
process among workers.
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upheld--i.e., commonly understood standards of what constitutes
fair work are adhered to--more or less--both by workers and
owners through a loose system of "self-monitoring." To
illustrate briefly, one small sewing machine assembler I
interviewed reported how in the 1980s his firm had developed
fixtures that would allow workers to assemble upto 5 sewing
machines per day instead of the existing norm of 2-3 machines per
worker. But he said, "no one adopted this system because it went
against market custom," or the prevailing norm of what
constituted fair work (J.S. Mechanical interview, 1992).4
(c) Local arrangements that allow for efficient and
innovative use of certain raw-materials: Other kinds of "market
custom" involving informal collective agreements by firms of
various sizes that may not know each other that well also exist
that help small producers cut costs jointly. For example, after
one of Ludhiana's major strikes in the early 1970s, a set of
institutional arrangements exist in the city that allow small,
medium and large producers to use scrap in highly efficient and
innovative ways. In a search for ways to cut costs following a
large increase in wages and piece rates after the 1972 strike,
producers of various sizes decided to pass on punched/stamped
metal sheets to other firms for downstream usage. For example,
if a BB-cup (bicycle Dart) maker purchases a full length metal
sheet at say Rs. 10 per length, he sells off his punched sheet to
4 This market norm of 2-3 machines in the 1980s is a shifting
anchor. In the late 1970s it was 1-2 machines per worker per day.
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a washer maker or a bicycle accessory maker at a lower price,
say, Rs. 6 per length. The latter producer extracts the material
it needs for its parts from the left over sheet and sells it
further to a firm that produces even smaller parts at an even
lower price till the final pieces are sold to the local scrap
dealer who then sells it to the local steel re-rolling mill.
Although the first firm buys the steel sheet at market rates, the
second and third users pay a lower cost.
This system of minimizing waste involves the collaboration
of firms that may themselves not gain lower costs directly (such
as the first firm), yet collectivley it enables Ludhiana's nut
and bolt, and cycle parts industry to sell some of their products
at prices lower than production cost elsewhere. Some bicycle
parts produced this way cost less even than what producers in
other regions (Bombay or Delhi) pay just for raw-materials.
(d) Other ways of lowering production costs: The cost
benefits and skills discussed above are not the only way in which
Ludhiana's producers are able to produce goods (such as bicycles
and sewing machines) of comparable quality to large producers
elsewhere at much lower costs. They save also in their
management costs by keeping overheads low. In contrast to the
plush offices of firms in bigger cities, their offices are basic,
often a small space partitioned off the shopfloor, with the
proprietor or partner handling most of the banking, tax,
procurement and sales responsibilities himself (i.e., involving a
degree of self-exploitation), accepting generally low profit
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margins (ranging on average from 6-10%4'), and often working
long hours--8-10. Additional cost saving comes through
widespread lateral subcontracting among firms in the region.
I have not included "cheap labor" here because although
labor costs for some tasks are low in Ludhiana, wages in the
sectors that dominate Ludhiana's industrial structure--woollen
hosiery, bicycles and parts, auto-parts and other transportation
equipment, sewing machines and parts, machine tools, machinery
and metal working--are higher than the national average (Report
on the Second All-India Census of Small Industrial Units in
India--All India and Punjab volumes, 1992: pp. T-79 and T-33
respectively). Similarly other researchers have found that even
as far back as 1975, Ludhiana's manufacturers paid their workers
three times as much as their counterparts in other industrially
developed states such as Tamil Nadu (Taub and Taub 1989:110).
rThe story is more complex than just wages--it involves
widespread occupational mobility among the local labor force.
This issue is linked to several factors: the land reform of the
mid-19th century that led to a relatively less unequal
distribution of income; effects of the green revolution over
time; easy availability of basic wage goods--food, vegetables,
41 Despite low profit margins on many of the standardized goods
produced in this region, most firms in my sample, once they had
established themselves, diversified into at least a few "monopoly"
items--complex, expensive, high quality parts, or import competing
products--that are imported but not yet produced in India on a
substantial scale (such as high speed industrial sewing machines).
Profit margins on these items were as high as 100%, even though
volumes were initially not that large.
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milk, transportation; "effectiveness" of some of the
government's programs targeted towards agricultural laborers and
urban-and rural based artisans; the outreach of other industrial
training institutes; expatriate worker remittances; and how the
changing economic structure influenced and was impacted by
changes in the occupational structure.
(e) A growing group of "brokers" and intermediaries: These
middlemen come in several guises, e.g., raw-material dealers,
sales dealers, wholesalers and merchant exporters who provide
small firms with connections into national and export markets,
finance and accounts consultants who help small firms prepare
project reports that are now increasingly required by most
lending institutions and banks which have been mushrooming in
this region since the mid-1970s, soft-ware experts and
programmer-consultants who provide the hosiery industry, and in a
few cases, the machine tool industry with computezized designs,
wire-drawing "barons" who peddle steel and subsist on the
government's quota regime structured around raw-materials
marketed through government controlled monopolies--but who also
indirectly finance small producers through elaborate supplier-
credit networks; and a new breed of white collar service
establishments who help small and tiny (first generation) firms
attain access to government incentive schemes, subsidies, and
loans. These service firms also help rural and urban educated-
unemployed youth to apply for special government benefits. In
addition to these "new" intermediaries, are the older varieties
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such as grain merchants/traders--who have traditionally financed
several entrepreneurs, seed merchants who lend their seasonal
surplus dear to producers in need af start-up loans or working
capital, and cold-storage owners who do the same.
(f) A highly differentiated, but skilled, labor market:
Finally we return to the main point made earlier in this chapter.
The presence of relatively inexpensive skills. The labor market
for Ludhiana's metal industries comprises of a largely skilled
local workforce which is dominated by Punjabi male workers
(although many women are found in the woolen hosiery industry).
There is in addition, a diverse and stratified group of unskilled
and semi-skilled male migrant workers from states such as Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, and even Kerala; local women
homeworkers; and teams of migrant (tribal) men, women and
children who circulate between seasonal agricultural work on the
edges of the city and temporary factory work--such as collecting
steel scrap off the streets of the industrial estates for
recycling." The labor force also includes factory workers, as
noted above, who live in and commute from villages located in a
15-20 km radius around Ludhiana, as well as factory, service and
construction industry workers who continue to be simultaneously
engaged in agriculture as a secondary occupation.
" Quite innovative, special gear with magnets attached to
short wooden rods and a leather strap is available through the
region's radio repair shops. They use magnets from used or broken
speakers to put together this contraption. Although strenuous and
exploitative, the steel-scarp pickers say they often earn upto Rs.
100 per day on good days.
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(iii) The skilled small owner--lowering costs, competing against
imports and large dcmestic corporations.
Central to the dynamism of Ludhiana's light engineering and
metal working sector are the skilled metal-workers many of whom
go on to become entrepreneurs as mentioned in the previous
section. Not only are these entrepreneurs capable of working on
the shop-floor, but most significantly they manufacture, or at
least customize their own machinery, tools and dies. Known for
their ability to replicate existing machinery, they are able to
cut costs by reconditioning and adapting used machines with the
help of the skilled mechanics, job-shops, and reconditioning
teams mentioned earlier. They typically start out with rented or
second-hand machinery, or buy one new machine, and then copy it
(or get it copied by local mechanics) to produce their own at
half the price of the new machine. This access to skill, and a
traditionally honed understanding of production engineering,
allows these artisanal entrepreneurs to start out, and
successfully sustain their shops on much less capital than would
be required by an entrepreneur who had to depend on hired skilled
workers for similar innovation.43
Moreover, because they make some of the changes to base
machinery and production processes on their own shopfloor, or
with the help of small, local machine tool firms and mechanics,
43 See also Dasgupta 1989, Taub and Taub 1989, and Pandit
1985:146-179 for a related discussion on the skills of Ludhiana's
metal-workers.
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they are able to afford more machinery per rupee spent than small
firms who depend mainly on second hand machines, or on new
machines produced by large firms located outside the state. One
producer of automobile parts reported how he worked together with
a highly experienced mistry to install a whole leaf spring plant
in his firm for under Rs. 3.5 million when the quotes he got from
South Korea for the same plant had been over Rs.10 million. This
firm had also recently completed a prototype for a parabolic
spring at an expense of only Rs. 70,000 compared to the Rs. 50
million that the giant auto company Maruti-Suzuki had spent
installing its parabolic spring plant near Delhi (Akal Springs
interview 1991). A medium sized partner of the same firm
developed a propeller-shaft unit using local machinery and
expertise for Rs. 15 million compared to Rs. 70-80 million spent
by their competitors outside Punjab on imported plants.
This lowering of cost of base machinery and expertise also
feeds back to the customers of the region's products, lowering
their final costs. In some cases this had even led to successful
competition with imports. A small auto-parts firm"
specializing in press work in Ludhiana developed a highly
precision-intensive TV picture tube frame for Samtel, a
collaboration between Mitsubishi and an Indian firm at a third of
the price that Samtel was paying to import the part from Japan
till 1990. Now Samtel plans to re-export this indigenized part
" The firm is officially small in scale, but is at the large
end of the category. It has two plants with a total of 170
workers.
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to Canada, Europe and South Korea (Moonlight interview, 1991).
Similarly, Samtel's engineer present at Moonlight's factory
reported that Samtel got a quotation from South Korea for the
TV's inner magnetic shield for Rs. 4 million per shield. But
Moonlight is now producing this part for Samtel at Rs. 0.8
million per shield--at one-fifth the cost of the imported
component. Samtel is therefore no longer importing the part from
Korea. "Samtel is years ahead of its competition (Uptron, JCT)
Fnd has been abl3 to save a minimum of Rs. 10 million in imports
because of the high quality import substitutes provided by
Moonlight" (Gupta, Samtel interview 1991)
By virtue of their ability to routinely manipulate base
machinery, these skilled entrepreneurs minimize their need to
hire skilled workers up-front. Thus, they combine the advantage
of low start-up costs, a low wage bill and low fixed costs, with
the large-firm type ability to develop new products through
reverse engineering, and improve productivity through changes to
their production processes and base machinery.
This presence of cheap skills and the work-arrangements
described above help to lower production costs for both the
region's small and large firms. Hardly any firm in the region--
large or small--produces all components of any of the region's
composite final-goods (bicycles, sewing machines etc.) in-
house. 4 5 As noted earlier, this system has allowed the region's
4s The region's larger assemblers do wield greater market
power, yet very few of the smaller component producers and/or
assemblers remain tied to single customers. Once established, they
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large and small firms to together undermine and eventually
displace more integrated, large MNC producers elsewhere in India.
Ludhiana firms produced the same goods that these larger firms
produced, of comparable quality, but at virtually half the cost.
The products where Ludhiana-based firms wrested a competitive
edge vis-a-vis large producers are bicycles (Sen-Raleigh and TI
Cycles in Bengal and Madras respectively), sewing machines (both
Singer and Usha--a large Calcutta firm--have been forced to
procure a bulk of their complete machines from Ludhiana), some
farm implements and simple non-electrical machinery (Rao, 1989,
Singh, 1990).
(iv) Overcoming everyday obstacles in production: some examples
from the shopfloor
Aside from supplying to OEMs and final buyers, a bulk of the
region's small firms supply to the replacement market. This
means that although the products manufactured for the replacement
or spares market by these producers are fairly standardized--
bicycles, sewing machines, auto-parts, machine tools--the
productive process is nevertheless highly variable and is
constantly adapted and altered by individual or groups of
producers in order to lower production costs or increase output.
A few examples will illustrate what these firms do to make
tend to diversify their large customers while simultaneously
selling in the replacement market on their own brand-name. Some
seek government orders, and/or try to export indirectly through
trading houses.
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small ongoing modifications and how they might lower production
costs. (a) The piston pin is a standardized part that comes in
standardized sizes, so a firm producing these pins cannot make
modifications to improve the product design. But as one
manufacturer of piston pins reported, they can introduce superior
material, or improve their production process to achieve better
quality and less wastage. So they try to minimize rejections.
In the case of the reporting firm, they reduced rejections from
10% to 2-3% in a few years.
In addition, the firm made small incremental improvements on
the shopfloor involving changes to fixtures and tools, or the
set-up of the machine can help increase output and efficiency."
Often, this involves gradual, and selective automation of the
production process.
For example, the piston pin manufacturer discussed above,
used to grind the piston pin one face at a time, because they had
a machine in which the parts were fed vertically. With the help
of their mistry (mechanic, technician-foreman) they developed a
machine in-house in which the two faces of the piston pin can be
now ground simultaneously. Whereas earlier an operator had to
mechanically reverse the sides of the pin after one face was
ground, now the machine is modified so that the pin is fed into
-6 These changes are gradual and ongoing in nature. They arise
from battling with problems that emerge on the shopfloor or are
pointed out by outside assemblers of these parts. The solutions
emerge from the experience of the mistry and the owner's technical
knowledge, or through consultations with others.
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it edgeways and passes through a fixture-head fitted with two
grinders at both ends. Thus both faces of the pin get ground at
the same time, and the part rolls off at the other end.
Similarly this firm used to chamfer the inner and outer edge
of another of its item, the bush, sequentially (i.e., first the
inner edge, then the outer). A mechanic friend who had a firm in
another line suggested that they develop a new tool that would
allow them to chamfer both edges simultaneously. The firm
produced the new tool in its own tool room, with the help of its
own workers and local tool and die makers.
(b) The same firm used to cut the pipe for the piston pin
on a regular machine and measure it several times with calipers
to get the exact dimension. Again, a mistry suggested that they
develop a tool and fixture whereby the fixture would be set
exactly at the distance they needed the length of the piston to
be, so that the cutter tool would automatically stop when it
reached precisely the desired point. With this more complex tool
and fixture the firm attained more speed as well as accuracy.
At the time of interview this firm was developing a special
adaptation to its turning work-station so that the final
stage/operation of polishing and finishing (now done on a
separate polishing machine) would be collapsed with the final
turning, thus eliminating the need ror the last step and extra
machines. A highly skilled project manager of the District
Industries Department was helping them as a consultant (after
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hours) to achieve this.47
Despite its small size and low margins, this firm has been
able to increase output, reduce rejections, and gradually upgrade
its production process as its finances have allowed it, and as
and when it has had to resolve production problems on the
shopfloor. Constant consulting with other producers, other
assemblers, and mechanics helped highlight for the firm problem
areas and ideas about how to solve the problems.
Conclusions
This chapter argued that in addition to the social and
historical features discussed in forgoing chapters, a key reason
why metal-based small industry came to be successfully
concentrated in Ludhiana, a region thousands of kms away from any
material input source, was (i) the nature of its accumulated
human capital, and (ii) the widespread availability of cheap
physical infrastructure provided by the state government. Unlike
other states in India where governments assisted industry through
equity participation or ownership, Punjab's government focussed,
early on, on extending basic infrastructure throughout the state,
47 Most firms work with very low margins, as does this firm.
It competes by picking up odd-sized, or customized parts that
other, standard firms cannot accommodate, and by responding to a
shifting niche demand. I.e., large firms produce long runs of the
same part for a substantial time period, say for 2-3 months. In the
interim they cannot pick up any odd sized parts that someone
demands. Small firms that focus on the replacement market (or the
spare parts market) pick up this kind of demand.
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and encouraging skill formation among workers, technicians and
small owners.
Discussions about training, upgrading of worker skills, and
increasing a region's human capital base have acquired increasing
relevance in the recent literature on industrial growth. But the
lessons about training and the state's role in it are usually
portrayed as distinct from discussions of what workers do on
their own in the labor market to acquire skills. Studies that
Jook at informal sources of learning or skill enhancement usually
do not feed back into the way in which public training programs
are designed. Outside of the recent work on learning via
exposure to practical knowledge on the shopfloor in the
literature on East Asian successes (Amsden 1989) and industrial
restructuring in advanced industrial economies, on-the-job
training is not only ignored, but regarded as too inadequate, too
weak and disorganized, to raise worker skills to levels that
would make a region competitive.
Taken by itself this may be true, and indeed some formal
training programs are often designed precisely to compensate for,
or improve upon, the techniques and short cuts workers learn on
the shopfloor. But in this way of thinking, training systems
remain dichotomous, split between the formal programs that carry
much greater validity than informal processes that are more
ubiquitous, but remain unvalidated and marginalized. An area
that deserves serious research and policy attention, therefore,
is the reconciliation of these disparate tracks of human capital
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accumulation, by understanding how formal training programs can
combine with, and incorporate more consciously, the less formal
processes of learning that are already taking place on the
shoploor and among workers in the labor market. As described in
this chapter, the Ludhiana case illustrates the striking success
of such a combined process. Although the particular way in which
this beneficial interaction between the state's emphasis on skill
formation through vocational training and workers' own skill
acquisition trajectories, came about was inadvertent, and shaped
by Ludhiana's idiosyncrasies and history, it nevertheless could
be repeated by fostering key relationships through policies and
programs. An understanding of how formal and informal processes
of training and skill acquisition interact, may provide insights
into building a cheaper, broad-based system of upgrading the
skills of a region's workforce that is accessible to the smallest
firms.
The findings about training, apprenticeship, and learning in
Ludhiana (and Punjab in general) reported in this chapter, are
different also from the recent emphasis in the literature on
education and health leading to stronger and more equitable
economic growth (Birdsall et. al. 1995). Punjab, as we saw in
Table 4.1, is the country's highest GNP state; in addition to a
dynamic agriculture, small and medium sized firms are the basis
of its industrial growth; and only 7% of its population is below
the poverty line compared to 30% for the nation as a whole. Yet
the state has only mediocre health and literacy indicators that
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are slightly better than the national average (Table 4.1). While
the arguments about education and health leading growth may not
be wrong, the Ludhiana case does not fit the model. The broad-
based character of the region's accumulated human capital cannot
be read off its literacy and health indicators, yet this human
capital base has been crucial to the region's economic growth.
There are, thus, other paths to relatively equitable growth that
do not involve heavy investments in education and health first.
In the next chapter we will see how, located within this
environment, local firms built relationships with each other,
with state agencies, and with numerous intermediaries, that
allowed them to break out of several traps that typically plague
small firms: such as coping with unstable demand, getting access
to markets, technical knowhow, and performance standards.
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CHAPTER 5
Getting around common bottlenecks that plaque small firms:
unstable demand, distribution, and performance standards
Introduction
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, many of
Ludhiana's small producers had repair origins. Many others, in
the bicycle industry, for example, started out as component
producers at 1,w ends of the rarket and moved up gradually,
improving product quality over time up to the point where, by the
1970s, they had wrested away market share from the country's
largest multinational bicycle producers, forcing them to procure
components from Ludhiana or get out of the business. This moving
from low to higher ends of markets by small firms over time is
not new, or unusual in and of itself. Small firms in many
regions and countries start out prodacing at the low end; but
many firms, and regions also stay stuck at the low end. In the
Ludhiana case, how did a region dominated by small producers that
started out manufacturing simple components, located hundreds of
miles away from any input source, come to dominate national
markets in the products in which they specialized, producing over
60% of India's production of bicycles and parts, over 80% of its
sewing machines and parts, and 95% of the nation's woollen
hosiery output (Dasgupta 1989)? What enables some firms and
regions to move from low to higher ends, and not others? How
exactly do they do it?
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Similarly, there is overwhelming evidence in the literature
that marketing is a major stumbling block for small firms. Field
studies furnish vivid evidence about how lack of access to
markets, or lack of 'marketing ability' strangulates small firm
growth. As sales stagnate and revenue-streams shrivel up, firms
are unable to reinvest in upgrading, or expanding production, and
are less and less able to compete in local or outside markets.
If they additionally have heavy debt liabilities to banks or
private lenders, they go under (Little et. al. 1987, Liedholm and
Mead 1987).
Given this scenario, I was surprised to find hardly any of
the 117 firms I interviewed report that marketing was a problem
for them. The common response was that "sales are no problem."
Most said they typically had more demand than they could meet.
This is not to say they did not face any problems with demand,
but they did not regard these problems as debilitating. Why did
issues of sales and marketing not present themselves as problems
to these firms which they felt they couldn't get around? What
explains this departure from our usual understanding of marketing
as a chronic problem that plagues small firms?
This chapter focuses on these questions and asks how and why
some are firms able to cope with key bottlenecks that typically
plague small firms, such as qetting sc-uck at low-ends of the
market, being unable to find out how to improve quality enough to
enter outside, higher quality markets; improving performance
standards; dealing with problems of marketing, and coping with
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the sudden loss of demand, or acquiring the ability to shift
production in response to changes in demand without incurring
debilitating costs. I address these questions by looking closely
at one case and explaining how several small and medium producers
in Ludhiana managed to get around these traps, and the conditions
under which they succeeded.
Some aspects underlying the ability of these firms to cope
with bottlenecks that typically hamper small firms are best
illustrated by situating Ludhiana in a comparative context. The
chapter therefore begins with a brief comparison between Ludhiana
and Howrah's small metal manufacturing firms. Both regions had a
skilled workforce and significant early demand from the
government. Yet, Ludhiana's metal-working industry prospered at
the same time as Howrah's metal industry declined. What explains
this difference in outcome?
The first part of the chapter lays out the comparison
between Ludhiana and Howrah's metal-based engineering industries.
First, drawing on the themes developed in the previous chapter,
it shows how the differing nature of skills in the two regions,
and the different ways in which small-owners and workers got
access to them imposed quite different pressures on firms that
employed these skills, as well as on their diffusion and
transformation. A second difference between Ludhiana and
Howrah's trajectories lies in the different kinds of demand
pressures faced by small firms in the two regions. Even though
government demand was important to both regions it was mediated
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by different kinds of intermediaries, and evoked different
responses by firms in the two regions. With the Ludhiana-Howrah
comparison in mind, the second part of the chapter draws on
several case-examples to examine how successful firms in Ludhiana
coped with the moving away of demand and the lack of assured
markets. It examines the distributional networks that give
Ludhiana's small firms access to national and export markets
outside the region. And it shows how firms constantly put
pressure on themselves to improve output and product quality by
exposing and comparing themselves to a variety of outside
standards.
Part I: The Ludhiana-Howrah comparison--tracing their different
traiectories:'
Ludhiana's growing success in the 1950-60s paralleled
exactly Howrah's decline. Compared to Punjab, Howrah had every
natural advantage: proximity to a key port, location at the heart
of Bengal's iron and steel producing centers, and a century long
insertion in one of India's busiest trading and manufacturing
centers (Bengal). Sources of coal and other inputs are at its
doorstep. For nearly a century Howrah's metal industry had sold
its output to the largest and most powerful (though
monopsonistic' buyer in the region--the colonial government, in
particular its railway department and shipyards near Calcutta.
1 In addition to the references cited herein, this section
draws heavily on discussions with Abhijit Bannerji on the metal
industry of Howrah (MIT, 1994).
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Despite these comparative and natural advantages, this industry
declined; it declined over the same period that Ludhiana's metal
industry prospered.
The standard West Bengal story of militant unions subverting
industrial growth breaks down in explaining this decline because
most of Howrah's workshops that first prospered and then declined
were non-union--just like the Ludhiana workshops that began to
successfully compete with them. Instead, as we see below, a
different kind of human capital base and a different history of
work organization in Ludhiana seemed to overwhelm any clear
natural advantage that Howrah had over it.
Two of the factors explaining Ludhiana and Howrah's
differing futures are examined in greater detail below. (i) One
factor relates to the composition and history of skill in the two
regions. (ii) The other relates to the character of demand
facing small firms in the two regions: the nature and source of
demand, and how it came to be transmitted across firms in the two
places was different.
(i) Differing character of local skills and their differing
antecedents.
Both Howrah and Ludhiana have skilled metal workers. But
the nature of their skills, and the way in which they were
acquired is quite different. (a) Howrah's skilled workers are
narrowly specialized to perform with great Lrocision certain sets
of tasks, not because production was organized along mass
production lines, but because the network of small metal firms
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specialized in a very small set of items, and employed processes
that demanded a narrow range of skiils. The region's speciaity
through the 40s, 50s, and upto the 7 0s was pipe fitting, and the
production of some machines that are involved in this process
(RBI 1964). Workers in this region are, say, excellent pipe
fitters because they have been doing the same task for many
years. But when demand for this product waned, a bulk of the
firms were unable to move successfully to new and different
tasks.
By contrast, most workers in Ludhiana have broader skills.
The metal industry produces a variety of related goods and uses a
wide range of production processes. This has created demand for
a wider range of skills. As opposed to specialist pipe fitters
who work on the same problems and on the same machines everyday,
the pressures imposed by the way production is organized in
Ludhiana has created incentives for skilled workers to learn how
to deal with newer problems not previously known to them. As we
have seen in earlier, the region's small firms are constantly
seeking modifications to their production process, different ways
of performing specialized operations (e.g., gear-hobbing) on
unspecialized, general purpose machines. This demand for finding
newer, cheaper or customized ways of doing things has old roots.
As we saw in chapter two, even the region's farmers have long
made cimilar demands upon local mechanics, technicians, artisans
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to develop customized equipment for them.2 The skilled workers
most in demand are mechanics and technicians, those who can look
at a machine, or task they have never seen before and figure out
how to go from machine A to B, or process C to D, in a small
number of steps, and to apply these skills to different kinds of
unforeseen problems.' These skills, moreover, are available to
small firms without their having to fully internalize their
costs, as we saw in the last chapter--through the presence of
reconditioning teams, numerous job-shops owners, and component
manufacturers who are themselves skilled technicians.
(b) The history of the construction of skill, and its
transmission is also different in the two regions. Different
kinds of social groups went into industry in the Ludhiana vs
Howrah. Artisans, who over time became transformed into
technicians, mechanics, and skilled owners, were historically
central to the industrial system in Ludhiana in Howrah, by
contrast, labor employed in small firms was never in the networks
where skills were formed naturall1,. Those who owned capital had
little practical skill themselves. They hired cheap migrant
2 For example, we saw how the farmers who returned to East
Punjab after the partition of Punjab in 1947, having been exposed
to irrigated farming in West Punjab's canal colonies, and to the
use of improved implements, turned to local artisans to help
develop equipment to suit their smaller plots and a1 tered
conditions of work.
' Again, these kinds of general skills are not unique to
Ludhiana. Most places that have an adaptable industrial base
appear to have them (See Sabel 1982, Piore and Sabel 1984, as well
as cases in developing countries, especially, Schmitz 1995.)
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workers from Orissa and Bihar who became trained narrowly in the
jobs they performed. Other than the jobs they learnt to do, they
did not have an understanding of mechanical work in general, nor
did they have access to institutions of apprenticeship and
information in the local labor market as did workers in Ludhiana.
Howrah's metal workers existed in a narrow segment outside the
formal sector, whereas in Ludhiana the bulk of small producers
were the region's industrial mainstream.' Thus, although there
were skilled workers in Howrah, as well as less skilled workers
who had a lot of experience, the trajectory of neither group was
able to converge in a way that technician's skills ever became
easy to acquire or be widely reproduced. Those outside the loop
of the small skilled elite stayed stuck in narrowly defined job-
tracks, becoming good at some tasks, but unable to acquire
general skills.
(c) The social structures in which the workers and small
owners in the respective regions were embedded were different as
well. Punjab's agricultural and non-agricultural working class
already had some wealth through 18th-19th century land reforms,
4 It is interesting that the career trajectories of
migrants in Ludhiana appears to be quite different from that of the
same group in Howrah. During my field work, some U.P. and Bihari
migrants who had worked in Ludhiana for four years or more reported
a desire to start their own firms one day. One semi-skilled
migrant worker whom I interviewed in a small firm showed me parts
of used machinery that he had been buying with his savings to
assemble a motor. Ultimately he said he would find parts to put
together a lathe. The demonstration effect of the trajectory of
local (Punjabi) workers appeared to have been the motivator. "This
is what everyone does.. .this is how people start here" (Babu Ram at
Nirmal Auto, interview 1991).
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migration, extensive contract work and the colonial government's
investments in public works, irrigation and infrastructure during
the late 1800-early 1900s. By contrast, the petty landlords from
East Bengal who became owners of small industry in Howrah were
embedded in a rack-rented system of tenancy throughout the late
19th-early 20th centuries. Although they had enough to eat, and
thought of themselves as belonging to the landed class, they had
no significant surpluses. Moreover, because of their perceived
"upper" class social status, and white collar aspirations, these
former landlords had never worked with their own hands: much of
the actual cultivation was done by Muslim sharecroppers (Bannerji
1994, Bose). In Punjab, by contrast, peasant status was
socially acceptable, and owner-cultivation carried status.
Consequently there was no radical alienation in that society from
all forms of work with one's hands. Cultivators as well as
artisans earned stature by working with their hands, acquiring
skill in practical work. The artisanal groups who became small
owners in Ludhiana, therefore, accumulated a different kind of
human capital. Since these early small-owners themselves had
practical technical knowledge, they did not rely solely on hired
skills.
In sum then, Punjab developed an active artisan class in the
late 19th-early 20th centuries that was transforming its
traditional skill base and accumulating some capital through
contract work on the colonial government's infrastructure
projects. This group later entered industry. East-Bengal's
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peasants, who later became metal-shop owners in Howrah, had
enough to live on, but did not accumulate any surplus, or skills.
They hired cheap unskilled or semi-skilled migrant laborers from
neighboring states who remained isolated. They could never join
the networks of the skilled Bengali foremen where skills were
created and preserved. Thus when demand for Howrah's metal
products declined, the skilled tier just moved away to new
industries and jobs' leaving behind the small owners and their
semi-skilled migrant workforce without the ability to shift to
new products.
In contrast to this isolation, in Punjab a wide range of
workers could participate in the networks that taught the skills
(not only in technical schools, but within firms and the labor
market). Aiding this relatively democratic structure of skill
transmission, moreover, was the fact that the social boundary
between small firm owners and skilled workers was blurred--they
belonged loosely to the same social class--of former artisans or
in some cases, merchants engaged in metal trade. The policy
response from the government of Punjab throughout the 1950s-60s
also encouraged skilled workers to start their own enterprises,
creating a large tier of middle-class entrepreneurs who had moved
up the ranks of workers. Small owners who had risen from the
ranks still had ties to networks of skilled workers they had been
a part of, who they could turn to for technical advice without
s As did the contractors who brokered the demand between
Howrah's small firms and the main buyer, the government.
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having to hire them. Thus, embedded in an evolving skill-base,
with indirect support from the government and from a variety of
other actors, small firm owners in Ludhiana (and Punjab) were
better able to cope with the moving away of, or declining of an
obvious source of demand than their Howrah counterparts, as we
will see below.
(ii) Demand and its varieties
A second dimension of difference between Ludhiana and Howrah
lies in the nature and source of demand. In particular,
government demand, and the way in which it got transmitted to
small producers in both places. In Howrah, the government's
large railway coach factories monopsonistically bought parts from
small local suppliers via contractors. The small firms who
produced for the government had little direct contact with them,
and hence were unable to build any relationship with their
ultimate buyers. At the same time, most of them had no
independent market outside of the railway department. The
products they specialized in were customized to fit the
particular design and requirements of the railway workshops, and
could not be sold on the open market. Thus, when the
government's railway workshops moved away from their location in
the vicinity of Howrah's small metalshops in the 1950s-1960s, the
contractors who were the chief brokers of demand between the
railway workshops and the small firms, also moved their business
to where government demand was, thus cutting off the small local
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producers from their primary market. Some of the small producers
recovered slowly by turning to other clients in the local market,
but the cluster as a whole failed to survive the exodus of the
government workshops. Rather than shift to new products, a large
number of firm-owners became petty traders after the metal trades
declined (Bannerji 1994).
In Ludhiana, by contrast, public and private demand played
itself out quite differently. Government demand--especially from
the defense department and the railways--was central to the
initial growth of the region's small firms as we saw in the
preceding chapters, but it differed from Howrah in at least two
ways. (a) Its spread amongst the region's firms was more
diffuse. Unlike the Howrah case, small firms in Ludhiana as a
whole, were not dependent on the production of only a narrow
range of parts for a single government agency like the railways
or any single buyer. Different firms produced a variety of
products ranging from nuts and bolts, bicycles and parts,
knitting machinery, various type,-: of industrial sewing machines
(zig-zag, overlock, embroidery machines and "tailor" models)--to
a variety of auto components, machinery and tools. Firms also
produced woollen hosiery, pullovers, uniforms and other goods for
a variety of government departments including rural development
and welfare, railways and defense. Thus, public sector derand in
Ludhiana came from a diverse set of agencies, and for a variety
of products.
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(b) But, even as government demand was important to the
early growth of the metal and hosiery firms in Ludhiana, and is
still an important source of demand for local firms, private
demand progressively overtook government demand--the volume of
output sold in the open market (local and national) has exceeded
government procurement since the 1960s (DIC, Ludhiana).6
Unlike Howrah, local firms here did not depend solely on
government orders for particular goods for their survival. Nor
did they remain locked into the repeated production of a narrow
set of goods; demand emerged, instead, from a variety of public
and private buyers for a variety oi related goods. They were
thus better able to cope with the falling off, or moving away of
demand from the government or other buyers.
Inadvertent benefits to industry of the government's time-
bound subsidies to agriculture
Since the late 1950s-early 1960s, moreover, the government
has played another kind of indirect role in stimulating local
firms, namely by unintentionally creating demand for them via a
series of subsidies and incentives targeted towards the buyers of
goods produced by the region's firms. For example, in the early
1960s through the 1970s the government gave farmers subsidies to
purchase threshers, diesel engines and pumpsets as part of its
6 Although Lucdira.- figures are not available, from my
own sample of firms, the average proportion of output purchased
directly by the government works out to around 35% for the sample
as a whole. Some firms sold nearly all their output to government
agencies, others sold less than 5% or none at all, but on average
the government procured about a third of the total output of the
sample firms in 1991-1992.
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drive to boost agricultural productivity. This simultaneously
sparked the rise of the local pump-set and diesel engine
industry. Several firms that were already producing agricultural
implements, or repairing pump-sets and diesel engines reported
having switched to or started the production of pumps and engines
during this period. Similarly in the late 1960s and 1970s state
government subsidies to farmers for the purchase of capacitors to
regulate the consumption of power by pumpsets let to the growth
of capacitor making firms which later turned to the production of
capacitors for fans, furnaces and auto-parts. The establishment
by the state government (jointly with a private consortium) of a
large tractor producing firm in Punjab in the early 1970s (PTL),
led to the development of a chain of ancillaries and suppliers
who initially produced tractor parts, and later diversified also
into the production of auto-parts for large automakers outside
the state. All my interviewee firms who had been affected by
these subsidies reported a sharp rise in sales when the buyers of
their end products got subsidies from the government. This was
especially true for firms that produced items consumed by the
state's farmers or agricultural sector--ranging from agricultural
implements to farm accessories, capacitors, pumpsets and diesel
engines.
The finding that agricultural subsidies indirectly benefited
small industry is ironic not only in light of the strong
criticism in the literature about subsidies to agriculture or
industry, and caveats about the pitfalls of prolonged dependence
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on them, but also because subsidies aimed at increasing
agricultural productivity benefited small industry--an issue that
is rarely raised in the literature. In contrast to the long-term
or direct subsidies debated in the literature, these subsidies to
industry were both inadvertent and they were time bound. Since
they were administered by the agriculture department, without the
aim of benefiting industry, they lasted for the time period they
were intended for in agriculture. In most of these cases the
subsidies were a result of the farm-lobby pressuring the state
government, not firms. But the result was the creation of demand
for industry. The firms responded to the opportunities presented
by this subsidy-induced demand, but given their lack of control
over their duration, did not assume they could count on it
indefinitely (Mahajan interview, 1991). As the subsidies in the
original markets dried up, they learnt to spread to newer
markets, expand their sales to other provinces where farmers
would use these products, or get out of a specific line and move
into a related one (e.g., making capacitors for fans instead of
pumpsets to which the original subsidy applied). The halting of
these inadvertent incentives thus pushed these firms to seek
alternative markets beyond the local region, most did not go
under .'
7 In spreading to other markets, Punjab-based firms had an
advantage in that agricultural mechanization spread relatively
slowly to other states compared to Punjab. Thus, as Punjab's
agrarian markets for new equipment became saturated, demand for
these goods was just opening up in other regions.
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Part II: Getting around some common bottlenecks.
(1) Coping with the moving away of demand: some examples
This does not mean that firms in Ludhiana have uniformly
faced steady demand. In several cases the primary source of
demand for firms--including from the government--moved away.
Some managed to switch to new products, some did not. We examine
three examples below that illustrate some of the key mechanisms
by which firms adapted to the sudden falling off of demand. That
all three examples involve the shifting away of government demand
is more a reflection of the nature of my particular sample of
firms and the importance of government demand in their early
histories, than any comparative statement about the stability of
public vs. private demand.
(i) Case One: The buyer as the anchor. One small firm'
that I interviewed used to supply most of its output of fasteners
(bolts and rivets of sizes ranging from 10-25mm) to the
government's Railways Department since the 1960s. In the early
1980s, however, the design of wagons changed, and the Railways
began to sharply cut down their demand for the firm's bolts and
rivets. Some of the wagon parts that used to be fastened or
riveted, were now welded; with some parts being welded and some
fastened, government demand for fasteners became highly erratic
and uncertain. After a year of losses and tremendous fluctuation
8 The firm, a partnership with two principals, has two plants
with less than 25 workers in each, and an annual turnover (total
sales) of over Rs. 10 million.
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in orders, the firm decided to look for a product that would not
be so vulnerable to changes in design. Its particular solu-ion
was two-fold. (i) First, it turned towards Ludhiana-based
wholesalers to tide over its sales crunch in the short run. The
firm did not give up or close down its fasteners unit--rather,
with the help of these wholesalers and merchant intermediaries,
it gradually reoriented its fastener production away from the
railways and towards private firms and the defense department.9
(ii) Second, and, more importantly, it diversified into the
production of a different item for which demand would not
fluctuate so much. The firm chose wagon paint as the new line.
Wagon paint is a completely different item than fasteners.
But on closer examination it turns out not to be entirely
unrelated to some aspects of the firm's previous specialty. The
common thread for the firm between this product and its previous
line of fasteners was the buyer. It still supplied to the same
buyer. the railways. The firm's bottom line had been to retain
the railways as its chief customer--a relationship it had built
over long years. In its choice of an alternative, therefore, the
firm looked for an item that could still be sold to the railways
but would not be vulnerable to changes in wagon design. In that
search it stumbled upon wagon paint. An acquaintance who had
links with the paint industry's hub in Calcutta suggested that
9 At the time of interview in 1990, the firm was contemplating
getting into the export of fasteners to the Middle-East. Sales
intermediaries--wholesalers, merchant exporters and retailers were
crucial to this shift.
211
industrial paint for railway wagons and army trucks was a good
option. Since no one produced wagon paint in Punjab, "there was
little competition from within the state, and the field was wide
open." Moreover, "the same wagons that are riveted or welded are
also painted," so demand for wagon paint would not depend upon
the shape or design of wagons (Twiga Bolts interview, 1990).
In addition to allowing the firm to continue doing business
with its old buyer, the Railways, entering this new line was
opportune. At the time that the firm got into paint production
in 1985, regional demand for wagon-paint was especially
promising. The central government had recently opened a large
rail-coach manufacturing factory in a district near Ludhiana
(Kapurthala), and a second large parastatal, the Diesel
Components Works (DCW), was simultaneously under installation in
another neighboring district. 0 As one of the few industrial
paint producers in Punjab, the firm felt that its proximity to
these new clients, and regional buyers such as the Northern
Railways, would help it win tenders more easily than the
traditional paint suppliers of Calcutta, located 1200 kms away.
The firm also turned to the defense department for the sale of
10 The establishment of both these parastatals was being
expedited at that time by the Government of India and Punjab's
administration partly in response to the rising separatist unrest
in Punjab in the mid-±1oo. -..any believed that these parastatals
were part of the Indian government's attempt to provide employment
("good jobs") to Punjab's youth (especially its "educated-
unemployed" in rural areas), and to address the local grievance
that the Indian government had neglected Punjab's economy,
especially its industry, while extracting and draining away its
agricultural surpluses.
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both paints (for army trucks and tanks), and fasteners. Thus,
despite the jolt it received from the slump in government demand
in the early 1980s, the firm ended up diversifying and expanding
production, and still retaining the Railways as its main buyer.
The search for this new, less volatile line of production was not
arbitrary. The firm introduced an item for which there was
little local competition, but it also paid attention to the
demand for it, and the opportunity that had opened up locally
through the establishment of new railway factories.
Two points are important to note here. First, the firm
coped with fluctuating demand by maintaining stability and
continuity with regard to its key buyer--the government's railway
department. Rather than give up a valued customer it had
developed over long years, the firm allowed its products to take
the slack. It moved from one product (fasteners) to an unrelated
product (paints), in order to keep its buyer constant. The
firm's search for a new product was driven as much by a concern
for more stable demand, as by its desire to maintain stable ties
with its old customer. This response to demand instability is
virtually the opposite of the response where a firm retains its
specialty product but seeks new markets or new buyers for it.
Although this firm also sought new markets and buyers for its
line of fasteners, its major response was to retain its buyer and
shift to a new product. By contrast, as we saw in the previous
section, small producers in Howrah's metal industry were unable
to do either--upon the moving away of demand from the Railways,
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they were neither able to shift to new products, nor find new
buyers for their older specialties.
Unlike Howrah, where a large number of intermediaries
(contractors) brokered demand between the Railways, the
government's shipyards, and Howrah's small producers, in the
above example, the small producer had direct links with the
Railways which they had nurtured over many years. This direct
contact not only allowed for the possibility of continuity even
after demand for one item got disrupted. Most importantly,
direct contact allowed the producer to build an understanding of
what it would take to continue its link with the Railways--e.g.
regarding requirements of quality, tender procedures and other
sources of demand from the same buyer. By contrast, the small
producers of Howrah were left isolated after the tier that had
the information and direct contact with the Railways moved away.
Second, the response illustrated in the above example, of a
firm moving between products that are themselves unrelated but
linked by a "common" consumer, is contrary also to the way we
think about policies that pick "winners." These policies usually
support particular products or sectors, based partly on the
thinking that successful firms usually develop a specialization
in a particular product line, which takes many years of focussed
work to build. This view is often true, but there may also be
different paths to success. As the above example showed, this
may involve, not necessarily remaining tied to a particular
product, but rather seeking out products for which there is
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demand, perhaps around a stable buyer.
In this regard, the nature of the buyer is important to
note. Most government buyers are routinely criticized for being
"soft" on small firms, unable to discipline them with regard to
quality. This is especially true in India given its strong
small-firm favoring programs such as concessional procurement and
reservation of products for exclusive production in the small-
scale sector. In contrast to this view, we saw that the
customer, in the above case, was an exacting buyer. Although a
government agency, its agenda was not to assist small firms.
Since it allocated demand via tenders, the Railway department did
not care whether this particular firm continued to be its
supplier or not. Unlike some other public programs where an
agency with an explicit mandate to help small producers buys
their products and tries to further market them--such as the
Handicraft Board of India--in this case the decision to maintain
ties with the government buyer was the firm's, not the
government's. To remain a supplier, the firm had to not only win
the tender, but meet the quality requirements of the Railway
department, just as much as any other supplier of paints in the
country. Because of this quality-requirement, the firm, by
choosing to work with the Railways, was also imposing pressure on
itself to rise up to a higher standard.
Therefore, unlike some procurement programs which are
criticized because they fail to help their clients graduate into
independent markets (Sanyal and Pradhan 1990), this relationship
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carried an in-built disciplinary mechanism." To continue to
work with the Railways, the firm had to learn to be good eIgh
to meet its quality requirement. The firm's own decision to
maintain continued association with a demanding buyer forced it
to improve its quality.
(ii) Case Two: changing the product mix in loose relation to
the demand mix of a cluster of public consumers: A medium-sized
producer of machine tools who specialized in items for the
defence department faced a similar dilemma of fluctuating demand
in the late 1980s. Under government contract the firm had spent
nearly two years in the mid-1980s developing tools and equipment
" See also Tendler and Amorim (1996) for a detailed account
of a highly successful public procurement program in Brazil that
dramatically enhanced small firm performance. This program was put
together, inadvertently, with similar disciplinary pressures built
into it. The procuring agency had no direct interest in supporting
small suppliers. They only looked for good quality at low rates
and hired only those small firms who could deliver it.
12 Not all government departments are equal. Most are not as
exacting as defense and the railways, and perhaps not for all
products. Starting out by supplying to "tough" and stringent
departments such as the railways or defense forces supplier firms
to "get it right" faster or forces the pace of learning. But not
all small firms can afford that pace. Because if material gets
rejected, a few times consistently, then it could wipe out a small
firm that has scarce capital. As with the Railways, or defense,
designs are specific to the needs of these customers, so firms
cannot find alternative buyers so easily if they cut back demand.
Those who have resources or the capacity to hire skilled help or
are skilled themselves can afford to absorb the losses. Others may
find it easier to go a different route--work their way upwards
slowly through building a relationship with a small retailer, and
improving quality gradually or incrementally. Because that way
there is more room to make mistakes--yet they can sell early,
imperfect material in small quantities to seconds' markets where
rates are lower. One is not necessarily better than the other, but
the two paths coexist, and work in different ways.
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for a component that would go into a warship being commissioned
by the Navy. But after two years of development work, even
before the first batch of parts could be despatched, the
government indefinitely postponed the commissioning of the
vessel, and halted all ongoing production related to it. The
impact of this decision on the machine tool producer was to
render obsolete all the machinery that it had developed, set up,
and fitted specially to fulfil the Navy's orders, including a
foundry. The government compensated the firm for its two years
of development time, but not fully for the machines and processes
it had developed. To cope with its losses, the firm reacted in
two ways.
(a) First, to recover the costs of investing in a foundry,
it began to take in job work from other firms to ensure that its
foundry did not lie idle. Drawing upon a pattern common among
firms in the city, the firm contracted the on-site management of
its foundry to an outside agent 3 rather than deploy its own
staff to run it. The outside contractor hired its own labor
which came to the producer's factory site daily to operate the
foundry on a commission basis for the firm (R.K. interview,
1990). Even though the firm was medium-sized, it took in job-
work to cut its liabilities and recover its sunk costs--taking in
job-work is therefore not only something the smallest firms do.
(b) Second, the firm had contracts from other sections of
the defense department, some since the past 20 years. It tried
' Under loose oversight by the one of the firm's foremen.
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to get them to increase their orders, at least in the short run.
But most importantly, as in the previous example, it turned to a
new product and a new market: in addition to seeking orders from
the Railways' Diesel coach factory installed in Punjab in the
1980s, it took up the production of CNC lathes for the
government's industrial training institutes. The firm's decision
to diversify into CNC lathes was not entirely abrupt--in the late
1980s it had produced turning heads of CNC lathes for Hindustan
Machine Tools (HMT), the government's largest machine-tool
parastatal. Since then it had wanted to enter the line more
fully. The disruption caused by the cancelled contract provided
the "push" to make the shift. The firm planned to take up the
production of "the cheapest possible" version of CNC lathes. Its
intended market was still the government--specifically its
industrial training institutes (ITIs). The firm's idea was to
"put at least a few cheap CNC lathes in each Industrial Training
Institute in Punjab (and eventually elsewhere) so that workers
could be trained on them." (R.K. interview, 1990). Despite the
setback from the defense contract, by early 1990 the firm had
already secured Rs. 20 million in financing for the project from
the Industrial Financial Corporation of India,14 as well as
14 The firm-owner emphasized the importance in this regard of
hiring (a local team of) consultants to put together a "slick and
convincing" proposal. Echoing the sentiment of a growing number of
medium and well-established small firms, the firm said that
contracting out the service saved them time and hassles. "If we had
made it ourselves we might have suffered more, it might have taken
longer." It was well worth paying the consultants (Rs. 150,000 in
this case) to ensure that they handed in "a professional proposal"
(R.K. interview, 1990).
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support from its prospective clients, the Industrial Training
Institutes.
As in the previous example, this line had virtually no
competition in Punjab. No other firm produced such machines
locally: the firm's main competition was from imports, and
secondarily, from government parastatals like HMT, and large
private sector firms like Kirloskar and others in South India.
As in the previous example, here too the firm sought a new
product--although unlike the paints example, this product was
still within firm's line of machine tools--and a new buyer (the
Industrial Training Institutes). But its primary relationship
still remained with government agencies. The firm thus responded
to loss of demand for one item by changing its product mix
(within the same broad line of machine tools), in accordance with
the demand mix of its various government buyers."
is Firms also specialize in products which, although seemingly
diverse, are linked by a common production process. For example a
firm producing auto-parts may specialize in all kinds of suspension
items, and develop machinery to handle a range of suspension parts
(e.g., leaf-spring, propeller shaft components, rolling needles in
the pin of the universal joint kit as in the case of one firm),
another may develop a range of sewing machine parts all of which
require specialized machining and milling work, another firm may
specialize in press-items. One interviewee firm specializing in
press-work had developed items as varied as fan-bodies, pump-set
parL.s, high precision T.V. picture tubes, T.V.'s inner magnetic
shield, automobile silencers, even warehouse equipment and grain
silos for the government's godowns (Moonlight, 1991).
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(iii) Case three: distributors as source of information and
advances for the development of a new item. Finally, in the late
1970s a small firm (T-con) faced a declining market for power
capacitors for pump-sets after the government of Punjab abruptly
cut off subsidies to farmers, the firm's chief clients, for the
purchase of pumpset capacitors.16 "The healthy market I had
anticipated, just evaporated" (T-con 1990). In an attempt to
cope with the drying up of demand, the firm-owner turned to local
distributors and technician friends to find out what would be a
good area to move into. One distributor suggested trying to
market the power capacitors in states outside Punjab. Another
distributor who had an agency for electric fans offered a longer-
term solution. He suggested that the firm get into a line that
needed capacitors and condensers more routinely--e.g. automobiles
and electric fans, where there was always a scarcity of good
capacitors in the replacement market. The distributor also
offered to procure T-con's initial fan-condensers for some local
manufacturers--under T-con's own brandname--and gave him a cash
advance to defray the cost of the switch.17 Assured of initial
" In the mid-1970s the government of Punjab had announced a
subsidy to farmers for the compulsory purchase of capacitors which
the government required them to use to save on the consumption of
power on their pumpsets. Thus demand for capacitors shot up, and
the firm did well. But in a few years due to poor enforcement,
farmers gave up buying genuine capacitors and the government
withdrew its subsidy.
17 This practice of a distributor or assembler giving small
producers (or skilled technicians) advances to develop an item
(copy an existing model, or modify it, or develop the tools, dies
and fixtures to produce it) is common in Ludhiana. Several firms,
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sales, the firm also procured some funding from the Punjab
Finance Corporation. Once the firm's quality stabilized, a
distributor who held an agency for a large, Calcutta-based
consumer electronics company (USHA) heard of T-con's brandname,
and placed the first of several orders for fan-condensers on
behalf of the OEM (USHA). By the late 1980s, T-con had
modernized its plant and turned from producing dry condensers and
capacitors to more sophisticated oil-based condensers and
capacitors. Now the firm produces a full range of electric-fan
condensers, and mini-capacitors for automobiles (mainly two-
wheelers) and holds a virtual monopoly in these products in
Ludhiana city. At the time of interview, the firm was
diversifying into other kinds of industrial capacitors--e.g., for
furnaces--upon demand from local industrialists (T-con interview,
1990). The firm started out producing an item for which it had
anticipated strong demand, but upon unexpected erosion of that
demand, it changed its product, adapted it to fit into a new
market.
Several issues emerge from the above examples. In all three
examples, firms moved to new products. The shifts were not
especially those run by skilled technicians reported having been
offered advances by r or assemblers while they were
still workers, even before they had set up independently, to
develop a machine, or a part, or tooling for an item for which
there was demand. Extending advances (credit) by distributors for
the development of an item is rarely discussed in the literature.
More common are instances of suppliers credit for operating
expenses.
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arbitrary. The firms sought out items for which there was good
demand. In two cases the move was to related products, within
the same broad line,18 in one case the firm shifted to an
unrelated product, but was driven by the logic of retaining a
valued customer. Given that decision, it looked for an item for
which demand would be less prone to fluctuations. None of the
firms held on to any particular product they were producing; they
moved to where there was better demand. But how did small and
medium firms that were facing uncertain demand and undergoing
losses, manage to successfully make the shift? (i) How did they
find out where there was demand; what to produce? (ii) How did
they learn how to produce these new items? (iii) How could they
afford to make the shift?
I. How do small firms find out about new sources of demand?
Seeking demand on an ongoing basis.
In the Howrah example discussed at the start of this
chapter, small skilled firms that had specialized in a certain
line of metal goods for the Railways for nearly a century, faded
away after the Railways and the contractors who brokered that
demand moved away; unable to switch to new products or markets.
What was different about the Ludhiana firms discussed above?
One difference is that in this region, seeking out new
sources of demand, or new products for which there is demand is
not a one-shot, exceptional activity that happens when a firm is
18 From a defense-item to a CNC lathe in the case of the
machine tool firm, and from power capacitors to fan-condensers and
a family of micro-capacitors in the other case.
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facing a down turn. Rather, it is the norm. The metal
industry's system of day-to-day production in this region is
built around an ongoing search of demand opportunities. Many
"follow" demand throughout their firm histories, seizing
opportunities that open up, even if temporarily. For example,
one machine tool producer that was successfully producing milling
machines in the 1960s, "temporarily" diversified into the
production and setting up of spinning plants in the early 1970s
to catch the cresting boom for these plants among local hosiery
producers after the Indian government signed a long-term contract
with the Russian government for the export of woollen hosiery.
All the firms selected by the Russian government were Ludhiana
based, and demand for spinning plants boomed. Even before this
boom died out, the firm began prospecting for other options, and
responded to another opportunity that opened up, this time in the
guise of a team of defense officials touring the region's
engineering firms to recruit suppliers for defense products and
simple armaments (R.K. interview, 1990)." Thus, firms seek out
products or markets for which there is demand not only to
overcome downturns, but as an ongoing business strategy.
19 The officials had brought samples and invited tenders from
those who could match the sample quality. The interviewee firm
tried; its attempt passed muster, and it got recruited as a
supplier--a relationship that continues till today.
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Low margins, and monopoly niches. In part, this unceasing
search for demand is a response to operating in an historically
unstable industrial environment, where capital was scarce, and
markets were never assured.20 But in part, this continuous
search for demand is also driven by chronically low margins and
the constant pressure this puts on the profits of small
producers." Therefore, one reason why small firms in this
region are constantly searching for demand, is to cope with low
margins.
Margins for commonly produced items in the region's bicycle
and sewing machine industry are very low--between 5%-9%.22 To
shore up revenues these firms have learned to find ways to offset
these low margins (Swaroop Mech interview, 1991). One way in
which small firms in this region cope with low margins is by
seeking "monopoly niches"--or scarce items that are not made
locally, that command a high premium, and allow high mark-ups.
20 Whether through external disruptions such as partition, a
border status, or the lack of large and stable direct public or
private investment in building up key industries in the region.
21 Since reinvestment for the smallest firm depends critically
on maintaining a steady revenue stream, stable sales are crucial to
the liquidity of these firms (Mahajan interview, 1991, J.Singh
1990) . But this "stability" is an artifact of the firm constantly
searching out ways of increasing sales and offsetting low margins.
22 This is especially true for items where capital
reqcuirements are low, replacement demand steady, and where the
production process followed by other local firms is well known and
accessible to all. For example, there are at least 250 small firms
producing bottom-bracket axles and cups (bicycle components) in
Ludhiana city alone; and hundreds producing simple fasteners.
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As one small firm producing auto-parts (for scooters)
explained (as if out of a standard neoclassical text): "some
items are routine, a lot of other firms also manufacture them.
Competition drives their prices down. Their prices are low, but
stable--almost fixed--everyone charges about the same. The
margins are also very low." To compensate for these low margins,
producers seek specialized items produced by very few local
firms. They look for "items that are in demand but are highly
specialized, or technically difficult, and which very few other
producers manufacture. It is on these items that we are able to
earn higher profits. The margin is often 100% or more. Firms
are always looking for specialized items like this on which they
can earn good profits and take out the average" i.e., raise their
average profit margin to a more acceptable level (Nirmal Auto,
1991). But they do not necessarily give up on the standard
items. "Standard items are safe. You know there is always
demand2 3 for them, so sales are not a problem" (Nirmal Auto
Interview, 1991). The interviewee firm itself earned a profit
margin of 7-9% on several of its products, but earned a margin of
over 150% on its "niche item"--the front-hub axle of three-
wheelers, a complicated item that wore out quickly, and hence
required frequent repairs, but was not easily available in the
replacement market. This is similar to what we saw in the
examples discussed above. The machine tool producer chose a new
product (CNC lathes) which hardly any local firm produced, and
23 Mostly in the replacement market.
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for which there was little local competition. The capacitor
producer was also one of the few firms in Ludhiana that produced
a sophisticated range of condensers and capacitors. Similarly,
the bolt producing firm did not give up on the production of
bolts and rivets, it reoriented its supply to the replacement
market, while adding a new, more lucrative, niche line.
It is noteworthy that "niche" here doesn't refer to a new or
customized item. It refers to quite standard items that are not
produced locally, or are not available cheaply. 2 4 The item may
be available via imports or from large manufacturers at a price
affordable by only bigger firms. Thus the clientele for these
niche products are generally other small and medium firms. This
idea of a "niche" is different from the more complex niches
discussed in the literature on industrial restructuring and
flexible specialization. Firms operating in the "niche" markets
discussed in the literature are usually technically
sophisticated, often export-linked small producers who use state-
of-the-art technology to compete in markets where consumer tastes
and product designs are constantly changing. By contrast, the
"niches" discussed here are relatively unsophisticated, and
involve producing standard items that are not easily available,
24 Examples are routine items like the front-hub axle for three
wheelers discussed above, or a high-speed overlock machine that is
hitherto produced orly hv 'r-ge multinationals such as Singer or
others, or automatic machinery such as machines for (bicycle) hub
flanges, or a range of automatic lathes, milling machines that
usually produced by large out-of-state producers or government
parastatals such as HMT.
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or are produced only by bigger firms and hence are inaccessible
to smaller manufacturers.
The sophistication or ordinariness of the item
notwithstanding, this seeking of a "niche" item, or an item that
has little local competition, often amounts to competing with
imports (and with large producers), even if these imported models
are themselves not state of the art. For example, in the late
1970s when hosiery manufactures in India most commonly used a
3300 spm (stitches per minute) overlock machine imported from
Japan, a small Ludhiana sewing machine producer introduced a
modified 5500 spm self-lubricated semi-automatic overlock machine
copied and modified from a 1970 Japanese model (JUKI). It was
the first small Indian firm to manufacture this model locally
(Akal Mechanical, 1991). This model was not only faster than the
commonly used model in India, but cheaper as well. 2 s Similarly,
another Ludhiana firm "import-substituted" a 6600 spm Japanese
over-lock model (hitherto produced only by Singer in India), and
had plans to modify the Yamoto 711. The firm's strategy "is to
go after newer models, develop a model that no-one makes in India
yet, so that there is no competition" (Revo interview, 1991).
The advantage of this tendency among Ludhiana's firms of
introducing items for which there is little local competition to
off-set low margins in other product lines, is that it is geared
25 Ludhiana's sewing machine producers association was a key
player in the 1950s-1960s in the fight to get the Indian government
to impose tariffs on sewing machine imports (Revo interview 1991,
Rico interview, 1991. See Kumar 1989 for the chronology of tariffs
on bicycles and sewing machines).
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towards small producers. By introducing a line of items not
previously produced by small firms, not only do these producers
gain a market, but at the same time, small local consumers also
get access to low-cost items that had hitherto cost a lot more.
These benefits spills over into the region as a whole. It is not
only the small firms that benefit from this introduction of new
cheap product lines (e.g., components of bicycles, sewing
machines, auto-parts, and machinery). In Ludhiana some of the
largest firms procure not only components, but also machinery
that is produced this way." This finding that small producers
successfully compete with imports (or import-substitute) for the
benefit of other small producers as well as large firms is so
contrary to the usual thinking that protection or tariffs harms
small producers because it the larger producers that corner
important domestic markets through tariff-induced import-
substitution and that the removal of protection would free up
small firms because competition would loosen the hold of large
firms on national markets. In this case, Ludhiana's small
industrial and hosiery sewing machine producers have come to
control nearly 85% of the national market.
Access to these networks where cheap, locally made machinery
26 Avon cycles, Hero Cycles, Hero-Honda, and G.S. Auto, all
large firms with over 900-1000 employees reported having procured
hundreds of machines from Ludhiana's small machinery producers.
One firm (the Hero group) set up a whole separate machine tool firm
(Rockway) around the skills of a group of Ramgarhia technicians who
had equipped several of its other plants.
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is produced, access to technicians, and the fact that many of the
Ludhiana's small producers are themselves skilled, allows small
local firms to not only seek out and enter new markets, but hedge
against demand uncertainty in another way. Typically, small firm
in the region "develop" tooling and fixtures for a number of
items but produce only a few items at a time, and run batches on
the basis of demand. As one auto-parts producer reported having
developed tooling for "30-40 items" related to auto-gears (for a
range of two and three wheelers) over time, but produced only 5-6
at a time "as per market demand" (Sai Auto interview, 1992).
Seeking out demand then, is not only associated with times
of trouble, but it is an ongoing activity among this region's
small metal-producers--a strategy key to their survival. Unlike
the relatively isolated small metal firms of Howrah who found it
difficult to know what to do with their specialized skills after
their primary customer moved away, small firms in this region are
linked to several networks of feedback. Seeking out new sources
of demand is not only something they do during downturns, it is
an ongoing part of how they work. As we see in the next section,
firms routinely ask a variety of actors around them for feedback
on what items there is demand for, what to produce. Partly
because they are hooked into these circles even during times of
growth, it is easier for them to find alternatives during actual
times of adversity, and know who to turn to when Lhey do need
help.
229
II. How do firms find out about what to produce and how to
produce it: Multiple sources of feedback--cheap, and easy to
access. At least three sets of actors appear to be crucial to
the ability of these firms to find out about and seize the
opportunities of demand that open up: (a) Technicians and skilled
mechanics, (b) locally based distributors, dealers and retailers.
(c) And, mid-level government officials, many of whom are
themselves technically skilled and serve as informal
"consultants" to firms after hours.
Asking around: feedback from technicians and users:
A striking feature during field work in this region was the
degree to which firms of all sizes, especially smaller firms
reported turning to local technicians, skilled workers, and other
colleagues for advice. This turning to skilled technicians for
advice was not only formal--through consultancies, or through
hired help--but most pervasively it occurred informally.
Although there was a lot of hiding of one's proprietary
technology or modifications from competitors, the overwhelming
empirical impression in the field was one of lack of any clear
boundaries between small firm-owners, skilled workers and
technicians. When seeking advice or information, small-firms did
not necessarily have to pay a fee or negotiate a formal contract
with these groups--they interacted with them in several ways
inside and outside the sphere of work and industry so that
exchange of information occurred in many ways. This proximity
between small-owners and technicians is not because small owners
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and workers belong to the same social or ethnic group in this
region, but rather because (i) technicians and skilled workers
carry social status in this environment (as we saw in chapter 4),
and (ii) so many of the small-owners were themselves skilled
workers once. These strong ties between firms and skilled
workers is hardly unique to Ludhiana. Several accounts of
dynamic regions within India and in other countries describe such
links, 2 7 but this easy and cheap access to technical advice is
often absent in the day-to-day toil of the typical small firm.
This access is a key factor underlying the ability of small
producers in regions like Ludhiana to keep track of demand
opportunities, to find out what to produce and how to do so.
For example, in the search for "niche" items, a scooter-
mechanic, or tractor owner, or sewing machine assembler may bring
a broken part to a small-firm owner acquainted to him and say
this part is tricky and difficult to procure, why don't you
produce it? The producer may later discover it has much wider
demand than it envisaged. A clear example of how this works
comes from the way in which the auto-part firm cited in the
previous section (Nirmal Auto) found its "niche" item(s). This
firm also started out producing "routine" items for the
replacement market which were easy to manufacture and required
27 For example, see accounts of Bangalore's software industry
(Holmstrom 1994), the woodworkers of Sao Joao do Aruaru in Brazil's
Ceara state (Tendler and Amorim 1996), small semi-conductor firms
in California's "silicon valley" (Saxenian 1994), and several other
regions reported in studies of European and Asian cases (Pyke et al
1990, 1992, Humphrey ed. 1995).
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low capital investment--axles for two-wheelers, a long axle for
three-wheelers, and the bevel gear. The firm had many competitors
in these products, and margins were low (7-9%). The firm-owners
began asking around for a "good [niche] item" to produce. A
three-wheeler operator and motor mechanic acquainted to the
interviewee's father (a former skilled mechanic, who founded the
present firm in the early 1960s) was ultimately the one who
suggested what they produce. The three-wheeler operator showed
them a part that he had always found problematic--the front-hub
axle. A complex, costly item, the front-hub axle caused
operators and mechanics "a lot of headache." Because of heavy
friction, owing to the part's position in the machine, its
"teeth" tended to wear out rapidly requiring frequent and costly
repairs, or replacement. But the item was not easily available
in the spares market, so repairs cost a lot of money. Since
there was a lot of replacement demand for this item, the three-
wheeler operator suggested they try to produce it.
The firm-owners took it up. Being closer to the equipment
and its use, the three-wheeler operator-mechanic also had advice
on how to improve the part over existing models.2" He
suggested that they grind the inner surface between each gear
tooth of the axle, in addition to the standard practice of
grinding the outer surfaces. This would cut down friction,
improve the axle's efficiency, and prolong its economic life.
28 In many other cases the repair mechanics or assemblers serve
the same purpose.
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With this simple improvement over existing models, the producers
have earned brand-name recognition among their buyers
(wholesalers, three-wheeler operators and mechanics) . They have
since made further improvements, and sell the part in several
cities outside Punjab. At the time of interview, their brand
sold at Rs 5-6 higher than market price, and yet buyers (mainly
wholesalers) queued up with advances to book orders--the firm had
"more demand than we can meet." (Nirmal Auto interview, 1991) .
It was, therefore, the user of the part that gave
information to the firm about what niche item to produce, what
item there was demand for. It was the user also, that the firm-
owners turned to for ideas about where improvements could be
made. But, it is important to note, the "user" discussed here
does not refer to the manufacturer's particular customer or
client. Rather, the firm was seeking out "users," as a class,
for opinions, feedback, and ideas about what to produce, how to
improve its quality, and about where demand lay. This is
different from, and goes beyond the demand-driven assistance to
29 As we will see more fully in the following sections, this
pattern of turning to users, or repair mechanics is a common
practice among small firms here--it is a cheap, ongoing process of
getting feedback on one's products and processes. Some producers
regularly visit the sites where machines or products similar to
theirs are installed to see how workers and operators actually use
them, what problems they face, what improvements c- be made.
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small firms emphasized in the literature where a particular
producer and a particular client/user are linked in an ongoing
relationship. In this case, the firm could tap into a larger
pool of users, for ideas and feedback, rather than turning only
to its immediate customer, or particular client with whom it had
a long-standing relationship. Small firms who supply to the
replacement market could especially benefit from this kind of a
general relationship with users as a class. In contrast to firms
that supply to an original equipment manufacturer who would have
a direct stake in helping them develop their product or improve
its quality, there is generally no clear or visible customer from
whom suppliers to the replacement market can get feedback. It is
therefore harder for these firms to improve quality and catch up
with firms linked directly to OEMs. It is no wonder that the
literature portrays supplying to the replacement or spares market
as a second best option, a transitionary step at best for firms
seeking growth, and regard small firms who move from supplying
OEMs to supplying as equivalent to having "dropped out of the
market" (See Humphrey and Schmitz 1995). For those firms, then,
building ties with general pool of users such as repair
mechanics, equipment operators, technicians--is an invaluable
source of direct feedback on their product.
Indirect feedback loops via retailers: Some firms in
Ludhiana build these ties indirectly, via intermediaries such as
retailers or dealers. A common practice among the smallest firms
in the region is to turn to a few assemblers, retailers or
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wholesalers very early on not only to learn what item to produce,
or what there is good demand for, but to learn about the defects
in their product and how to upgrade it in order to sell more
freely in the open market. Firms begin by developing a
relationship with one or two retailers who agree to buy small
batches of their initial output at low prices (e.g, at Rs. 2-3
below market rates, given that the item is not yet upto
standard). The retailer sells the item (typically a component--
of bicycles, sewing machines, or an auto-part) to small local
assemblers, or to repair mechanics who can "make the component
work," for a certain period of time. In return for the
producer's low prices, the retailer seeks out from the assemblers
or repair mechanics feedback on the item, which he passes on to
the novice firm. The assemblers and mechanics thus get drawn
into the feedback loop indirectly, and provide the producer with
detailed feedback on the item: what is working, what is not, what
needs to be improved or changed, especially with regard to
tolerances, hardness, and material composition.
Crucial to this relationship is the implicit understanding
that there will be incremental and progressive improvement in the
quality of the manufacturer's output in a reasonable time frame.
This gives the retailer confidence that the new producer "can
deliver" (Iqbal interview, 1991). If the manufacturer
consistently turns out poor quality goods, and does not show
improvement, or doesn't incorporate the feedback the retailer
gives him, the tie breaks. If the manufacturer cannot build a
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good reputation with the retailer in a reasonable time period,
"he fails in the market. " (Iqbal interview, 1991) .30 This kind
of "disciplining" tie between merchant traders and manufacturers
is completely contrary to an older, entrenched view in the
entrepreneurship literature that retailers and wholesalers will
peddle anything (See London 1975), and that as long as they get
cheap rates, they are unconcerned about quality. But as the
above example shows, wholesalers and traders can also be agents
of quality change for the smallest firms and serve as cheap and
accessible sources of feedback and information." In addition
to feedback on quality, as one sewing machine producer said,
"when demand for one item (e.g, a sewing machine component)
decreases, [the dealers] tell us to cut back on its output and
produce more of another part for which demand is good" (Dalco
interview, 1991).
3 One small producer of a complex embroidery machine part
reported how he had taken over a failing business and successfully
turned it around. He succeeded where the previous owner failed
because the previous owner had spent many years outside the
industry and had lost his links with the technicians and mechanics
who could help develop his item. Although he built a relationship
with a retailer who gave him feedback, he was unable to incorporate
the feedback successfully, and consistently turned out bad lots.
Within a year the relationship broke. Unwilling to "get into the
business of finding the mistries who could help him," the owner
sold the firm and returned to his non-manufacturing business (Iqbal
interview, 1991).
" Although as one pump-set wholesaler said, "we sell according
to what the buyer wants. If a customer comes in and says that they
are willing to buy a moderate quality pump for a lower price we
will sell it, but that is not the market we build towards" (Mahajan
interview, 1992).
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It is not just users, distributors or mechanics that provide
firms with information about what to produce. As several small
firms reported, they keep asking "anyone we can trust" what is a
good item to produce, where the demand is. They ask mechanics,
skilled workers, distributors, firms owners, government
inspectors, officials of institutions such as the Central Tool
Room32 , the Small Industries Services Institute, and the
District Industries Center. One producer of piston pins, for
example, said that whenever he travels by train to Delhi or other
cities on business, he strikes conversations with those around
him. If they are firm-owners or workers he asks them questions
about problems he is struggling with. How do you resolve this?
How do you do that? During my field work in 1991-91, a small-
firm owner reported how he and a delegation of members from
various associations had just met with the director of the
Central Tool Room after his month long visit to Germany (a major
financier of Ludhiana's CTR) to ask "what he had seen in plants
32 A Ludhiana based technical assistance and training center
funded by Indian and German governments. All the machinery in the
Tool Room is from (formerly West) Germany; the recurrent
expenditure is borne by the central government. As part of a
bilateral assistance program with Germany, the government of India
had decided in the late 1970s to set up a Tool Room and Training
Center in North India, but had not decided where. "Ludhiana's
industrialists, the auto-parts association and cycle parts
association, lobbied the government and convinced the central
government to locate it in Ludhiana" (R.P.Sandhu, CTR training
officer, interview 1992). There other four such centers in India
are in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, and Bangalore.
3 One of 16 such centrally funded, regional institutes in the
country, the SISI provides technical assistance and runs a variety
of other programs for small firms.
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there, what was relevant for Ludhiana, what new ideas he had
picked up."34 Similarly, the general manager of Ludhiana's
District Industries Center (DIC) who had spent two years in
Holland on deputation also reported being "plagued by questions
from firm owners" whenever he meets them casually or informally
about how production is carried out there, how they deal with
this problem, or that problem.
Firms not only ask and observe, but many quickly implement
what they see. For example one sewing machine parts producer saw
an innovative set of simple and safe-to-use grinding machines on
the premises of a tap-producing firm in Delhi that he had visited
during a business trip. Impressed by the machines he saw, he
decided to put together a similar system in his own factory. He
reproduced the system from memory, filling gaps in his own way,
and thus ended up innovating further. Just as workers accumulate
knowledge as they move from shop to shop, building a repository
of practical knowledge, so do these many episodes of "copying" by
small firms add to the local productive vocabulary.15
4 These visits are routine, 1-e said. "We want to know what
ideas they pick up.,"
3s This asking and observing is not only a response to sudden
adversity, or a one-time hedge against loss of demand, but an
ongoing process of survival in an environment where there never
were assured markets, and where firms have had to learn not to rely
on only a few sources of demand.
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Feedback loops and the public sector: This observing, asking
and implementing, however, involves not only private actors such
as mechanics and distributors, but also the government. R.K.,
the machine tool producer cited earlier in the chapter had
started out its machine tool business with the manufacture of
lathes in the 1950s. After being initially supported by a post-
independence boom in the machinery industry that lasted through
the 1950s, the firm faced a recession by the end of that decade.
Many new small firms had begun to produce lathes, especially in
Punjab, and R.K.'s profits fell. Dissatisfied with declining
revenues in lathes, the firm switched to another line of
machinery that still had only a few local producers in Punjab--
milling machines. But why milling machines? The switch,
needless to say, was not automatic or arbitrary.
A few years earlier in 1956, the firm owner had attended a
national machinery exhibition organized by the government of
India in New Delhi, where some foreign firms had also displayed
their products. At that time, with the help of a Punjab
government loan-subsidy to machinery producers, the firm-owner
had bought a sample each of Czech-made milling machines, shapers
and a gear-cutting machine with the expectation of copying them
and selling adapted versions later." In the early 1960s, when
36 This strategy of "copling" had some history to it. This
machine tool firm had spun out of a hosiery and spinning business
in an "accidental" way. In the 1950s, the original hosiery firm
(in business since the second world-war) had imported a second-hand
spinning plant from England, along with a maintenance shop--
239
lathes were no longer as lucrative to produce as before, the firm
asked industry officials for advice, and learned that demand for
milling machines was growing. With the help of local Ramgarhia
technicians, and his own skill, he went about copying the milling
machine he had bought. But crucially, the firm also turned to
the government for assistance--specifically, the "Colombo Plan,"
a new scheme that the central government had launched in the
1960s. Under this program the government, with assistance from
the Ford Foundation brought in retired US and German engineers
and machinery experts to provide technical assistance to local
firms. The government paid the engineers' air fare, the Ford
Foundation paid their fee, and the beneficiary firm paid part of
their living expenses. The machine-tool producer enrolled for
assistance, and got a retired American engineer under the Colombo
plan to help him modify the design of the milling machine, and
develop the base machinery to bring it into production.37
complete with lathes and planers. The spinning plant went into
production, but the firm felt the maintenance shop was under-
utilized. One of the partners (the elder brother of the current
owner) was skilled and interested in metal work. Along with a
Ramgarhia mistry he decided to copy a lathe to see how it is made.
A friend who owned a metal-working shop saw the lathe and bought
it. This gave them the idea that manufacturing lathes may be a
good business in its own right. The firm diversified and started
a machine tool factory (R.K. interview, 1990).
" At least four firms in my sample reported using the services
of such engineers. Several others report having learnt from the
mechanics who worked at these firms at the time of assistance.
Three of the firms are medium-sized now, the fourth still remains
small. It is noteworthy that all four were active members of their
respective associations (sewing machines, bicycles, and machinery
making) in the 1950s-1960s--quite in keeping, it seems, with the
view in the literature that active association members usually get
access to government programs and benefits such as these more
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Even subsequently, firms such as these frequently have
turned to individual members of government institutions such as
the District Industries -Center, the Central Tool Room, the
Bicycle R&D Center for assistance. Many learn about new ways of
doing things in the course of doing "development" work for these
R&D agencies--work on the prototypes these agencies develop.
But, most turn to individual officials who are known to be
technically skilled, or who have been abroad on deputation, for
help with devising special purpose machinery, or other
specialized machines after hours. Even though local firms can
access the same officers for advice for free during regular
working hours, they prefer to contact them personally later, and
insist on paying them a fee to ensure that they get advice that
is specific to their needs. Specific advice such as this
requires factory visits because it is centered around the
problems faced by the firm on its own shopfloor. Few standard
technical assistance programs are built around site-visits, and
hence are unable to accommodate specific problems. Thus firms
that need concrete advice prefer to seek out skilled officials
after hours, and pay for their services--a pattern that has
parallels even in the region's agricultural sector.3 3
readily than the rank and file.
38 One Block Level Extension officer (industry) I
interviewed, reported that since the past few years, when dairy and
poultry farming became increasingly important and lucrative in
Ludhiana district, livestock farmers have begun talking about
paying for veterinary services. At the moment there are no
privately licensed veterinary services in Punjab--all vets. are
paid by the government. Yet, the practice on the ground has been
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III. How firms make the switch cheaply: access to networks of
skill, expertise, and distribution
In the three cases described earlier in this chapter, we saw
how firms coped with the sudden moving away of demand by shifting
to new products in related or unielated lines. When most small
firms are usually strapped for funds and capital, how were these
firms able to invest in shifting to a new line just when they
were facing loss of demand and revenues? In this section I argue
that they were able to make the switch cheaply because in
addition to being inserted in the feedback loops described above,
these firms were also tied into networks that helped them save on
costs in a variety of ways; and because they could turn to
locally-based distributors to find new short-run markets.
The replacement market and the latitude it provides:
Finding markets--at least as a back-up--is easier for small firms
in Ludhiana because they have the option of selling in the
replacement market through a widespread network of wholesalers
and dealers who supply to assemblers and to the spares and
that farmers pay the vets additional sums out of their own pocket
for every visit even though the doctors are already being paid by
the government for their services and for the medicine they
prescribe to the farmers. The farmers still want to pay the doctor
because, they say, they have high value cattle and they want to be
sure of the service they get. "They want the government to let
veterinary doctors charge them as if on private consultancies
through village hospitals" (BLEOI interview, 1991).
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repairs market nationally, via retailers." In contrast to the
intermediaries involved in the Howrah case, discussed earlier in
the chapter, who brokered demand/contracts between large buyers
such as the government's railway workshops and Howrah's small
metal shops, the wholesales and dealers based in Ludhiana procure
goods from local firms and sell them in replacement markets
throughout the country.
This pattern has old roots dating back to the Punjab Land
Alienation Act of 1900. As discussed in Chapter 2, after this
Act barred non-agricultural artisan and trading groups from
owning prestigious agricultural lard, a number of them turned to
industry. While artisans took up manufacturing, most merchants
turned to distribution. They set up of an "all india
distribution network" (Wall 1973:81). This distribution system
also paralleled the "vertical disintegration of the various
stages of production" of Ludhiana's woolen hosiery industry
"involving several distinct groups and tiers of exchange.. .By
1902, "Hindu merchants obtained raw wool [through imports and
domestically] and retailed it to a second class of traders, who
had it spun into thread or yarn by women of all classes. Another
set of merchants obtained and distributed the wool to weavers.
After weavers transformed wool into wearing apparel, Punjabi
wholesalers sold the articles all over India through an elaborate
distribution network. An important characteristic of the India-
39 Similarly, all the large light-engineering goods merchant
exporters based in Bombay, Delhi and Calcutta have a strong local
presence and highly active procurement offices in Ludhiana city.
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wide distribution of woolen articles was that it was controlled
almost exclusively by Punjabi E-merchants] from Ludhiana itself"
(1973:82). Subsequently, especially after the partition of
Punjab in 1947 brought with it an influx of metal traders, this
"far-flung" network spread to include the region's growing
bicycle industry and metal goods.
As firms stabilize and grow, even the smaller firms build
their own network of retail and wholesale agents across the
country, and spend time maintaining them. It was surprising to
hear from even quite small firms--with 15-or less workers--that
they had "over 200 dealers" across the country; and that they
visit their dealers (in states outside Punjab) "at least once a
year to see whether they are facing procurement problems" and to
get feedback on their product. "The dealers feel happy to be
asked how they are doing" and the ties deepen. Two small
producers of sewing machine parts, for example, said how they had
just travelled to Calcutta--nearly 1200 km from Ludhiana--to
attend the inauguration of their key dealer's new retail outlet
there despite tight production schedules: "Large firms can
maintain hundreds of dealers because they can give credit. We
need goodwill" (Diamond interview 1991) .40
40 Although having easy access to replacement markets
nationally alleviates marketing problems for many small producers,
this "dealer-centered" way of working also involves un1renness of
demand. As a hedge against this unevenness, firms develop more
than one key item--i.e., they usually develop dies and fixtures for
the production of 9-10 items or more, of which they may produce
only 4-5 at a given time "according to market demand" as conveyed
by the dealer. Demand may fluctuate according to the orders that
the dealer places. As one producer noted, this unevenness also
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Just as the fasteners-wagon paint firm discussed earlier
turned to the replacement market to sell its fasteners when
government demand for them dried up, others use the replacement
market get out from under the shadow of the local OEMs. One
small bicycle parts producer (Birdi, 1992) reported how access to
the replacement market helped finance his transition between
buyers. In 1972 his firm was supplying most of its output to
three of the region's largest OEMs--Heros, Atlas, RMI--supplying
upto 2000 dozen pieces per month to each OEM. In the late 1970s
however, one of the OEMs (Heros) suffered an export setback, and
suddenly reduced the firm's order, complaining about quality, and
wanting to reduce rates. The supplier decided to "stand on [its]
own feet, and supply to a variety of markets under [its] own
brandname." To do so, the firm turned to dealers in the
replacement market. Whereas in mid-70s it supplied 80% of its
output to 3 OEMs, after the Hero setback in the late 1970s, it
began to supply 100% of its output to the replacement market
under its own brand. In a few years it supplied 50% to the
replacement market, and half to indirect exporters. By the early
forces small firms to train their workers carefully, "If a dealer
comes and wants extra pieces of a certain part that needs
specialized turning, we cannot lose the order simply because the
worker who operates the lathe is absent that day" (Dalco interview,
1991).
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1990s, having improved product quality in accordance with the
requirements imposed by the indirect exporters," by the early
1990s, they were exporting more than half their output directly
to East Asia, and the middle-east, and dividing the rest between
indirect exports and the replacement market. (Birdi interview,
1992).
Access to networks of practical skill: A second reason why
the firms cited earlier managed to switch products despite facing
demand loss and adversity, is because they had access to networks
of skill that allowed them to redesign their product relatively
cheaply.
During my field work I had been struck by the finding that
almost all the successful small firms I interviewed had tool-room
of their own--whether they manufactured nuts, or bicycle parts,
sewing machine parts, any auto-parts. This was surprising
because tool-room are expensive to maintain. They are usually
associated with larger firms who can afford to internalize
expensive tool-rooms to meet their maintenance needs. Why were
so many small production firms (not those specializing in
machinery making) investing in tool rooms? I soon learned that
these tool rooms are not for the maintenance of the various
4' Exporting indirectly through merchant exporters is a common
practice among local small firms, often as a prelude to exporting
directly. One firm reported how it began to export indirectly
because it wanted feedback on quality. "We first sold to an
indirect exporter in the 1970s to see what kind of buyers they
would make, and mainly to get feedback on quality. The exporter
gave extensive feedback on the product, but also made immediate
payments. As a result turnover increased; and we expanded output."
Later they turned to direct exports (RI Corp. interview, 1992).
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machines on the firm's shopfloor, but most crucially their
function is to design, manufacture, and modify tooling (die- and
fixtures where needed) that converts a firm's general purpose
base machinery (milling machines, lathes of various sizes, and so
on) so as to perform a variety of specialized functions. It was
the quality of the tooling, its precision and design that would
determine the productivity of an ordinary lathe or workstation.
The design of tooling was also where a firm's "proprietary
knowledge" was expressed and embodied. But who runs these tool
rooms? How can small firms afford skilled fitters and workers?
In large part, the tool-rooms are operated by the skilled owners
themselves, along with one or two technicians, or less skilled
workers whom they train on the shop. But even if the owners is
not skilled enough to design tooling, firm after firm reported
how they had nevertheless invested in at least one highly
supervisor or fitter who directed the design and maintenance work
in the tool-rooms. These tool-rooms in the smaller firms are
quite lean. Because firms can, and routinely do, turn to an
array of specialized services available in "the market"--from
tool and die makers, to firms that do casting, forging, testing,
hardening, precision machining and have machines that can
accommodate a range of equipment sizes--to supplement the
capacities of their own tool-rooms. The proliferation of this
practice--which has grown over several decades in the region--
interviewees explained, is because "if you have little capital,
you cannot get stuck with specialized equipment. Otherwise you
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will be wiped out if demand fluctuates" (Bassi, 1991). The
system of using ordinary machinery, but customizing it by using a
variety of tools and fixtures allows firms to get the same base
machine to perform a different task or function simply by
changing its tooling. "Developing" an item therefore, at core,
means developing its tooling and fixtures and modifying the
machinery on which they will be used. As one small auto-parts
firm described why its tool-room was so important, "tools and
fixtures are key to changing design. The quality of these tools
is key, and we control it."42 When demand changes, or if a firm
needs to switch to an item with better demand, it the tooling
they need to change, modify, or remake, not the base machinery.
To do this cheaply, a firm needs access to skills. It is not
surprising therefore that so many successful small owners in the
region are themselves skilled.4 3 It is not surprising either,
that less costly technicians skills (rather than an engineer's)
are so salient to the way production is organized in this region,
and have been reproduced over and over for nearly a century.
42 But they look around as well, "we have no resistance to
change. We are always looking for ways to extract the most out of
the machines we have. If a technician has an idea, we are ready to
go with it because we can test it out right here in our shop."
(Bassi, of Moonlight. Interview 1991).
" As a skilled small machinery producer put it, "If I didn't
have skill in designing this way, would not have succeeded like
this. Cannot hire skill in this line and still compete (Auto-
turners 1991) . "
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Yet, given the varied nature of the technical tasks involved in
modification of this kind, these skills are constantly being
modified as well. The reproduction of these skills--whether in
the owner or in the workforce--therefore also involves their
constant modification.
Technicians' skills are not the only source of a firm's
ability to modify its production process and keep up with
shifting demand. The presence of a local machine-tool industry--
geared towards small producers,44 most importantly--is another
key factor behind the ability of even small local firms to switch
from product to product quickly and at low cost.
As one firm-owner said firms save costs because "most firms
here don't use a machine as it is supposed to always be used...
If a process involves no taper turning, then you don't taper
turning equipment on a machine that will do plain turning. On a
machine that will do plain turning we have no threaded [section],
nor so many angle adjustments or speed changes; maybe also a
smaller motor. So you don't pay for those parts that you don't
need" (Gopi tools, 1991). This cuts costs drastically. A medium
lathe from the government's parastatal HMT costs Rs. 65,000 at
minimum (in 1990). "We put ours together for Rs. 25,000.
Instead of paying for items we don't need, we used the saving to
modify our milling and grinding machines according to what we
44 That is, run by and targeted towards small firms.
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needed" (Gopi Tools, interview 1991) .45
This kind of customization, stripped use, and modification
is not possible if a firm were to rely only on standard models
available in the market, or on imports. Large machine tool
producers typically do not sell a machine without its standard
parts, or charge a lot more for such customization. Thus, the
presence of a local machine tool industry that sells stripped
down versions such as these, the presence of technicians who can
make modifications routinely, and the fact that many of the small
owners are themselves skilled is crucial to the ability of small
firms to shift from product to product quickly, and to "develop"
a variety of products. As the small tool-maker cited above put
it, it is this combination of "production infrastructure" in
Ludhiana that allows a small firm to lower overheads, maintain
quality and compete. "You need practical and theoretical skills.
An engineer can create new products and processes, but can he cut
costs? The advantage here is that [Ludhiana's] workforce has
skill, and even the entrepreneur has a strong functional
understanding of the total process." (Gopi Tools, 1991). Even as
engineers are on the rise among the region's small-owners,
practical knowledge, and a "strong functional understanding"
4s An evaluation of Ludhiana's Cycle Bottom Axle (BB axle)
production technology carried out by the Asian Productivity
Organization in 1981 found that the use of special fixtures in
combination with a lathe-based work-station, allowed Ludhiana's
small firms to produce BB axle of given quality at 50% of the cost
of producing it on standard equipment (1981: 55). See Appendix-1
for a production cost comparison of the Ludhiana method with the
standard procedure employed by large firms.
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remains salient to the ability of small firms to compete on
meager capital.46
The owner of a small auto gear-making firm I interviewed,
had set up shop in Ludhiana in the mid-80s, freshly armed with
two degrees in engineering from the prestigious Indian Institute
of Technology at Delhi. Surrounded by small firm-owners many of
whom were not even formally trained--who had only ten years of
schooling, or a non-technical BA, or at best a diploma from the
local vocational training institute, or who had risen from the
ranks in the labor market, he felt confident of his superior
academic training, and of succeeding. He said he had felt he
differed from them in many ways--from their tendency to mix so
freely with their workers, to sometimes "sit and drink with
them," and from their penchant for "cutting corners." He wanted
to stick to the right processes and standard machinery. It came
as a shock therefore, to find himself completely dominated by his
skilled and semi-skilled workers by year's end, "I should have
been in control, but I was the one totally dependent on them."
46 There is an enduring debate on the importance of technical
experience for owners and managers. In the 1960s the view,
especially among US industrial sociologists, was that practical
training was superior to pure academic understanding (Musgrave
1967) . More recently, similar findings have emerged from the human
resource literature concerned with productivity enhancing work-
arrangements. One U.S. based study recently cited how experienced
line operator. "none of [whom] ... had more than a high school
education" successfully solved an important problem of overcoming
breaks in welds between two coils of ot-ei that a "number of
college professors and consultants" were unable to solve
(Ichniowski et. al. 1993:39).
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Despite his degrees, he had no practical experience, and was
unable to get the job done within the liruited capital he had. "I
could operate all machines, but I couldn't develop the item.. or
understand what was actually involved. Workers would exploit me
because I didn't know much practically." For example, "if we had
a 1-inch drill in the factory, and needed to bore a 2-inch hole,
workers would say we can't give you accuracy till you get us a 1-
3/4 inch drill. This costs Rs.900-1000 in the market. For a
small lot of 200-300 pieces this was too much expense. It took
me two years to learn the system, to understand how to start a
job and get it done without unnecessary expense and waste." To
understand "the system" he turned to the neighbors, and local
technicians he had stayed aloof from earlier (Sai Auto Gears
interview, 1992).
He learnt how to work backwards--to procure an original or
imported part from the market and set it as a standard to work
towards: measure its hardness, get its material composition
tested from the government-run heat-treatment and finishing
center, sit down with a group of trusted mistries or foreman and
figure out the sequence of operations. And then decide what
kinds of machines and fixtures would most economically yield the
desired results. The standard practice for cutting gears, for
example, is to use gear-shapers and gear-hobbing machines--
specialized equipment that small firms like this cannot afford.
So he learnt "to do what a gear-shaper or gear-hobbing machine
will do, on a milling machine." This involved learning what
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fixtures and tools would perform the various operations, and
getting them made cheaply. Practical knowledge of the production
system was central to doing business this way, where firm-owners
had to find viable alternatives to using expensive specialized
machinery.4
As another engineer-small owner supplying auto-parts of some
of the country's largest automakers (Maruti-Suzuki, Swaraj-Mazda)
put it, most successful firms in Ludhiana have "a mixed work-
culture. They have both Ramgarhia technicians, engineers, and
ITI trained technicians. They each have their own importance.
If an engineer designs a die, it is the Ramgarhia foreman, and
the experienced workers who are able to tell, foresee practical
problems in its design. They are the ones who say whether it
works or not. They are the ones that provide the firm with the
ability to excel. They are interested in the work, not just in
getting paid for it... small firms cannot do without their
expertise. As a small firm you may hire an engineer, you may
even be able to afford his pay, but you can't psychologically
provide him with the idea that he can develop his career
opportunity here. So, he will move on. A Ramgarhia technician
may move too, but he will probably move on to set up his own firm
with which you can still maintain a relationship" (Technico
interview, 1992).
47 Amsden (1989), and others have noted the same importance of
practical knowledge. Amsden however discusses the importance of
experience in the context of putting imported technologies and
machinery into operation (1989:228-9).
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Turning outward and the self-imposed pressure of exposure to
external standards. Apart from turning to local groups such as
mechanics and merchants to learn about new markets and get
feedback to upgrade themselves, a striking pattern among these
firms is that they do not limit themselves to looking only
inward--i.e. to resources and institutions available locally--for
feedback and exposure, but in a sustained way, turn outward.
As illustrated by the wagon paints example,48 firms seem to not
limit themselves to niche options available locally--they often
turn outward, or go out and procure the technology they need to
enter a particular line.
For example, one small electroplating firm (VPC), in
operation since the mid-1940s, reported how they were approached
in the 1950s by a client--Hero Cycles, currently Ludhiana's and
the country's premier bicycle and motorcycle producer, which was
then another small but rapidly growing firm--with a special
request. Hero Cycles wanted VPC to "improve on" the standard
electroplating process that was available in Ludhiana at that
time. The existing system involved first applying a nickel coat
on the metal surface, and then chrome-plating it. Hero wanted
VPC to introduce an extra layer: it wanted "first a copper coat,
then nickel, then chrome-plating." But the technology to do this
was not available in Ludhiana in the 1950s. What would one
expect a small firm like VPC to do under such circumstances? The
48 Although the firm did not have experience in paints, it went
all way to Calcutta to observe the production process of firms
there, and to hire a skilled foreman who helped them set up.
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experience of small firms in many other parts of countries like
India suggests that the firm would most likely turn down the
order because getting access to new know-how is costly, and it
would not know where to get it. How could it afford to install
it just to meet the demands of a single small customer?
VPC, however, did not refuse the order simply because it did
not know how to install the extra chrome layer. Rather, it
"asked around. " 49 In particular, it turned to the official
incharge of electroplating at the newly established government
testing and finishing center in Ludhiana. The government center
did not have the machines for copper-plating, but the official
suggested that VPC get in touch with Cassell Fans, a large
electric fan producer based in Delhi, that did have the required
technology. VPC travelled to Delhi (4 hours from Ludhiana by
road), and visited the plant. After consulting with technicians
and operators there, he returned to Ludhiana and tried to
replicate the process in his own firm with the help of local
mistries and the official at the government testing and finishing
center. VPC not only gave his customer, Hero Cycles, the extra
copper coating that they wanted but also "extended" the
technology to other firms in the market. A new process was thus
49 Part of the reason for not passing up the opportunity
perhaps was that electroplating was a growing industry in the
region, and VPC's small firm was one of the oldest, best known
electroplating firms in the region at that time. Also see the next
footnote for more detail on this issue.
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introduced in the region. 50
But the visit also generated other unexpected spill-overs.
While at Cassell's, VPC had also seen a 5-station cold pressing
process that "impressed him." Upon his return to Ludhiana he
developed his own version of the workstation with the help of his
mistries. He then developed dies required for operating the
machines. The workstation was soon copied by other local firms
in this line, but VPC remained a key supplier of dies to those
who installed the cold-press workstation (V.P. Chopra interview).
Thus, firms with modest means can also become channels for
getting access to and introducing new techniques for the benefit
50 But why did VPC go out and get this new technique? Did it
see a general benefit for its own firm in getting know-how for a
more expensive form of electroplating? VPC said in this regard
that the 1940s and 1950s were times of evolution and ferment in the
metal industry in Ludhiana. Previously, firms (most of which were
small) produced whatever they could manually. And, they could sell
whatever they produced because there were scarcities--due to war
initially and then, the Indian government's restrictions on
imports.
But as firms produced more and became more experienced, they
sought better ways of doing things. They had started from a very
low threshold of quality, and there was plenty of room for
improvement. Producers found that items that were made better,
also got better rates (VPC interview, 1991). Demand for better
techniques was increasing among local firms, and firms that
provided better techniques, even if they cost more, were able to
earn a much higher premium. Following Hero Cycles' use of this
higher priced process on its bicycle components, several other
firms also adopted the improvement, and were willing to pay the
same higher price as Hero paid for it. Thus VPC did see a wider
clientele for its new service than just the single client who
initially asked for the service.
While the client, Hero Cycles, paid for the item and for part
of the cost of the installation of the process, VPC also bore part
of the installation cost.
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of other small firms in the region as a whole." This process
involves a chain of actors--customer firms, government officials,
skilled mechanics or technicians, skilled small-firm owners, and
directly or indirectly, large firms like Cassell in the above
example. Most importantly, the introduction of new techniques
does not happen at random--it is often the result of a sequence
of demands placed on the supplier firm by its clients, customers,
or pressures that a firm may place on itself to solve particular
problems in its own production process.
Firms don't look only to larger producers in other cities
for know-how, but some look to firms abroad. One medium-sized
exporter of bicycle parts and hand-tools, explained how they use
their travels abroad to learn from successful third-country
exporters about the kinds of standards they need to meet in order
to successfully enter more demanding markets. Like many medium
and well-established small firms in the region, this firm also
travels "extensively to markets where we do business." But, in
addition, they also engage in a different kind of travel to
selected places where they don't have regular business ties: "we
si This is in contrast with the view in some strands of the
literature that small firms often remain hooked into older,
relatively obsolete production systems because their revenue
streams and the nature of the markets they supply to prevent them
from affording to constantly upgrade their systems. (The flexible
specialization literature points to the opposite spectrum of small
firms that supply high end markets and constantly upgrade
themselves to operate close to the cutting edge technologically).
While it is true, as in Ludhiana, that the machinery and procedures
used by smaller firms are older and hardly at the cutting edge, the
above example shows that successful small firms do keep upgrading
their production systems incrementally.
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make regular trips to Taiwan, South Korea, sometimes Malaysia,
inward we don't have many business dealingq there." They go to
these countries not to sell, but "to see what kinds of standards
international buyers are asking for, and what these firms are
doing to meet these standards.. .to see how they work, and what is
their set up" (Eastman interview, 1991). They not only visit the
factories that manufacture components of interest to them and try
to tour their shops, but they also visit repair firms--where
these parts and the assemblies into which they go, are taken
apart and repaired. In addition, wherever possible, they try to
obtain samples of the component at various stages of its
production sequence, which they show to their skilled foreman,
designer, or subcontractor to extrapolate drawings from. In the
same vein, they may frequently take a trusted skilled worker
along who can understand the process "simply by observing the set
up" and make drawings of what they saw and understood. This
collage of technical know-how is then used to get small
technician-suppliers in Ludhiana to develop the part locally for
export through the merchant firm (Eastman interview, 1992).
In sum, as the firm-owner put it, small and medium firms
like them cannot afford to travel to too many potential markets
abroad to see "what sells." Instead, they travel to successful
exporter countries--in this case South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia--
to see what it takes to meet international standards. Then, with
the help of an ensemble of actors--skilled workers, skilled small
subcontractors, and suppliers, they develop these parts locally
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and try to pull themselves up to meeting the standards they saw.
Finally, another channel of exposure is through government
exchange programs whereby they subsidize brief trips of selected
small and medium owners to tour firms in selected countries
abroad. This program was strongest in the late 1950s through the
early 1970s---when most of the firms I interviewed reported
having availed of it. Immediately after independence the Punjab
state government took selected local producers (most of whom were
small in scale) on tours of bicycle and machine tool firms that
had been run by the British in different parts of India to see
what imported plant and machinery looked like.
For example, as one beneficiary firm put it, the job of the
Ludhiana Productivity Council (set up in the 1950s) "in the early
1960s was to take owners of small firms to tour large factories
formerly owned by the British for exposure. The government used
to pay half the expenses and the fare. Sen-Raleigh in Calcutta
had machinery imported from outside. Many small cycle
manufacturers from Punjab went to see these machines" (Birdi
interview, 1992). This firm, for example traveled to Bangalore,
Madras, and Calcutta on this government program. But, as the
interviewee added, "few firms came forward to take advantage of
this scheme because many small firms did not have enough manpower
(i.e., family members who could manage the firm) to be able to
leave their firms for 15 days. Firms that were able to go did
better--many of the others got left behind." (Birdi interview,
1992).
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This exposure and emulation, it is important to note, does
not necessarily produce outcomes that bring small firms near the
cutting edge.5 2 They represent, rather, an ongoing and constant
source of gradual improvement through which firms are able to
better their own prior performance.
Conclusions: In sum then, small firms in this region do not
have an insurmountable marketing problem, and are better able to
cope with the sudden moving away of demand because they turn to
multiple sources for sales and feedback. These sources range
from skilled technicians, assemblers, state government
departments, to original equipment manufacturers (most of whom in
the bicycle and sewing machine line are located in and around the
Ludhiana region), to an extensive network of dealers and merchant
distributors who link small producers with replacement markets
nationwide (and internationally through indirect exports) .53 It
is the combination of having easy access to the replacement
market through a dense trader-wholesaler network, spatial and
social proximity to OEMs, and having learnt to shift constantly
to markets that have demand, that makes marketing less of a
52 For example many "successful" firms in Ludhiana produce
machinery and products that are 15 or more years old. Cold forging
techniques have been adopted by the smaller firms only recently,
since the 1980s.
5'As several firms pointed out, these markets have different
peaks and troughs of demand for the same product; so if you are
hooked into a network of suppliers that has access to these
differently behaving markets, you can increase supply in one or
reduce supply in another as demand fluctuates without losing out on
output.
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problem for small firms in this regic.
We saw also that firms did not remain tied to any one
product, but routinely "followed demand." What remained constant
in this process was ties to some preferred customers, and the
small firms drawing upon a common "infrastructure" of skills and
sources of feedback, information and assistance. A firm's
products change, markets change, but some key customers and
access to rich networks of support are the anchors that remain
constant. Government demand in its various guises has been key;
anid replacement markets allow these firms to weave back and forth
between preferred customers.
As many observers have noted, hunar (skill), and tazurba
(experience) are at the heart of the region's ability to compete
(Kular Cycles, interview 1990). But even more important to note
is that these skills keep changing. Artisanal skills, or
specific skills by themselves may die out. As they have in
several regions that had strong artisanal--including among
Howrah's metalworkers. But skills survived in this region
because they kept getting transformed. Key institutions within
which local workers were embedded--especially "demanders" as a
class--forced them to be dynamic by constantly putting pressure
on them to help make the most of a limited capital base.
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CONCLUSIONS
The story of Ludhiana's small metal-manufacturing firms told
in the preceding pages is an attempt to understand how, and under
what conditions small, capital constrained firms in this region
learned to improve their performance, and over time come to
dominate national markets in the key sectors in which they
specialized--bicycles, sewing machines, auto-parts, simple
machinery, and agricultural implements. In many cases (e.g., in
the case of bicycles and bicycle parts), they achieved this
dominance by wresting advantage away from large multinational
partnered firms located in other, more industrially sophisticated
parts of India.
These firms established themselves in national markets
despite being hundreds of miles away from the nearest source of
coal, iron or steel,' and they sell a bulk of their finished
goods outside the region. Thus, in contrast to the view that
small firms often build off of local resources or sell to locally
based customers, input as well as output markets of these firms
are largely outside the state. Similarly, unlike the view that
while they are repositories of employment during boom times,
small firms are the first to die during downturns--these small
producers have maintained their hold over national markets
1 A vibrant steel-re-rolling industry has developed in the
region, but basic raw materials comes from outside the region.
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despite a long history of instability in the region,2 the latest
of which was a decade long period of separatist violence that
crippled Punjab throughout the 1980s up to 1993. What lessons
does this study then, offer about small firm growth in other
regions?
On the face of it, this region has neither the high-
technology, high wage features idealized by studies of regions
like the third Italy, nor the engineer-based, state guided
economic structure exemplified by the Ectst Asian successes. Yet,
it has elements of models and combines an ability to find new,
highly economical ways of producing standard goods, with an
ability to constantly learn through reverse engineering and
upgrade and revise its skill-base and production processes. The
core of this production structure is a knowledge-base built
around the mechanic's practical skills, not the engineers--and
its ongoing transformation over time in response to changing
demand pressures.
A key finding of the study in this regard, has been that
Ludhiana's small firms grew and did well despite adverse
conditions not so much because of any inherent capabilities they
had, or any unique or exceptional qualities that history endowed
them with, but because they learned to deal with downturns,
conflicts and adversity as disequilibria that put pressure on
2 A violent partition of 1947, another in 1966 when Punjab was
split into three states and lost most of its large industrial base
to Haryana, three wars fought on its borders in the 1960s and early
1970s, and the long years to secessionist strife in the 1980s.
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firms to find alternative strategics to get around the immediate
bottleneck, even though this often involved settling for
second-best solutions, or temporari'y lowering some standards.
These inter-firm relationships, together with the
government's own policies, and the nature of its responses to
local demands, led to the evolution of a plurality of
arrangements and institutions that helped the region's small
producers economize on capital; upgrade their skills and
production processes; and deal with common bottlenecks that
typically hamper small firm growth--e.g., problems finding
markets, coping with the sudden loss of demand, access to credit,
and exposure to better production standards.
This study has argued that the ability of Ludhiana's small
producers to successfully cope with adversity and find ways to
get around common bottlenecks comes, in large part, from ongoing
interaction between the character of the productive environment
in which these firms are embedded, and the choices they
themselves made. This environment has constantly changed over
time as a result of strategic choices made by local firms and the
region's key industrial actors (workers and producers
associations, distributors, merchant exporters, reconditioning
teams, skilled mistries, specialist job-shops, government
agencies and locally based industrial bureaucrats), but the
continuities that remain have provided local firms with at least
five (advantageous) features which have persisted over the years
3 Also see Sabel (1994) for similar arguments.
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even though the specific processes through which these advantages
have worked have changed over time.
(i) The practice of tapping into multiple sources of demand
on an ongoing basis, not only during times of adversity or
downturn. These sources include demand from the government, from
local assemblers, original equipment manufacturers, from direct
and indirect exports, and from sales to the replacement market
via merchant distributors (See Chapter 5 for details). (ii)
Access to a variety of mechanisms that helped lower production
costs and reduce wastage--e.g., collective arrangements to use
scrap productively; a local machine tools and machinery making
industry that catered primarily to the needs of small firms;
(iii) Networks of institutions and social arrangements that
provided small firms with a plurality of easily accessible
sources of economical and ongoing feedback that helped them learn
about outside quality standards, about defects in their products
and production processes, and how to upgrade the quality of their
equipment and output, and rise to higher quality standards over
time, and to better markets. This feedback was customized and
decentralized. And networks that provided this customized and
decentralized feedback, and information about new sources of
demand included other firms, users, assemblers, mechanics,
reconditioning teams, retailers, distributors, factors,
technicians, technically skilled government bureaucrats who
consulted after hours.
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(iv) Widespread presence of technical skills among the
region's workers and small firm-owners centered around the
practical knowledge of the mechanic--not the engineer. These
skills are relatively cheap--and accessible to a broader swath of
production workers--compared to an environment where engineers
dominate the skilled workforce. Most importantly, these skills
kept getting transformed over time with changing demand
pressures. Demand from clients and firms to constantly adapt
things, copy through reverse engineering, or make a standard
product through non-standard means put pressure on workers to not
only think in open-ended ways, but forced them to keep
reinventing their skills according to the demands of the task in
hand or changes in technology and standards.
Close interaction between workers' informal strategies of
skill acquisition and the government's formal system of providing
vocational training through technical colleges, engineering
diplomas was crucial to facilitating this demand-responsive/
demand-induced upgrading of a skill base that was originally
rooted in repair and artisanal skills. That this formerly
artisanal and traditional skill base transformed and modernized
itself over time undermines arguments that heavy investments in
engineering, or sophisticated technological transfers are a
prerequisite to competitive industrial growth. These arguments
are important, but they also assume a polarization and separation
between practical skills and experience on the one hand, and
formal engineering skills on the other. The Ludhiana case
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demonstrates the fallacy of such a polarization. By showing how
broad-based access to intermediate skills, and their demand-
induced transformation, pulled a whole region of small producers
up to impressive levels of growth and at least middle class
livelihoods, suggests that there are alternatives to the high-
technology model.
(v) Finally, the state's role was pervasive and present in
influencing the region's industrial trajectory, but not always
visible. Its chief, concrete manifestation was the provision of
an extensive physical infrastructure in the region, the provision
of a network of technical training institutions, and the endowing
of status and prestige to mechanical/ practical skills through
its own investments decisions and hiring practices (staffing the
industry department's technical wings with graduates from
industrial training institutes and holders of engineering
diplomas (not necessarily degrees). But its ongoing role was one
of a broker: rather than try to internalize all kinds of
expertise within its ranks, it tried to put local firms together
with a variety of public and private sources of assistance. The
"state," for local firms, at an everyday level, is effectively a
network of technically skilled officials across a network of
locally-based institutions who interact together around
industry's problems, irrespective of whether their institution is
run by the central government (SISI), state government (DIC) or
autonomous institutions funded jointly by the central government,
state government, bilateral and multilateral agencies (e.g.,
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Central Tool Room [run with German funding], Bicycle R&D Center
[UNDP]).
These features, which allow small firms to adjust
resiliently to unforeseen changes in demand or markets, are
ironically mixed in with features associated with the "low" road.
For example, the production system involves considerable self-
exploitation on the part of both, the small-entrepreneurs as well
as their workers. Workers routinely work long hours--10-14, as
do the owners--10-12 hours--to raise their average returns to
acceptable levels. Small owners save on overheads by handling a
variety of tasks themselves--banking, letter writing, sales,
purchases--by being "Peon-to-Proprietor" entrepreneurs, as they
put it. They cut costs in every way--use part-time accountants
if sales are sluggish; if they have to type out form-letters in
bulk they get it done from local commercial colleges or from
private institutions that teach typing and shorthand.
Yet, despite the need to work long hours and lower overheads
in other ways, the region's smallest firms have relatively cheap
and ready access a variety of services that are usually not
easily available to the typical small firm: physical
infrastructure, serviced industrial plots available on easy
installments, a highly developed (and effective) trucking
industry, a widespread network of publicly provided and privately
run communication facilities--telephone, fax, and computational
services--whose costs are borne partly by the government and
partly externalized into the region as a whole.
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We examine below briefly, the mechanisms through which the
elements listed above helped firms increase productivity, raise
output, lower costs and grow.
Importance of skill and the nature of its propagation:
(i) Demand-induced learning: a plurality of sources of
feedback. There is compelling evidence in the literature that
small firms are at their most vulnerable when they start out.
Poor product quality means high rejection rates and difficulty
finding demand; and revenue lost through high rejection rates can
mean closure for a small, capital-constrained firm that is just
starting out and needs liquidity. The problem often is that
small producers may not know how to find out what they need to do
to improve their product quality quickly enough, and be guided
through the learning process.
Traditional technical assistance programs seek to get around
this problem by offering small firms marketing assistance, or
offering them technical training courses that might help them
detect production problems. But this approach of offering
standardized courses or assistance packages did not always work.
Recent studies suggest that a more effective approach is to build
customized and more focussed technical assistance processes that
advise a firm according to its particular needs. These studies
emphasize the importance in this regard of close supplier-client
ties where a particular supplier is linked to a particular buyer-
-whether private or public--in an ongoing relationship of
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feedback, and the buyer tries to coach the supplier through the
learning process.
A striking finding of the Ludhiana study is that successful
small firms learned to tap into multiple sources of feedback and
demand as a matter of course, not only during troubled times.
They are therefore tied into a network of feedback givers on an
ongoing basis. These groups not only get to know the firm and
the work it does well and are in a better position to offer
suggestions and customized help on an ongoing basis, but the firm
is more likely to get help during times of real adversity because
it is already tied into an active and diverse support network.
These same circles also become conduits for other kinds of
information and advice--about new practices, opportunities such
as joint exports, and production or marketing advice. These
groups include skilled technicians, repair mechanics, assemblers,
technically skilled government bureaucrats, PKD centers such as
Ludhiana's Central Tool Room, users as a group. The turning of
small local firms to these groups for feedback had two
characteristics that set them apart from standard practice.
First, as we saw in Chapter 5, small firms don't just turn
to their particular clients or users, but they seek out "users"
as a class, for opinions and advice about what item to produce,
what has good demand, and how to improve their product. Fo-
example, a small firm producing a three-wheeler gear or part may
ask a general repair mechanic, or an assembler, or a three-
wheeler operator acquainted with them for ways to fix certain
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problems, or advice on materials and better processes that would
improve the particular part. This is different from, and goes
beyond, the recent emphasis in the literature on demand-driven
assistance where a particular producer is linked in an ongoing
relationship to a particular client from whom he gets feedback.
While recent research has shown convincingly that a small firm
learns fastest when it works in a close, feedback intensive
relationship with a large buyer who can help bootstrap it
technlogically, the literature is also pointing out how only a
small tier of firms can attain these "learning" relationships
centered around long-term buyers. The Ludhiana case suggests
that there are also other ways in which small producers can
upgrade themselves that do not necessarily involve building a
relationship with a particular buyer. Small firms can turn to
users as a class, or to repair mechanics or assemblers as a group
to accumulate the feedback that can help them improve their
production processes and quality across the range of products
they produce.
The second way in which this is different from standard
practice is that while usually small producers can ill afford
constant consultations with skilled technicians outside of the
circle of their clients, or government technical assistance
programs, here access tn killed mechanics and technicians is
pervasive and relatively cheap. Many of the small owners are
themselves former technicians, and have ties with networks of
skilled workers. This is in large part because of the highly
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blurred boundaries between small owners and skilled workers, on
the one hand, and small entrepreneurs and mid-level government
officials on the other, many of whom are skilled and run their
own firms on the side under the name of family members. These
technically skilled government officials were often trained in
the same engineering diploma courses or technical colleges as the
skilled workers and skilled small-owners and part of the same
cohort. Lack of social distance or of deep class cleavages
between these middle-class (skilled) workers, small entrepreneurs
and mid-level bureaucrats; just as there is social proximity
between a small industrialist who was once a repair mechanic (or
whose father was), and another who still is a repair mechanic and
an acquaintance, and can become a source of advise to the
manufacturer on how to make its product or parts more efficient
(as examples in chapter 5 showed). There is therefore a
significant relationship between the nature of skill in the
region, the premium and prestige associated with technical
skills, upward mobility that has allowed many skilled workers to
become small producers, and the access that such "industrialists"
can maintain to skilled workers who once worked and socialized
with them for ongoing and informal advice.
(ii) "Following" demand, and getting around low margins.
There is overwhelming agreement in the literature that
marketing is a major stumbling block for small firms. By
contrast we saw that most firms in my Ludhiana sample said
marketing was not a major issue for them, at least not an issue
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they couldn't get around. A key reason for this, we saw, was
that small firms in this region tapped into multiple sources of
demand, and kept "following" demand (i.e, finding out about newer
markets, or related products for which demand was good) even in
periods when demand for their current products was good. Keeping
track of newer sources of demand, and hedging their risks was an
ongoing strategy. Two other factors helped make marketing a less
daunting task for firms in this region.
(a) One is the tendency of firm-owners (at least those who
were former workers) to start out with demand in hand. Nearly
90% of firm-owners who were skilled workers before they took to
production reported that they waited to build contacts and first
identify demand from a committed buyer who knew what they could
produce, before setting up shop. And as we saw in chapters 4 and
5, firms don't just seek out new sources of demand at the
beginning of their firm histories, or during downturns, but they
often "follow" demand, temporarily going into related lines of
production to take advantage of opportunities that open up (as
illustrated by the case of the lathe producer in chapter 5 who
switched to making spinning plants to capture the short boom in
the demand for these plants after seventeen of Ludhiana's hosiery
firms won a large export order from the former Soviet Union in
the early 1970s).
(b) Two other factors allow small firms to lower costs and
minimize risk when they start out. (i) One is the practice of
merchant buyers, or even OEMs, making part of the payment to
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small producers in the form of advances. Merchant buyers or
assemblers often extend 40-50% (but in some cases up to 70%) of
total costs to small producers at the time of placing an order.
This practice is by no means unique to Ludhiana--and some recent
studies have reported advances as financing working capital in
regions as varied as Brazil and South Africa (Tendler and Amorim
1996, Tendler 1995). What is different about the Ludhiana case,
as we saw in Chapter 5, is that in this region distributors and
merchant buyers extend advances to small producers not only to
finance recurrent expenditures, but to also develop an item.
That is, to get the producer to figure out its production process
and develop the tooling to bring it into production, or to
copy/modify an item for them that is so far not produced locally
(Eastman Exporters was one example cited in Chapter 5).
(ii) A second feature is the presence in Ludhiana of a
broad-based and deep infrastructure of specialized job-shops and
firms that perform a wide range of routine as well as highly
sophisticated tasks for firms. These services range from
forging, casting, electroplating, testing, hardening, specialty
turning and machining, painting and many others. As any visitor
can see, and as local firms report, all kinds of services,
processes as well as intermediate inputs (such as nuts and bolts)
"are right at hand." A firm can start production from a rented
shed with a bare minimum of machinery in-house, because
practically every process can be got done from specialized firms
in the market. Small firms, especially those that started out in
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the 1960s and 1970s routinely reported having built up their
capital base incremental. As product quality stabilized and
output expanded and revenues increased, they invested in buying
the machinery they needed, often one machine at a time, and
gradually internalized some of the processes they used to get
done from the outside.' This ability to start with little
investment not only allows very small firms, or former workers
with little capital to enter into production for themselves, but
having such an infrastructure to fall back on is important to the
ability of small local firms to switch products relatively easily
during downturns or when demand for a particular product wanes.
Switching to new products does not require them to first invest
in expensive re-tooling or make changes in their production
processes up-front. The firm can make the changes incremental as
revenues increase, and meanwhile rely on its links with
specialized job shops and other service providers initially.
Demand impetuses
As we saw in chapters two and three, even historically, a
series of demand generating episodes were crucial to allowing
Ludhiana's small firms to establish themselves during and after
the second world war. In all of these cases, the government was
' More recent firms typically reported starting out with a
larger equipment base, perhaps reflecting either a growing
accumulation of wealth in the region, or changes in the way newer
firms carry out production, requiring perhaps more specialized
equipment or more precise operations.
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a key source of demand for the region's metal and woollen hosiery
producers. Subsequently, firms branched out into supplying the
private sector and the replacement market. But government demand
from a variety of departments has continued to be important.
Demand relationships with exacting departments worked best
in forcing firms' pace of learning and helping improve quality.
Departments with low latitudes for rejections or poor quality
(e.g., railways and defense) had a built in disciplinary
mechanism that enhanced performance, even though the firms won
orders on the basis of tenders, rather than longer term
personalized contracts.
The literature on demand-induced learning among small firms
raises two issues. First, as we noted earlier, it emphasizes
long-term, face to face interaction between a particular buyer
and its particular supplier as facilitating the tutelage that is
needed for the supplier to learn. A second factor implicitly
emphasized in the development literature on industrial promotion
is that government agencies are often not very good at fostering
procurement-induced learning, especially among small producers.
A recent study of a highly effective government procurement
program in Brazil's Ceara state showed however, that if the
government user agency is separated from the government agency
that does the procuring, and is interested in assisting small
firms, then government procurement programs can become powerful
tools of learning for small suppliers because it is in the
interest of the intermediary procuring agency to upgrade the
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production skills of its small suppliers to ensure that they can
meet the quality requirement of final buyers (Tendler and Amorim
1996). What is different about the findings of the Ludhiana case
is that they suggest that proximity to the actual customer is not
the only way for small firms to learn from demand induced
pressures. In the Ludhiana case, firms turned to a variety of
other actors who were not directly related to them through a
demand relationship, for feedback on how to achieve the quality
standard required of them. Similarly, as we see momentarily,
many of Ludhiana's small producers who supply to the replacement
market through merchant distributors or retailers, also build
ties of feedback with their intermediary buyers (retailers,
wholesalers and merchant distributors) and with mechanics and
local technicians to find ways of improving their product despite
supplying to diffuse and distant final buyers.
(c) A third reason why small firms in this region have few
marketing problems is that they are embedded in a far-flung and
sophisticated network of merchant distributors and wholesalers
who procure spare parts and complete items from Ludhiana's small
producers (of bicycles, auto-parts, sewing machines, agricultural
implements and machinery) and sell them in replacement markets
throughout the country as well as abroad through indirect
exports. This distribution network and the replacement market
provides small firms with ongoing back-up demand and allows local
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firms to cope during downturns. 5 Producers making transitions
from one product to another or one buyer to another, also weave
in and out of the replacement market using it as a source of
interim revenues.
A feature that made this role of merchant distributors
different from the picture of traders as the exploitative
middleman-buyer traders emphasized in the development
literature,6 is that it embodied substantial feedback from the
merchant distributors to small suppliers on their product
quality. Indeed, the smallest firms actively used this
relationship with retailers/wholesalers and dealers, and its
cycle of feedback to pull themselves up and improve their product
quality when they started out. They reported supplying small
' Many small firms sell mainly to replacement markets for much
of their firm histories, but they sell to markets in several
states, and even abroad via indirect exporters. They sell either
through the network of dealers, or build their own networks of
retail stores over time. But typically, those in the my sample who
exported indirectly, eventually sought out OEM buyers, or other
assemblers. Some took to exporting directly.
6 Although there has been some recent interest in looking at
the developmental potential of intermediaries such as traders and
sales agents with regard to small firm growth (e.g., Schmitz 1995),
the traditional view is that the interests of traders and merchants
are often contrary to those of producers, and hence detrimental to
their long-term growth. The dorinant view, or at least the view
that informs policy, continues to be that traders and merchant-
buyers typically exploit market imperfections and attempt to hoard
market-power. Thus, while they sell at high mark-ups, but try to
buy at low rates from small producers. And, because they can sell
in different quality segments of the market, why would they care
about a particular client's product quality? While much of this
picture is accurate, and merchant interests are often opposed to
the interests of producers, the Ludhiana case suggests instances
where merchant-buyers may play a positive, quality enhancing role
for small producers.
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batches of output to one or two selected retailers/wholesalers at
lower than market rates for a short time period. In exchange for
the low rates, the distributors gave them extensive feedback on
the quality of their product--feedback which they, in turn,
elicited from the technicians or assemblers to whom they sold the
items. Since most distributors seek to sell under their own
brandname, it is in their interest to help a new supplier whose
products they help market, to come up to par with market
standards in a reasonable time period. As firms improve quality
further, they may diversify their buyers (distributors) or sell
under their own brandname.
There is growing interest in the developmental role of
traders and merchants in the recent literature (See Schmitz 1995,
and Piore 1996) , and in the study of buyer driven commodity
chains (Gerrefi 1994), but in most of these cases the trader
intermediaries broker demand from large buyers abroad (e.g., the
U.S. shoe chains in the Sinos Valley case studies by Schmitz), or
the retailers themselves are large well-known chains (such as J.C
Penny in the Mexican case studies by Piore et. al 1996). Little
has been discussed about the conditions under which the
replacement market--usually regarded as being a relatively
7 See Paul A. London's pioneering study on the role of
"merchants as the promoters of rural development" (1.975) . Through
interviews and extensive field research he shows how small
merchants played a key role in financing the distribution and
spread of fertilizers and irrigation equipment (such as pump-sets)
among farmers in the Indian Punjab, and in Western Uttar Pradesh in
the late 1960s-early 1970s. Also see Uma Lele's work on rural
middlemen in India's grain markets (1968, 1971).
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inferior and less quality consciouS source of demand--and the
merchants brokering demand from that source can play a positive,
quality enhancing role in helping small firms at least come up to
par with existing market standards. In the Ludhiana case we saw
that this was possible with the help and presence of an ensemble
of actors and feed-back givers (technicians, "users, " assemblers,
workers, retailers) in the environment in which local firms were
inserted and whom they had easy access to.
Linkages across sectors: historical and institutional links
between a dynamic agricultural sector and local industry:
Other indirect demand-generating mechanisms in Ludhiana's
industrial history relate to the Punjab government's subsidies to
agriculture (Chapter 4) and their impact on small industry,
especially, small machine-tool producers and agricultural
implements producers. Policies such as subsidies for the
procurement of farm-implements and machinery are typically
advocated as supply-sided subsidies to agriculture--and have
often been highly criticized as such. But ironically, in this
case, they unintentionally acted also as demand-sided subsidies
to the machine tool industry. In this sense they were a
variation on the other demand-sided impetuses discussed
previously (i.e, war-induced demand from the government, demand
opened up by the government's ISI polices, and the rebuilding
efforts during partition). Ironically, also, it was lobbying
from agriculturalists--not equipment manufacturers--that brought
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about these subsidies and related polices, which indirectly
stimulated industry.
(i) Importance of cheap and extensive infrastructure
Infrastructure, regarded till a few years ago as an "old"
issue or one of the older, "harder" and more traditional roles of
the state, is once again the subject of considerable interest
today. From being criticized as being unduly subsidized,
politically charged, and a burden for fiscally strapped
governments in the 1980s, the infrastructure debate is revived
again in the context of privatization (World Bank 1994). The
Ludhiana case sheds some historical light on this question by
pointing to the importance of the state's provision of extensive
and cheap infrastructure throughout Punjab early in the region's
industrial history and its spill-overs into private initiative.
One of the key findings of the study was that the
availability of cheap and extensive infrastructure--roads, rail
networks, cheap electric power, water, serviced land, and
communications links-- was crucial in allowing the region's small
firms to lower production costs, and compete in distant markets
despite being small and constrained for capital.
Installation of this infrastructure, and access to it on the
part of industry, however, did not come automatically. Indeed,
much of it was not even directed towards industry originally.
Historically, the Punjab government's (including the colonial
government's) investments in infrastructure were targeted towards
agriculture and the military. When the colonial government first
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began its massive infrastructure investments in Punjab after
annexing :he state in 1849, it concentrated on laying a rail
network that would connect the region's volatile border along
Afghanistan with the center of colonial power in Delhi, and would
enable the movement of troops across Punjab. The colonial
government further extended its road and rail networks in Punjab
to consolidate land and colonize the vast, but sparsely populated
frontier regions of Western Punjab. An immediate, and short-
term, goal of these infrastructure projects was to launch public
works projects that would provide work/employment for the
disbanded soldiers of the Sikh army whom the colonial powers had
just subjugated. But a longer term and central goal in settling
the frontier was to bring new land under cultivation. In this
regard the colonial government invested in building one of Asia's
largest irrigation canal systems--and agrarian settlements (canal
colonies)--in West Punjab in the late nineteenth century.
The Railways and irrigation works had impact far beyond
agriculture and defense. As we saw in Chapter 2, these new
trades raised non-agricultural incomes by providing new avenues
of employment and contractorships to local groups such as
artisans and traders outside agriculture. Most importantly they
indirectly and over time, transformed the traditional skill-base
of a whole generation of artisanal metal and woodworkers formerly
engaged in the manufacture of simple farm implements, through
exposure to new processes and products on the state's railway
projects, irrigation works and in the government's railway
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workshop.
The government's focus on infrastructure continued after
independence in the form of state-wide rural roads projects,
construction of power plants (initially hydro projects, and later
a series of small thermal power plants), and rural
electrification. By the early 1970s every one of Punjab's 12,476
villages, towns and cities was electrified and connected by at
least one all-weather road. Though still aimed primarily at
agriculture, the benefits of these investments were fungible,
across sectors and accrued to industry as much as they did to
agriculturalists. In addition to their early, historical role of
raising rural incomes, and transforming local artisans' skill
base, infrastructure investments, especially those in roads and
cheap electric power helped small local firms lower production
costs and increase their marketing speed and options.
(ii) Trucking as a preferred mode of transport--speed,
savings, and quicker turnover of capital
One of the more surprising findings was the preference by
local firms of trucks over trains as to transport their finished
goods to locations outside the state. The presence of an
extensive road network had led to the growth of a robust trucking
industry in Punjab since the late 1960s-early 1970s, controlled
by the state's wealthy agriculturalists. The trucking industry
developed initially to meet the marketing needs of
agriculturalists--e.g., to expedite the transportation of
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perishable produce such as fruit and vegetables, and to transport
wheat, rice, other grains and export crops to other parts of
India. But since harvests are seasonal, truck-owning farmers
began to lease out their trucks to local firms since the 1970s.
Today the region's large, small and medium producers of metal
parts (not so much machinery), bicycles, sewing machines, and
agricultural implements prefer this means of transport for long-
distances over trains.
As we saw in Chapter 4, firms prefer using trucks because
unlike the delays and pilferage and damage often involved in
transporting goods by train, trucks are faster and safer; they
save money because they do not need to package their goods in the
heavy wooden crates mandated by the Railways. Not only do they
save on the cost of these crates, but they save also on being
able to pack more goods per sq. foot on the trucks. Most of all,
they can turn their money around faster--they load the trucks at
the end of each day, and the truckers deposit the goods at the
clients doorstep by the next morning or within a few days if the
destination is at the other end the country. Within a few days
of delivery, the customer releases the payment: some firms are
able to turn around their working capital four times a month.
Unlike other states where the trucking industry is weaker and
only bigger firms can afford to hire commercial trucks or
maintain their own fleet, in this region the growth of a trucking
industry supporting agriculture, and owned mainly by
agriculturalists, has allowed even smaller firms to access it
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relatively cheaply. Indeed, the presence of mechanical skills in
the local workforce--and in many trilck drivers--has, in turr
supported the growth and maintenance of the region's trucking
industry.'
Thus, industry's easy access to infrastructure in Punjab did
not come automatically. The history of Punjab's agriculture, and
the state's agricultural policies and investments, had a lot to
do with the presence in Punjab, early in the region's industrial
history, an extensive physical infrastructure. Subsequently
local industry learned to fight for it--as evidenced by the
successful battles led several of Ludhiana's industrial
associations in the 1980s for more power plants, better access to
power, for flyovers, storage locations, serviced land, water
treatment facilities, and better maintenance of the road network.
It is true now as it has always been that infrastructure
provision is a politically charged issue. It is true also that
it is costly, and fiscally burdened governments can no longer
treat it as a "traditional" responsibilty. But the evidence
suggests that cheap and extensive infrastructure is important,
and its presence makes a difference to the ability of small firms
to compete. It appears also that its benefits are fungible
across sectors (although more research is needed to clearly
understand this issue), and creating strategic disequilibria can
8 Gotsch (1972:191) remarked anecdotally that the high premium
placed on mechanical skills in Punjab was one reason why Sikhs
dominated India's transportation systems--not because they are
"great drivers!".
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lead to new ways of providing it. For example, having long been
accustomed to the availability of infrastructure (power, roads,
rail, water, transportation) local firms in Ludhiana are willing
to pay to get past any bottlenecks that arise. In response, the
Punjab government recently allowed private providers to extend
roads, construct bridges, maintain them and levy tolls for it--
without much protest from users.'
(iii) A different kind of "growth-linkage:" institutional
and policy links
A body of theory most commonly evoked to explain Ludhiana's
small-firm dominated industrial structure is the growth linkage
debate (Rana cf. Sharma 1988, Gosal and Kishan 1984). According
to this view, rapid agricultural growth in Punjab during the mid-
1960s through the 1970s and rising rural wealth induced
industrial growth in the region through increased demand for
locally made consumption and production goods (bicycles, sewing
machines, agricultural equipment, tractor parts, repair and
replacements of components). Thus, according to this view,
rising agrarian purchasing power and endogenous demand fuelled
small firm growth through production and consumption linkages.
But a central feature of the Ludhiana's small firms growth
that departs from the logic of the pure growth linkage argument
9 Another way would be for the state to prioritize
investments. First bunch them up in areas where population and
firm density is higher--areas that are neither urban nor rural, and
then to extend to less densely settled areas.
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is the export nature of Ludhiana's industrial growth, and the
historical importance in Ludhiana (and Punjab) of exogenous or
outside demand--from public and private sources. Even today,
nearly 90% of Ludhiana's final output of sewing machines,
bicycles and parts, woollen hosiery, even agricultural equipment
is sold outside the state; and all of the basic inputs used by
the region's metal industry (steel, iron, coal) come from outside
the region. Thus an open economy has long been the basis of
industrial growth in Ludhiana.
The origins of Ludhiana's small firms, moreover, especially
its dominant consumer durbales industries--bicycles and parts,
sewing machines, (and woolen hosiery) predate the green-
revolution years of high agricultural growth in the 1960s-1970s
by several decades. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, historically,
it was massive defense demand from the government during the
second world war, not from agriculturalists that, caused the
first real spurt of small firm growth in Ludhiana. Subsequent
demand-generating episodes (rebuilding after partition, import
controls, ISI) built upon this initial period of growth, allowing
the small firms that had mushroomed during the war to stabilize.
Indeed, it appears that the prior existence of a skilled metal
working class in and around Ludhiana actually aided the spread,
diffusion and rapid adoption of mechanization that was part of
the green revolution technologies introduced in the 1960s. Thus,
rather than rising incomes due to agrarian growth resulting from
the introduction of green revolution technologies in Punjab in
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the mid-1960s, inducing the rise of Ludhiana's metal industry, it
was the prior existence of a small firm led metal industry that
contributed to the rising agrarian incomes by aiding the adoption
and adaptation of improved implements and pump-sets and other
equipment that made the green revolution technologies more
productive. This round of agrarian growth further boosted the
growth of Ludhiana's metal-based small firms, especially its
agricultural implements industry (as Deolalikar 1985 shows),
rather than having caused the industry's original rise.
Rising agrarian wealth in the green revolution decades of
the 1960s and 1970s did indeed boost growth rates of small local
industries producing agricultural equipment, pumpsets and
capacitors. But the pure growth linkage argument, while
capturing some aspects of Ludhiana's small-firm based industrial
growth, does not explain or account for its emergence, nor the
nature of its growth. It suggests, instead, the importance of
looking historically at the variety of other institutional and
policy linkages between the region's industrial and agricultural
sectors that shaped the conditions of accumulation, investment,
and skill-formation in the region.
Three larger themes in summary
Underlying this region's pattern of small firm growth, in
sum, are three larger themes that have allowed specific features
in the region's production system to change while retaining some
threads of continuity as institutions transformed over time.
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(1) The nature of the region's labor market and human
capital base. The region's base of mechanics' skills kept
getting transformed in accommodating change in production needs.
This was in part driven by demand--demand brought by distributors
and sales agents with wide exposure, and because firms owners are
themselves skilled and exposed themselves to outside standards.
And in part, because many skilled workers go on to become firm
owners, they carry the awareness of link between changing skills
with changing demand. The nature of demand thus, affects the
skill base. In designing training programs therefore, it may be
useful to pay more explicit attention to the demand side--how
different kinds of demand pressures impact a region's workforce,
and the kinds of demand impetuses that are more likely to shape
broad skills and transform them (e.g., tasks that require
suppliers to adapt, modify items as they produce them--or even
copy items of higher standard than they were hitherto accustomed
to).
The Ludhiana case, at one level, shows the (historical)
conditions under which artisans became skilled technicians in
modern enterprises--both as workers and small owners--rather than
remaining trapped in old trades that eventually die out of
attrition. Although Ludhiana's organization of production
emerged initially due to fragmented capital, relatively even
distribution of income, and colonial polices that kept the elite
agrarian while at the same time transforming the skill base of
whole generation of artisanal workers, it reproduced itself later
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due to the benefits this system afforded to both small and large
producers.
(2) A second theme concerns the episodic problem solving
arrangements within firms in region. These organizations arose
in response to specific problems faced by a group of producers
involving those most directly involved who built an alliance
around the specific problem to be resolved (e.g., undercutting,
or the need to revise piece rates), and after the problem was
resolved, died out, to reemerge later in a different guise when a
different problem presented itself. Episodic organizations
emerged not only under the umbrella of a single producers
association or a regional association, but in ways that cut
across associations and producers groups. These highly mobile,
and flexible organizations, we saw, weave in and out of
traditional producers associations and are capable of carrying
information around economically and pervasively. The literature
has not focussed much attention on such groups partly because
they are seen as transient, sporadic, not permanent, and
therefore, understandably neglected as temporary. But we saw
that not only are there strong elements of continuity in these
organizations; but this organizational form lends itself to
reinvention more easily if it operates within a more stable,
overall framework of commonly understood rules and customs.
A similar structure characterized government intervention in
the region. The state bureaucracy's intervention was pervasive,
and through a variety of channels, some of which were outside of
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government. Rather than build a comprehensive base of expertise
within its ranks, the government relied on helping local firms
learn on their own by exposing them to outside standards,
indirectly providing them "models" towards which to build, and
facilitating their linkage to a diverse set of public and private
actors through buyer seller meets, brokering informal technology
transfer episodes by sending small firms to visit large companies
or multinationals outside the state. The Punjab government has
financed such "tours" (jointly with local associations) since the
1940s and 1950s when it arranged for selected local firms to tour
British plants within India. It organized similar, bilaterally
funded trips of local producers to Japanese, German and Eastern
European plants in the 1960s and 1970s; provided firms with
access to retired American engineers for technical advice through
a federally funded program supported jointly by the Fo-d
Foundation in the 60s; and to foreign machinery in government-and
bilaterally financed centers such as the Central Tool Room in
Ludhiana and other R&D centers catering to the products that
local firms specialize in--bicycles, sewing machines, machine
tools.
The boundaries between government and industry, moreover,
are very porous. Many industrial bureaucrats and mid-level
officials have their own small firms under the name of family
members, and play out their dual role as producers. But
government action was concrete as well--it had a history of
investment in infrastructure and skill formation, and invested
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heavily in technical training. Although much of the
infrastructure investments were initially targeted towards
agriculture, their benefits were fungible, and as we noted above,
benefited industry equally--e.g., cheap power, roads, and
serviced land.
(3) These practices interacted with, and evolved from a
social structure where extensive landreforms in the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and successive agricultural
polices of the colonial government had produced an economy
dominated by prosperous small-holders. Peasant status was
acceptable, as was the tradition of working with one's hands.
But equally importantly, colonial policies which created
prosperity in agriculture, also kept much of the elite that had
some capital rural. Thus, a lower-status, excluded group with
fragmented capital entered industry; and no single group had
disproportionate control over resources or the power to influence
investment decisions unilaterally. A small-firm industrial base
evolved, where relatively skilled firm-owners, and workers with
technicians skills put in place work arrangements that over time
allowed them to economize on capital, build a plurality of
institutions and networks that gave them access to technical
feedback, information about new sources of demand, and exposure
to outside standards, while constantly encouraging the formation
of demand-response skills.
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